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Abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
Taking advantage of methodological innovations in the quantitative analysis of text 
documents, this thesis explores the role of two previously largely neglected context 
factors in research on party competition – communication platforms and electoral 
arenas. Drawing on original data sets which combine information from various plat-
forms and from different electoral arenas, the study derives and tests expectations on 
how patterns of party behaviour play out depending on the specific context in which 
they operate.  
It is argued that the incentive structure for parties and the degree to which parties can 
act in accordance with their preferred campaign strategies vary depending on the situ-
ational context. Against this background, the expectation is formulated that party be-
haviour is contingent upon the specific circumstances in which election campaigning 
takes place. More precisely, it is claimed that parties’ campaign strategies and the 
constraints they face to act in line with these strategic considerations lead to variation 
in party behaviour across different contexts.  
This thesis comprises four independent studies. Overall, these studies provide strong 
evidence for this theoretical claim. The presented findings have at least two important 
implications. First, since patterns of party competition in public campaign debates, on 
social media, and in party manifestos diverge, party competition can only be under-
stood properly based on a diverse set of communication channels. Second, the context 
sensitivity of party behaviour regarding electoral arenas implies that generalisations 
derived from a specific type of election (e.g., national elections) might lead to wrong 
conclusions for elections at other territorial levels. This implies that policy recom-
mendations to foster political competition in second-order elections derived from 
insights from first-order national elections should be made with great caution. At 
least, variation in the incentive structure of political parties should be considered. 
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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 
Parteienwettbewerb ist ein zentraler Baustein repräsentativer Demokratie 
(Schumpeter 1950). In der politikwissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit dieser The-
matik hat sich eine Reihe theoretischer Ansätze etabliert, um das Verhalten von Par-
teien in Wahlkämpfen besser verstehen und erklären zu können (u.a., Budge and 
Farlie 1983a; Downs 1957; Robertson 1976; Stokes 1963). Eine wichtige Erkenntnis 
im Zuge dieser Forschung ist, dass Parteiverhalten einer konditionalen Logik folgt. 
Demnach hängt die Relevanz unterschiedlicher Erklärungsfaktoren des Parteiverhal-
tens sowohl vom Kontext in dem Parteien interagieren als auch von individuellen 
Merkmalen einer Partei selbst ab (Strom 1990; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Auf diese 
Weise kann erklärt werden, weshalb die Logik des Parteienwettbewerbs insgesamt je 
nach Zusammensetzung des Parteiensystems sowie der institutionellen Rahmenbe-
dingungen ganz unterschiedliche Ausprägungen annehmen kann (Sartori 1976).  
Die vorliegende Dissertation thematisiert einen blinden Fleck in dieser Literatur. Die 
Konditionalität von Parteiverhalten mit Blick auf institutionelle Aspekte (z.B. Regie-
rungssysteme) und insbesondere mit Bezug auf parteispezifische Faktoren (z.B. ideo-
logische Position) war Gegenstand zahlreicher Untersuchungen. Dasselbe ist jedoch 
nicht für den Handlungskontext des Parteienwettbewerbs der Fall. Dies gilt insbeson-
dere für Varianz im Parteiverhalten über unterschiedliche Kommunikationsplattfor-
men hinweg sowie mit Bezug auf verschiedene elektorale Arenen.  
Mit Blick auf Kommunikationsplattformen basiert die politikwissenschaftliche For-
schung stark auf den Inhalten von Wahlprogrammen (Dolezal et al. 2018). Inwiefern 
die Einsichten, die auf der Grundlage dieser Datenquelle gewonnen wurden, auch für 
andere Plattformen relevant sind, ist daher eine in weiten Teilen offene Frage. Vor 
dem Hintergrund, dass die Wähler*innen Informationen zu Parteien während des 
Wahlkampfs vorrangig nicht aus Parteiprogrammen, sondern insbesondere aus Mas-
senmedien oder in jüngerer Zeit auch verstärkt aus sozialen Medien beziehen, stellt 
dies ein zentrales Forschungsproblem für die Parteienforschung dar.  
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Hinsichtlich unterschiedlicher elektoraler Arenen, zeigt sich ein ähnliches Bild. Hier 
ist die Forschung stark dominiert durch Studien basierend auf nationalen Wahlen. 
Inwiefern Parteiverhalten in Wahlkämpfen auf der subnationalen oder der europäi-
schen Ebene sich systematisch von dem unterscheidet, was in nationalen Wahlen be-
obachtet werden kann, ist ebenso noch wenig erforscht (vgl. Golder et al. 2017). Vor 
dem Hintergrund anhaltender Debatten über die geringe Relevanz und die niedrige 
Wahlbeteiligung bei Europawahlen (hierzu u.a., Follesdal and Hix 2006), ist jedoch 
auch dieser Aspekt nicht minder relevant.  
Die Arbeit leistet daher einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Kontextabhän-
gigkeit von Parteiverhalten, indem sie diese relevanten, aber bisher unterbeleuchtete 
Faktoren in den Blick nimmt. Durch die Nutzung neuer Möglichkeiten der quantitati-
ven Textanalyse (Grimmer and Stewart 2013) werden verschiedene Datenquellen 
erschlossen, ausgewertet und in Relation gesetzt. Insbesondere werden Datensätze 
erstellt, die auf Informationen aus den Seiten politischer Parteien in sozialen Medien, 
Zeitungsberichten und Wahlprogrammen basieren. Auf diese Weise kann die Arbeit 
Parteiverhalten über verschiedene Kommunikationskanäle und elektorale Arenen 
hinweg systematisch vergleichen und relevante Unterschiede im Parteienwettbewerb 
identifizieren.  
Das zentrale theoretische Argument der Arbeit ist, dass die Anreizstruktur für Partei-
en und das Ausmaß, indem Parteien in Einklang mit ihren präferierten Strategien 
agieren können, vom Handlungskontext abhängen. Es wird also angenommen, dass 
die Kampagnenstrategien selbst wie auch die Hindernisse, diese Strategien umzuset-
zen, über Handlungskontexte hinweg variieren. Je nachdem, unter welchen Umstän-
den Wahlkampf stattfindet, können Parteien andere Strategien als zur Zielerreichung 
am besten geeignet ansehen (Spoon and Klüver 2014). Genauso kann jedoch das 
Ausmaß, in dem es Parteien über unterschiedliche Handlungskontexte hinweg mög-
lich ist, diese Strategien erfolgreich umzusetzen, zu Varianz im Parteienverhalten 
führen (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Dementsprechend wird die Erwartung formu-
liert, dass Parteiverhalten von den spezifischen Umständen unter denen Wahlkampf 
stattfindet, abhängt.  
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Inwiefern ist Parteiverhalten tatsächlich abhängig vom Handlungskontext? Die vor-
liegende kumulative Dissertation präsentiert zur Beantwortung dieser Frage vier ei-
genständige Forschungsarbeiten. Jede dieser Arbeiten basiert dabei auf den obigen 
theoretischen Überlegungen und bearbeitet davon ausgehend einen spezifischen As-
pekt dieser breit angelegten Ausgangsfragestellung.  
Die erste Studie (Chapter 6) untersucht die Treiber der Politisierung des Einwande-
rungsthemas in öffentlichen Wahlkampfdebatten (Grande et al. 2018). Durch die 
Nutzung von Wahlprogrammen zur Analyse von Parteistrategien und Mediendaten 
zur Betrachtung öffentlicher Wahlkampfdebatten kann gezeigt werden, dass die Mo-
bilisierung des Themas durch rechtspopulistische Parteien maßgeblich zu dessen Po-
litisierung beiträgt. Für sozioökonomische Faktoren sowie die Mobilisierungsstrate-
gien moderater Mainstreamparteien können dagegen keine direkten Effekte auf das 
Politisierungsniveau beobachtet werden. Ebenso machen die Analysen deutlich, dass 
öffentliche Debatten dennoch oftmals auch von Mainstreamparteien der politischen 
Mitte dominiert werden. Damit leistet die Arbeit allen voran einen wichtigen Beitrag 
zur Debatte um den Zusammenhang zwischen parteipolitischen Strategien und der 
Politisierung von Themen in Wahlkampfdebatten (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; 
Kriesi et al. 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2015).  
Die zweite Studie (Chapter 7) untersucht, inwiefern Einsichten aus der Analyse direk-
ter Parteikommunikation in Wahlprogrammen auch im Kontext öffentlicher Debatten 
in Massenmedien von Relevanz sind (Schwarzbözl et al. 2018). Dabei rückt die Ar-
beit zwei zentrale Erklärungsfaktoren in der Themenschwerpunktsetzung von Partei-
en in den Fokus. Einerseits wird auf die Erwartung Bezug genommen, dass die gene-
relle Assoziation von Parteien mit bestimmten Themen, das sogenannte „issue ow-
nership“ (Budge 2015), hier eine wichtige Rolle einnimmt. Andererseits beschäftigt 
sich die Studie mit dem Argument, Parteien würden sich auf die Themen fokussieren, 
die aktuell die Agenda des Parteienwettbewerbs insgesamt bestimmen (Steenbergen 
and Scott 2004). Basierend auf Überlegungen zum Neuigkeitswert unterschiedlicher 
Partei-Themen-Verknüpfungen wird davon ausgegangen, dass beide Erklärungen im 
massenmedialen Kontext sogar von noch größerer Bedeutung sind. Trotz beträchtli-
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cher Ähnlichkeiten zwischen beiden Kommunikationsplattformen stützt ein direkter 
Vergleich beider Datenquellen diese Erwartung. Dabei wird insbesondere deutlich, 
dass gerade kleinere Parteien in den Medien hauptsächlich zu Themen zu Wort kom-
men, mit denen sie ohnehin assoziiert werden, während die Ansichten großer Parteien 
umso mehr thematisiert werden, je präsenter ein Thema insgesamt auf der Agenda ist. 
Damit ermöglicht die Studie ein besseres Verständnis der (Un-)Sichtbarkeit verschie-
dener Parteien in Wahlkampfdebatten.  
Die dritte Studie (Chapter 8) basiert auf der Annahme, dass die technologischen 
Möglichkeiten von sozialen Medien Parteien neue strategische Handlungsmöglichkei-
ten eröffnen (Schwarzbözl 2018). Insbesondere können Parteien sich dort ganz be-
sonders aus strategischen Gründen auf bestimmte Themen konzentrieren und andere 
bewusst ausblenden (De Sio et al. 2018). Es wird erwartet, dass sich dies negativ auf 
die Diversität angesprochener Themen auswirkt. Abgeleitet aus der Salienztheorie 
des Parteienwettbewerbs (Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983a; Dolezal et al. 2014) 
wird insbesondere angenommen, dass Parteien hier allen voran auf Themen setzen, 
bei denen sie von den Wählern als kompetent eingestuft werden. In der Folge wird 
davon ausgegangen, dass Parteien verstärkt über unterschiedliche Themen sprechen, 
anstatt sich auf die gleichen Sachfragen zu konzentrieren. Um diese Erwartungen in 
vergleichender Perspektive überprüfen zu können, stützt sich die Arbeit auf eigens 
erhobene Daten zum Wahlkampfverhalten auf Twitter bei britischen Unterhauswah-
len und kombiniert diese mit Informationen aus den nationalen Wahlprogrammen der 
Parteien. Während die beobachteten Unterschiede zwischen der Kommunikation auf 
Twitter und in Parteiprogrammen hinsichtlich der Themenschwerpunktsetzung keiner 
vollständig unterschiedlichen Logik folgen, lassen sich die formulierten Erwartungen 
dennoch größtenteils bestätigen. Damit verdeutlicht die Studie, dass Kommunikati-
onsplattformen und die Möglichkeiten, die sie Parteien liefern, maßgeblich deren 
Strategiewahl und damit die Ausgestaltung des Parteienwettbewerbs beeinflusst. 
In der vierten Studie (Chapter 9) wird untersucht, inwiefern Personalisierungsstrate-
gien, die in nationalen Wahlen eine wichtige Rolle einnehmen, auch bei Wahlen zum 
Europäischen Parlament (EP) beobachtbar sind (Braun and Schwarzbözl 2019). Im 
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Gegensatz zu nationalen Wahlen, bei denen die Spitzenkandidaten der Parteien eine 
herausragende Rolle spielen (Kriesi 2012), kann gezeigt werden, dass die europäi-
schen Spitzenkandidaten durch die nationalen Parteien kaum in den Fokus gerückt 
wurden. Basierend auf eigenen Daten zur Wahlkampfkommunikation nationaler Par-
teien auf Facebook im Vorfeld der EP-Wahl 2014 macht die Studie deutlich, dass 
diese systematische Nichtbeachtung der Spitzenkandidaten auf strategische Überle-
gungen der Parteien zurückgeführt werden kann. Während die Fokussierung auf Spit-
zenkandidaten bei nationalen Wahlen für viele Parteien eine offensichtlich reizvolle 
Strategie zur Stimmenmaximierung darstellt, ist dies bei EP-Wahlen für den Großteil 
der Parteien nicht der Fall. Eine stark ausgeprägte Konzentration auf die Spitzenkan-
didaten konnte nur bei den wenigen Parteien beobachtet werden, denen einer der 
Kandidaten konkret angehörte. Damit kann die Arbeit am Beispiel der Personalisie-
rung von Wahlkampagnen zeigen, dass Parteiverhalten auch zwischen elektoralen 
Arenen aufgrund unterschiedlicher Anreizmuster deutlich variiert. Dieses Ergebnis ist 
vor allem für die anhaltenden Diskussionen zur Reform des Spitzenkandidatensys-
tems bei Europawahlen von großer Relevanz (hierzu Corbett 2014; Hobolt 2014).  
Insgesamt bestätigt die Arbeit damit die Ausgangserwartung. Der konkrete Hand-
lungskontext hat starken Einfluss auf Parteiverhalten in Wahlkämpfen. Aus diesem 
Ergebnis leiten sich allen voran zwei Implikationen ab. Erstens variiert Parteiverhal-
ten in öffentlichen Debatten, in sozialen Netzwerken und Parteiprogrammen mitunter 
erheblich. Um Parteienwettbewerb gerade in Zeiten einer zunehmenden Ausdifferen-
zierung von Kommunikationskanälen verstehen zu können, ist es notwendig, Partei-
verhalten in Zukunft noch stärker auf unterschiedlichen Kommunikationsplattformen 
zu erforschen (siehe z.B., Meyer et al. 2017). Zweitens zeigt die Analyse von Partei-
verhalten in EP-Wahlen große Differenzen zu nationalen Wahlen. Gerade Empfeh-
lungen, die darauf abzielen, Institutionen, die im nationalen Rahmen funktionieren, 
auf andere Ebenen elektoralen Wettbewerbs zu übertragen, um deren demokratische 
Qualität zu verbessern (siehe Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), sollten daher mit 
großer Vorsicht getätigt werden. Insbesondere gilt es, die strategischen Überlegungen 
von Parteien in solche Überlegungen miteinzubeziehen.   
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1. Introduction 
Party competition during elections is at the heart of democracy. This becomes most 
obvious in the work of Schumpeter (1950: 428), who puts parties’ fight for the peo-
ple’s vote at the centre of his definition of the democratic method. Following this 
notion of representative democracy, “one must first understand the political parties 
that are the foundations of the electoral process” in order to understand democratic 
elections and the role they can play to link elites and voters (Dalton 2008: 123).  
Given this relevance of party competition, it is hardly surprising that competing theo-
retical explanations of the goals parties pursue and the strategies they employ to 
achieve them were developed (see Müller and Strom 1999). This holds for various 
aspects of party behaviour in election campaigns, such as the emphasis parties put on 
different issues (Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983a), the positions they take on 
these topics (Adams et al. 2005; Downs 1957), or the degree to which they personal-
ise their campaigns (Kriesi 2012; Poguntke and Webb 2005).  
A central insight developed on the grounds of this literature is that party behaviour 
follows a conditional logic. That is, the relevance of general explanations of party 
behaviour is found to be dependent on the specific context in which a party operates 
and can play out differently depending on the characteristics of the party itself (Strom 
1990; Wagner and Meyer 2014). In this concern, studies on party behaviour provide 
evidence that broadly defined general hypotheses must be modified and put in con-
text, thus allowing more nuanced insights (e.g., Adams et al. 2006; Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen 2015).  
This doctoral thesis addresses a blind spot in this literature. The conditional effects of 
institutional aspects (e.g., regime type) and even more regarding party-specific factors 
(e.g., party ideology) have been intensely studied in existing research. However, this 
is not the case for the situational context in which parties operate. This holds in par-
ticular for the different communication platforms on which parties compete and for 
the variation across electoral arenas. Regarding communication platforms, existing 
knowledge is strongly based on manifesto research (see Dolezal et al. 2018). This 
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begs the question of how insights gained from the study of these documents can be 
used to draw conclusions about party behaviour on other platforms. This shortcoming 
is even amplified by an increase in the diversity of communication channels driven by 
the rise of campaigning via social media for instance (Jungherr 2016; Kreiss 2016a). 
Turning to electoral arenas, research is dominated by studies on national election 
campaigns. Whether party behaviour follows a similar logic in subnational and Euro-
pean elections is widely unexplored as well (see Golder et al. 2017). However, given 
the deficits in the electoral connection between parties and voters, especially at the 
European level (Follesdal and Hix 2006), this aspect is also highly relevant.  
It is argued that a main reason for this bias is a lack of suitable data. As demonstrated 
by Budge (2015), data availability and theoretical progress in research on party com-
petition have co-evolved. Existing theoretical accounts guide large-scale projects of 
data generation. This makes a specific type of data available which, in turn, guides 
further theoretical developments. The literature on party behaviour is strongly influ-
enced by salience theory (e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983a), which inspired issue empha-
sis-based codings of party manifestos at national elections, especially in the Manifes-
to Project (MARPOR) (Budge 2015; Lehmann et al. 2017). As a result, studies on 
party behaviour are often based on election manifestos at the national level and on 
party-specific moderating factors available within this data, while variation regarding 
situational context factors has received much less systematic attention.  
Against this background, this thesis contributes to shifting the boundaries in the 
knowledge of the context sensitivity of party behaviour. Taking advantage of meth-
odological innovations in the quantitative analysis of text documents (Grimmer and 
Stewart 2013), the thesis systematically explores variation in party behaviour across 
communication platforms and electoral arenas. Drawing on original data sets which 
combine information from different sources like parties’ social media accounts, party 
manifestos, and newspaper reports at the time of elections in different arenas, the 
study derives and tests expectations on how well-known patterns of party behaviour 
play out differently, depending on the context in which parties operate.  
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The thesis argues that the incentive structure for parties and the degree to which par-
ties can act in accordance to their preferred campaign strategies both vary depending 
on the situational context in which they operate. Against this background, the expec-
tation is formulated that party behaviour is contingent upon the specific circumstanc-
es in which election campaigning takes place. More precisely, it is claimed that par-
ties’ campaign strategies and the constraints they face to act in line with these strate-
gic considerations lead to variation in party behaviour across contexts. Depending on 
the specific circumstances of election campaigning, parties might consider different 
strategies to fit best with their goals and alter their behaviour accordingly (Spoon and 
Klüver 2014). Similarly, the degree to which parties can act in line with their strategic 
considerations is also expected to lead to variation in observable campaigning behav-
iour (Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  
To what degree does party behaviour depend on situational context factors? The the-
sis presents four independent studies, each related to the general theoretical argument 
outlined above, and each approaching this broadly stated research question from a 
different angle. Focussing on immigration issues, the first study (Chapter 6) shows 
that conflict surrounding this topic follows a political logic and cannot be attributed 
to objective pressures such as unemployment rates in a country (Grande et al. 2018). 
The study innovates from existing research in this field by combining different data 
sources. Specifically, it builds on an original approach to measure parties’ issue en-
trepreneurial strategies on immigration issues in election manifestos and links this 
data directly to the level of politicisation on the topic in public campaign debates as 
covered by the mass media. On the one hand, it shows that the issue entrepreneurship 
of radical right populist parties plays a crucial role in explaining variation in the polit-
icisation of immigration in campaign debates. On the other hand, it reveals that such 
debates are nevertheless frequently dominated by mainstream parties. This allows for 
disentangling existing findings on parties’ strategic efforts and the dynamics of polit-
ical conflict in the context of public campaign debates (see Green-Pedersen and Otjes 
2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2015). This contributes to a better under-
standing of the relationship between the two.  
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The second study (Chapter 7) examines how two important drivers of issue salience 
in direct party communication – issue ownership and systemic salience – play out in 
public campaign debates (Schwarzbözl et al. 2018). Based on considerations about 
the news value of specific party-issue associations, both relationships are expected to 
be particularly important in mediated campaign debates. Despite substantial similari-
ties in party-issue linkages across platforms, a comparison of manifesto and newspa-
per content reveals evidence for this claim. In particular, smaller parties are found to 
be hardly covered in the news on issues they do not own, while larger parties are es-
pecially present on salient topics. Since research on party behaviour has largely fo-
cused on the drivers of issue salience in direct party communication, these findings 
enhance our understanding of party-issue linkages in mediated environments, from 
which most voters get their information about parties and their issue positions. 
The third study (Chapter 8) is based on the assumption that the technological oppor-
tunities social media websites offer parties allow them to strongly focus on issues for 
strategic reasons (Schwarzbözl 2018). It is expected that this leads to a lower diversi-
ty in the issues addressed by a given party. Specifically, parties are expected to focus 
on issues they own. Consequently, the degree to which parties talk about the same 
issues is assumed to be rather low on these platforms. In order to test these expecta-
tions from a comparative perspective, the study relies on original data of party com-
munication on Twitter in combination with information from party manifestos. Over-
all, the analysis provides support for these theoretical expectations. These findings 
suggest that the technological opportunities of social media enable political parties to 
strategically interact with competitors, the media and potential voters. This makes 
such platforms especially relevant for small parties with fewer resources and less 
agenda setting power in public campaign debates. 
The fourth study (Chapter 9) explores personalisation strategies in elections to the 
European Parliament (EP) (Braun and Schwarzbözl 2019). Unlike in national elec-
tions, it is argued that EP elections do not provide incentives for strategically acting 
political parties to centre their campaigns on lead candidates. Here, data on cam-
paigning for EP elections is collected and analysed to put these findings in compari-
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son with research which shows significant personalisation efforts in national cam-
paigns (see Kriesi 2012). The analysis reveals that party strategies vary strongly de-
pending on electoral arenas because personalisation centred on lead candidates – a 
strongly employed campaign strategy in national election campaigns – is largely ab-
sent in party communication at EP elections. This finding is important because it 
demonstrates that institutions such as the Spitzenkandidaten, which work at one terri-
torial level of party competition, do not automatically function in a similar way on 
another level.  
In sum, this research confirms that party behaviour depends on the situational context 
in which parties operate. This finding has at least two important implications. First, 
party competition can only be understood properly on the basis of a diverse set of 
communication channels. Party manifestos are an invaluable source for studying par-
ty competition across countries and over large time periods. Nevertheless, results 
gained from this data source have their limitations. Patterns of party competition in 
public campaign debates are found to deviate from what is observed in manifesto 
content, especially because the mass media constrains strategic party behaviour. By 
contrast, party communication on social media follows a different logic because it 
expands the strategic opportunities of parties. In this regard, the rise of such websites 
particularly strengthens smaller and newer political parties, which often struggle to 
gain visibility in mediated campaign debates dominated by established mainstream 
parties. Such developments can only be captured by exploiting a variety of data 
sources and relating them to each other. 
Second, the context sensitivity of party behaviour regarding electoral arenas implies 
that generalisations derived from a specific type of election (e.g., national elections) 
might lead to wrong conclusions for elections at other territorial levels. The findings 
presented in this thesis indicate that the major shortcomings in introducing lead can-
didates in EP elections are due to a lack of incentives for parties to push these candi-
dates in such elections and make them visible to voters. Unlike national elections, EP 
elections hardly provide incentives for strategically acting parties to do so. This im-
plies that policy recommendations to foster political competition and turnout at sec-
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ond-order elections at the subnational or European level derived from insights from 
first-order national elections should be made with great caution. These differences 
invite future research which combines and compares party behaviour across electoral 
arenas.  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Part A continues with a system-
atic review of the literature on the conditionality of explanations of party behaviour, 
which outlines the research gap addressed above in more detail (Chapter 2). Based on 
these insights, general theoretical and methodological considerations to tackle these 
gaps are presented. In Chapter 3, a theoretical argument for the context sensitivity of 
party behaviour is developed. Chapter 4 then discusses the methodological implica-
tions to test this argument. In a next step, the four independent studies and their spe-
cific contributions as well as an outlook for future research are laid out (Chapter 5). 
In Part B of the thesis, these four studies are presented.  
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2. State of Research 
Much research is devoted to understanding party competition and the behaviour of 
parties, especially at the time of elections. The following review of this literature 
serves two goals: On the one hand, it illustrates that research has developed influen-
tial theoretical explanations on various aspects of party behaviour; on the other hand, 
it highlights factors, which affect the degree to which many of these explanations 
apply to. Concerning the latter point, it stresses that some aspects of the conditionali-
ty of party behaviour received much attention, while others, especially the role of 
communication platforms and electoral arenas, were hardly addressed systematically 
so far. In this regard, the discussion uncovers important unanswered questions about 
how parties compete under varying circumstances. 
Initially, three clarifications about the focus of this review are necessary. First, it 
must be emphasised that party behaviour is a multi-facetted phenomenon. Approach-
es on the subject therefore focus on a broad range of different aspects. Within this 
field, attempts to conceptualise and explain the positions parties take and the salience 
they attribute to different policy-related issues, are most prominent. However, there is 
also a strong trend to go “beyond positions and saliencies” in research on party com-
petition (Dolezal et al. 2018: 242), which is accompanied by a growing body of litera-
ture covering additional aspects of party behaviour like personalisation (Dolezal et al. 
2018; Kriesi 2012), negative campaigning (Lau and Pomper 2004), the employment 
of emotions (Soroka 2014; Westen 2008), the use of populist rhetoric (Engesser et al. 
2017; Kriesi 2014) or the framing of issues and positions (Diez Medrano 2003) in 
election campaigns. In the following, only three aspects of party behaviour are sys-
tematically discussed: issue salience, position taking and personalisation.  
All three aspects are of particular relevance, because they are inherently related to 
intense debates about the quality of the electoral connection in representative democ-
racies. Democratic representation requires political parties to provide competing posi-
tions on relevant issues (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]). This makes salience and posi-
tion as well as the interaction between the two so important (Hutter et al. 2016; Kriesi 
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et al. 2008; Meguid 2005). If the positions offered by parties do not match with vot-
ers’ preferences, one can hardly speak of a functioning electoral connection 
(Carrubba 2001). Likewise, if parties simply ignore relevant issues, voters do not 
know to which party their own position fits best and cannot vote accordingly 
(Follesdal and Hix 2006). Personalisation is crucial in this respect, too. Scholars ar-
gue that issue-centred debates are increasingly replaced by personalised campaign 
communication. Almost 20 years ago, Farrell and Webb (2002: 132) already claimed 
that the professionalisation of parties has led to thematic changes in their campaign 
focus in the sense that “image and style [are] increasingly pushing policies and sub-
stance aside”. Since recent technological innovations in campaign communication, 
such as the use of social media as platforms of party communication, are expected to 
even amplified this trend (see Enli and Skogerbø 2013), this aspect of party behaviour 
is examined in this review as well.  
Second, the review is solely concerned with party competition in election campaigns. 
Campaigns in general can be understood as “the period right before citizens make a 
real political choice” (Brady et al. 2006: 2). Consequently, aspects of party competi-
tion between consecutive election campaigns are left aside (see Benoit and Laver 
2006: 37). Moreover, the review concentrates exclusively on party behaviour in elec-
toral arenas and does not explicitly deal with party behaviour in other arenas like pub-
lic debates (Grande and Hutter 2016), the arena of protest politics (Hutter 2014) or 
the parliamentary arena (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Rauh 2015). 
Third, this review is only concerned with the horizontal dimension of party competi-
tion. Aspects, which comprise to the vertical dimension of party competition like par-
ties’ relationship vis à vis the state and the society (see Mair 1994) as well as ques-
tions of their internal organisational structure (see Beyme 1984) are not explored as 
dependent variables.  
The review starts with a discussion of crucial assumptions about the goals of political 
parties in election campaigns and how their behaviour is affected by strategic choices 
on the one hand and the constraints imposed on parties’ strategic manoeuvrability on 
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the other hand. Against this background, specific explanations for different aspects of 
party behaviour are subsequently reported. These discussions are particularly con-
cerned with questions on the conditionality of explanations of party behaviour within 
the existing literature. Based on these considerations, the role of situational context 
conditions is presented as an important research gap the thesis aims to tackle.  
 
2.1. Core Assumptions: Goals, Strategies and Constraints 
There are three crucial assumptions in the literature on party behaviour which serve 
as a point of departure for most theoretical explanations of party behaviour (Strom 
and Müller 1999). First, parties are expected to have clear and distinguishable goals 
(Strom 1990). Second, they are assumed to take strategic actions designed to reach 
their desired goals (Downs 1957). Third, the degree to which parties are able to act in 
line with their initial strategies is supposed to be constrained by internal and external 
factors (Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  
 
2.1.1. Parties as Goal-Oriented Actors 
The assumption that parties are purposeful actors is already present in Max Weber’s 
classical definition of political parties. As highlighted by Weber Weber (1922), par-
ties serve the goal to create objective and ideational advantages for its leaders and 
members. This notion of parties serving their leaders, members and activists to reach 
certain goals is broadly shared among the contemporary literature on party behaviour 
(for a detailed discussion, see Strom and Müller 1999). Concerning the specific goals 
that parties aim for, different and partly competing goals have been identified, how-
ever. In their systematic review of party goals, Strom and Müller (1999: 5-9) find 
three distinct goals: vote-seeking, office-seeking, policy-seeking. A fourth goal - cohe-
sion-seeking - is identified by Steenbergen and Scott (2004).  
First, following Downs (1957), parties can be assumed to be primarily vote-seeking. 
Downs (1957) defines parties as teams of individuals who want to win as many votes 
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as they can at electoral contests (see also Adams et al. 2005). This does not imply that 
other goals do not exist, but they are clearly seen as subordinate.  
Second, a contrasting view is formulated by Riker (1962), who claims that parties are 
primarily office-seeking, which means that they are less interested in maximising their 
vote share but in simply winning an election. The difference between the assumption 
of parties primarily seeking for office instead of seeking for votes is particularly rele-
vant in multiparty contexts with coalition bargains in the aftermath of an election 
(Strom 1990). In party systems where governments regularly develop out of coalition 
bargains between parties, winning most votes in an election does not automatically 
imply that a party will be part of the government and hold political offices (see 
Steenbergen and Scott 2004: 168). Confrontations with potential coalition partners 
during the election campaign can create unbridgeable differences and therefore di-
minish a parties coalition potential (Green-Pedersen 2012). Parties assuming such 
risks are therefore likely to behave differently than parties which solely try to maxim-
ise their vote share.  
Third, parties are assumed to be policy-seeking. Following this view, which is partic-
ularly present in coalition theories, parties are expected to maximise their influence 
on the shape of public policy rather than being interested in maximizing votes or 
gaining office (see Strom 1990: 567). However, it must be noted that policy-seeking 
parties must also strive for government, as “elective office is taken to be a precondi-
tion for policy influence” (Strom 1990: 567).  
Fourth, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) argue that cohesion-seeking is a further goal of 
political parties. This assumption takes issue with the notion of parties as unitary ac-
tors. It points out that parties run a risk of internal divisions, when issues are debated 
on which their members hold highly contrasting positions. As Steenbergen and Scott 
(2004: 169) put it: “Electoral success and office-holding have little meaning if a party 
is about to fall apart”.  
This outline of party goals shows that theories of party behaviour can take different 
starting points regarding the specific goal parties are assumed to pursue. Moreover, it 
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demonstrates that there exist contrasting views on the relevance of each of these 
goals. Therefore, an important question concerns potential trade-offs between reach-
ing certain goals and how parties balance them (Strom 1990; Strom and Müller 
1999). This is why parties are often seen as “seekers of multiple goals” (Steenbergen 
and Scott 2004: 167). Nevertheless, the assumption of vote-seeking parties is by far 
to most prominent point of departure in explanations of party behaviour (see Benoit 
and Laver 2006: 38).  
Especially when it comes to the conditionality of existing explanations of party be-
haviour, particular attention must be given to the underlying motivations of political 
parties. On the one hand, different types of parties might handle potential trade-offs 
between these goals differently. As argued by Ferland (2018: 2) for instance, main-
stream parties are more likely to follow a vote-seeking perspective, while policy-
seeking motivations are more pronounced for niche-parties. On the other hand, the 
relevance of individual party goals might vary depending context conditions. As ar-
gued by Spoon and Klüver (2014: 50), office-seeking motivations are less important 
at these contests in EP elections as compared to national elections, because “EP elec-
tions continue to only decide the composition of the Parliament without being con-
nected to the distribution of executive office positions”. Thus, both arguments have 
consequences regarding the relevance of general explanations of party behaviour de-
pending on the specific circumstances under which parties operate. Consequently, 
considerations about the assumed goals of parties in different theoretical accounts of 
party behaviour are emphasised in subsequent discussions.  
 
2.1.2. Parties as Strategic but Constrained Actors 
The idea that parties take strategic action to achieve their goals is another baseline 
assumption of most theoretical explanations of party behaviour. In terms of election 
campaigning, party strategy can be defined as a plan that “sets out party objectives, 
identifies target voters, establishes the battleground issues, and generally lays the 
framework within which campaign communications are constructed” (Norris et al. 
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1999: 54).1 This implies that parties are assumed to have clear visions on how they 
intend to act throughout an election campaign already at the beginning of such a 
phase. It does not imply that a party is also able to act in accordance to this plan, 
however. By contrast, the assumption that the space for parties to act strategically is 
restricted and that parties are constrained in their strategic manoeuvrability by vari-
ous factors, figures equally prominent in the literature.  
Both premises were already put forward by Anthony Downs in his theory of econom-
ic voting. Following Downs (1957: 28), political parties are strategic actors in the 
sense that “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elec-
tions to formulate policies”. That is, parties formulate policies which allow them to 
position themselves in a way that maximises their vote share. However, this premise 
does not allow concluding that parties are likely to radically switch their position on 
single policies or change their overall ideology within short time periods. In order to 
win votes, parties also need to be reliable and responsible in the sense that the claims 
and pledges they make in the past must be in line with their subsequent actions (see 
Downs 1957: 107). Thus, there exists a potential trade-off between strategic reposi-
tioning and ideological coherence. 
Theoretical accounts of party competition have different expectations about the rele-
vance that each of these two factors play for party behaviour, however. As shown 
above, Downs explicitly gives preference to strategy over constraints like ideology or 
a party’s historical legacy. While he acknowledges that the degree to which a party 
can act strategically and adapt its policy positions in order to appeal to voters at the 
time of an election, he conceives ideology only as a “means to gaining office” as it 
provides voters a shortcut to parties’ policy positions (Downs 1957: 111). Thus, de-
spite a potential trade-off between ideological coherence on the one hand and strate-
 
1 Whether the strategies employed by political parties are expected to be optimal choices must be dis-
tinguished from the question what strategies parties choose, because it strongly depends on assump-
tions about their knowledge and their rationality (Benoit and Laver 2006). As this study is not con-
cerned with the question whether or not a strategy actually was successful in the sense that it maximis-
es a party’s goal attainment (see Norris et al. 1999), but only with the question of how parties behave, 
different points of view about the knowledge and the assumed rationality of parties are not discussed in 
this section.  
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gic efforts to maximise votes on the other hand, this perspective on party behaviour 
suggests a substantial strategic leverage. Vote-seeking parties are expected to strate-
gically re-position themselves to appeal to the median voter. Factors that might con-
strain the degree to which parties can take such action are present as well in the work 
of Downs (1957), but only play a subordinate role. 
The idea of parties acting strategically is widely accepted by scholars of party compe-
tition. Yet, the size of the space that parties possess to maneuver strategically is often 
assumed to be considerably smaller than suggested by the Downsian model of party 
competition for at least two different reasons. On the one hand, this is because strate-
gically acting parties are expected to behave rather differently. Downs (1957) main-
tains that parties have almost perfect information about the positions of voters. Con-
sequently, he claims that strategically acting parties will quickly adapt their own posi-
tions according to perceived attitudinal changes among the electorate. Scholars who 
assume the information of parties about the positions of voters to be severely limited, 
come to a different expectation about how strategically acting parties behave. Under 
such circumstances, parties are expected to only incrementally change their position. 
Due to incomplete information about how the electorates’ position has shifted, they 
fear to loose voters who supported them in previous elections by moving into the 
wrong direction (Benoit and Laver 2006). On the other hand, irrespective of the in-
formation parties are assumed to posit, scholars highlight that the constraints under 
which political parties try to act strategically to reach their goals are much more pow-
erful than assumed by Downs (1957). In addition to explanations of parties’ initial 
campaign strategies, the literature has identified a number of factors that impose se-
vere constraints on the degree to which parties can act strategically. This includes the 
actions of other political parties (Steenbergen and Scott 2004), the role of the media 
(Merz 2017), a party’s historical legacy (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002; 
Tavits 2007) or its internal organisational structure (Meyer and Wagner 2016).  
These contrasting assumptions about the relevance of strategic considerations on the 
one hand and factors constraining the degree to which parties can take strategic ac-
tions on the other hand, allow concluding that a systematic investigation of party be-
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haviour needs to take both aspects into account. Moreover, it is likely that both fac-
tors are not equally relevant for all types of parties and under all circumstances. 
Therefore, the notion of parties as strategic actors which try to reach their desired 
goals as well as the insight that their manoeuvrability might be constrained will be 
discussed in detail for various aspects of party behaviour in the subsequent sections.  
 
2.2. Explaining Party Behaviour – Salience, Positions and Personalisation  
To systematically discuss theoretical accounts and central empirical findings, each of 
the following sections deals with a specific aspect of party behaviour, important ex-
planations in each domain and the role of conditionality in this regard. That is, studies 
on party behaviour are discussed separately, depending on the specific dependent 
variable they focus on.  
This procedure is justified against the background of findings from research which 
explicitly deal with different aspects of party behaviour (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; 
Harmel et al. 2018; Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter et al. 
2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008; Meguid 2005, 2008; Meijers 2017). This 
literature shows that different aspects of party competition are often only weakly re-
lated to each other and can follow distinct logics (see Hutter et al. 2016). Salience and 
position for instance follow different patterns as shown by Dolezal and Hellström 
(2016) for European integration issues. In addition, the role of strategic considera-
tions is likely to vary, depending on the aspect of party behaviour under considera-
tion. For instance, Harmel et al. (2018: 284), assume that parties are much more like-
ly to change the emphasis on an issue than the position they take on it. 
A separate discussion of different aspects of party competition acknowledges the idi-
osyncrasies of different aspects of party behaviour. Moreover, such a strategy allows 
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discussing the different logics they follow, and the specific theoretical explanations 
designed to explain them.2  
 
2.2.1. Issue Salience 
In democratic theory, it is commonly assumed that voters have preferences on poli-
cies and vote accordingly (Achen and Bartels 2016: 1). For this linkage between the 
electorate and their representatives to work, political parties must provide competing 
positions on relevant issues. Only if voters are offered a choice between parties with 
different sets of positions on policies that figure prominently on their minds, they can 
decide who represents their own stances best (Kaplan et al. 2006; Sides 2006; 
Sigelman and Buell 2004).  
Consequently, the decisions of political parties, as the most important political actors 
in contemporary democracies to promote or downplay specific issues are crucial, be-
cause they actively define the policy-related issues over which political competition 
takes place (Green-Pedersen 2007a; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hutter et al. 2016; 
Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008; Spoon et al. 2014). This aspect of party competi-
tion is commonly referred to as issue salience. Theoretical considerations about its 
drivers are particularly important, because they come to strongly diverging expecta-
tions about the shape and the dynamic of issue agendas in election campaigns. In the 
following, four types of explanations are discussed: Salience theory and issue owner-
ship, agenda setting dynamics, internal dissent and public opinion.  
 
Salience theory and issue ownership 
Studying the decisions of individual political parties on what to talk about in election 
campaigns, one of the central assumptions is that “parties emphasise certain issues to 
 
2 This separate discussion of different aspects of party behaviour does not contradict the idea that some 
theoretical accounts allow formulating expectations on more than one of these phenomena. In the re-
minder of this chapter theories of party behaviour are not exclusively discussed within one domain of 
party behaviour. If a theory derives expectations about more than one domain of party behaviour, it is 
discussed at several points in the following discussion.  
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gain an electoral advantage” (Spoon et al. 2014: 365). This point of view is most ex-
plicitly stated in salience theory of party competition (Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 
1983a, 1983b; Budge et al. 2001; Robertson 1976). On the one hand, this idea is de-
rived from a radical conception of the role of policy issues in party competition. In 
Stokes (1963) valence model, it is assumed that there are not only positional issues, 
but also valence issues. These are defined as relevant but uncontroversial topics. 
While Stokes (1963: 373) states that it is an empirical question what character an is-
sue has that cannot be answered a priori be at a theoretical basis, salience theory as-
sumes that parties hardly hold different positions on political issues (see Dolezal et al. 
2014: 62). Consequently, “[v]arying emphases on issues are by and large the only 
way that parties express their policy differences” (Budge et al. 2001: 82). On the oth-
er hand, it is based on an understanding of voting behaviour that puts great weight on 
the perceived competence of parties as an explanation for individual vote choice 
(Bélanger and Meguid 2008). This makes highlighting issues where a party is per-
ceived as more competent than its competitors an electorally viable strategy (Thesen 
et al. 2017). 
Based on these considerations, salience theory makes two important predictions about 
the behaviour of individual parties and the structure of issue competition.3 First, the 
theory expects that parties will strategically highlight issues they own (Budge 2015; 
Budge and Farlie 1983a; Dolezal et al. 2014). Issue ownership can be understood as a 
long-term reputation in dealing with policy-related issues (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et 
al. 2003). If voters chose a party on the grounds of their perceived competence on 
issues discussed in political debates or the degree to which a party is generally asso-
ciated with that issue (Walgrave et al. 2012), emphasizing such owned issues is likely 
to enhance a party’s vote share (Green and Hobolt 2008: 462). Therefore, salience 
theory expects that parties strategically highlight topics they own to seek an electoral 
advantage over their competitors. As the ownership of an issue, especially in the as-
sociative dimension of the concept, is assumed to be rather stable over time, the sali-
 
3 As shown by Dolezal (2014), additional expectations can be derived from salience theory. However, 
as these implications of the theory are not primarily concerned with explaining issue salience, they are 
not discussed here.  
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ence different parties put on an issue is also expected to be characterised by temporal 
stability (Budge 2015; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). This is particularly the 
case because salience theory does not expect parties’ salience strategies to be strongly 
affected by the actions of their competitors and what issues they emphasise 
(Robertson 1976). It is therefore concluded that parties, which are associated with an 
issue, like green parties with the environment (Wagner and Meyer 2014) or populist 
right-wing parties with law and order issues (Smith 2010), constantly highlight such 
topics over consecutive election campaigns. 
Second, resulting from of this behaviour, party competition is expected to be charac-
terised by an absence of confrontational debates about substantive issues. Rather, 
parties are assumed to largely talk past each other instead of engaging in meaningful 
dialogue (see Sigelman and Buell 2004: 651). If parties selectively address primarily 
issues on which they have a comparative advantage, issue convergence, defined as 
the degree to which parties talk about the same set of topics, is expected to be ex-
tremely low (Sigelman and Buell 2004: 651). Of course, this expectation about party 
behaviour stands in sharp contrast to the idea outlined in normative models of demo-
cratic representation that parties need to provide competing positions on substantial 
political issues in order to give voters the chance to choose between real alternatives 
at an election (see Kaplan et al. 2006: 724).  
Both implications of the theory have been studied extensively in empirical research. 
Findings show that the expectation about parties largely talking past each other must 
be strongly qualified. Scholars focusing on the degree to which parties address the 
same issues in election campaigns find notably high levels of convergence. This 
holds for presidential elections (Damore 2004; Dolezal et al. 2014; Kaplan et al. 
2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004) as well as for elections in a multi-party context 
(Dolezal et al. 2014; Meyer and Wagner 2016). Hence, completely in contrast to the 
expectation derived from salience theory, parties tend to a large degree to address 
issues that their competitors talk about as well.  
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Nevertheless, at the level of individual parties, there is strong evidence for the issue 
ownership hypothesis. This holds true for the “competence-based” and the “associa-
tive” dimension of the concept (Walgrave et al. 2012). While, Klüver and Sagarzazu 
(2016) cannot confirm the issue ownership hypothesis in their analysis of press re-
leases in Germany, Dolezal et al. (2014) find a positive association between the sali-
ence of an issue for political parties in Austria and the degree to which they are per-
ceived as most competent in dealing with the problem by voters. Similarly, Wagner 
and Meyer (2014: 1028) show for a much broader set of parties and elections that 
parties focus much more on issues on which they are generally associated with in 
their party manifestos. In addition, also on line with the issue ownership hypothesis, 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015) find that parties have long-term relationships 
with specific issues in the sense that they tend to emphasise issues disproportionally 
high over consecutive elections.  
Despite these positive findings, another important qualification concerning the issue 
ownership hypothesis must be considered. Specifically, scholars have presented ar-
guments, why issue ownership effects are likely to be less relevant for the most im-
portant actors: large mainstream parties. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015: 751) 
argue that mainstream parties “need to be closely aligned with the broader party sys-
tem agenda to maintain their pivotal role and support in the electorate”. Consequent-
ly, mainstream parties cannot simply rely on their owned issues and constantly ad-
dress them during election campaigns when voters, parties or the media bring other 
topics to the fore. Wagner and Meyer (2014) propose an additional mechanism which 
fosters such differences between large mainstream parties and other actors in the par-
ty system. According to their argument, it is only resource rich parties which have the 
possibility to address a broad range of issues. While “it makes electoral sense to ad-
dress the issues that are currently of concern to voters […], only parties with enough 
resources may in fact be able to do so without sacrificing emphasis on their ‘core’ 
issues” (Wagner and Meyer 2014: 1022). In this understanding, smaller parties with 
fewer resources are bound to their “owned” issues, while large mainstream parties 
can cover the full range of topics discussed in an election campaign.  
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Even if the causal mechanisms behind the two arguments differ, they both lead to the 
same conclusion: Issue ownership should play only a limited role for large main-
stream parties. Given that these parties are by far the most visible actors in campaign 
debates, this would strongly limit the relevance of the issue ownership hypothesis.  
While Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015) provide no direct empirical test for this 
expectation, Wagner and Meyer (2014) report that the effect of issue ownership on 
issue salience is in fact conditional upon party characteristics. Both, a party’s man-
power and a party’s vote share are found to have a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between issue ownership and issue salience. In their model, a vote share 
half the standard deviation below the mean vote share (6 percent of the votes) is ac-
companied by an increase in issue salience by 93 percent, while this effect for parties 
half the standard deviation above the mean vote share (35 percent of the votes) only 
leads to an increase of 35 percent (see Wagner and Meyer 2014: 1032). 
 
Agenda setting dynamics 
Notwithstanding that parties strategically and selectively focus on advantageous is-
sues, as expected by salience theory and the issue ownership hypothesis, the agenda-
setting literature (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; McCombs 2004; Norris et al. 
1999) allows proposing an alternative explanation for issue salience at the party level. 
This literature conceives party behaviour as a game of strategic interaction (see 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010: 261). Following this understanding, issue com-
petition, understood as “party competition on which issues should dominate the party 
political agenda”, is put centre stage (Green-Pedersen 2007b: 607). On the one hand, 
parties are expected to actively trying to shape the “party system agenda”; on the oth-
er hand, they also have to take the current agenda as given (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010). Accordingly, despite potential negative electoral consequences, 
parties may be forced to take part in publicly debating an issue due to systemic pres-
sures resulting from the dynamic nature of party competition in election campaigns.  
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This approach qualifies the argument of salience theory and the issue ownership hy-
pothesis by adding that parties are not always equally successful at strategically em-
phasizing their preferred issues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015, 2010; 
Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Parties face a decision between simply ignoring un-
pleasant issues and responding to them, whilst simultaneously trying to shape the 
agenda according to their own preferences. When the latter is not feasible, parties are 
likely to address issues that other parties put forward or that figure prominently in the 
media (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). Hence, parties cannot always choose 
freely which issues to highlight or downplay. Rather, the agenda-setting approach 
highlights that “a party’s issue strategies are constrained and influenced by the activi-
ties of other political parties” (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015: 748). 
Empirical studies on individual party behaviour provide strong evidence for the idea 
of parties addressing issues that their competitors put on the agenda (e.g., Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Hoeglinger 2015; Meyer and Wagner 2016; Spoon 
2012; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Tresch et al. 2018). Together with the observation 
of high levels of issue convergence at the party system level (Damore 2004; Dolezal 
et al. 2014; Kaplan et al. 2006; Sides 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004), there exists a 
large consensus that parties’ strategic choices of issue (de-)emphasis are constrained 
by the behaviour of their competitors.  
However, research also provides evidence that such systemic pressures are not equal-
ly relevant for all parties. In this regard, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015: 751) 
argue that mainstream parties “need to be closely aligned with the broader party sys-
tem agenda to maintain their pivotal role and support in the electorate”. It is therefore 
expected that these parties are more sensitive to the party system agenda than other 
parties, especially niche parties. In a similar vein, Meyer and Wagner (2016) claim 
that resource strong parties are especially likely to engage in campaign dialogue. 
Here, the argument is that these parties are able to maintain a broad issue portfolio 
since they can rely on experts on various domains, whereas small parties with scarce 
resources my struggle to do so (see Meyer and Wagner 2016: 559). Focussing on var-
iation in the responsiveness between different types of mainstream parties, Van de 
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Wardt (2015) additionally formulates the expectation that it is mainstream parties in 
opposition take more risks and therefore are more likely to respond to the issues ad-
dressed by niche parties than mainstream parties in government. 
For the case of parties in Denmark, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015) confirm 
the expectation that large mainstream parties are more responsive to issues that figure 
prominently on the party system agenda in their manifestos than other parties. Simi-
larly, focusing on the content of party press releases in Austria, Meyer and Wagner 
(2016) demonstrate that resource strong parties are in fact far more likely to rely on 
issue engagement in their campaign communications. Moreover, Van de Wardt 
(2015) finds evidence that mainstream parties in government are especially respon-
sive to the topics brought up by their niche party competitors.  
These findings are important because they indicate that not all observed behaviour of 
political parties during an election campaign should be attributed to their initial stra-
tegic considerations designed to reach a pre-defined goal. Especially when it comes to 
the salience of an issue, systemic pressures to address a topic, which are beyond the 
control of individual parties, should not be underestimated (Steenbergen and Scott 
2004). Thus, the agenda-setting approach is well-suited to explain significant changes 
in parties’ issue attention over time especially when such a step cannot be meaning-
fully attributed to a strategy aimed at achieving a certain party goal like vote-
maximisation. Moreover, this research shows that not all parties are equally sensitive 
to the actions of their competitors when it comes to the salience they attribute to an 
issue. In particular, evidence is provided that it is mainstream parties that are respon-
sive. 
 
Internal conflicts 
Departing from the general assumption formulated by salience theory that parties 
strategically highlight preferred issues and downplay others (Budge and Farlie 
1983a), the degree of disagreement on an issue within a party is expected to affect the 
salience attributed to an issue as well. As argued by Steenbergen and Scott (2004), 
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parties are not only vote-seeking, but also cohesion-seeking actors. This notion im-
plies that parties fear debates on topics where they struggle to find a clear position. 
On the one hand, internal disagreement makes it difficult to provide a coherent and 
convincing positions to voters, which makes them less electorally attractive (see 
Edwards 2008: 60). On the other hand, debating such issues might even lead to the 
breakup of the party if internal conflicts get out of control. Hence, downplaying such 
topics is also rational from a “perspective of party maintenance” (Steenbergen and 
Scott 2004: 171). Therefore, it is often argued that the degree to which a party can 
arrive at a common position is likely to affect the emphasis it wants to devote to an 
issue (Van de Wardt 2014). From this perspective, parties are particularly likely to 
downplay issues on which they face internal disagreement (Edwards 2008; Green-
Pedersen 2012; Hellström and Blomgren 2015; Spoon 2012; Steenbergen and Scott 
2004).  
In general, this argument applies to all parties and issues. If parties face internal dis-
sent about a topic, they shy away from debates about it and focus on other issues, 
especially at the time of elections, where disunity can have negative electoral conse-
quences. Nevertheless, it is expected to be particularly relevant as an explanation of 
the behaviour of established parties on issues that cross-cut traditional lines of politi-
cal conflicts on which these parties emerged (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008). 
On such instances, internal divisions can be assumed to have structural causes leading 
not only to occasional disagreement, but to stable internal conflicts within a party 
(Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Since European integration is as an issue that does not 
align into existing lines of conflict in Western European party systems (see Hooghe et 
al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008), internal divisions are claimed to be a particularly rele-
vant explanation for variation in issue salience in this regard (Braun et al. 2016). Due 
to internal conflicts especially within mainstream parties in these countries, the politi-
cisation of the issue and therefore the choices presented to voters over the future 
course of European integration is expected to be low (Van der Eijk and Franklin 
1996). Since European policy issues do to some degree fit into the left-right line of 
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political conflict (see Hix et al. 2007), this argument should especially hold for con-
stitutive European issues (Braun et al. 2016). 
Research finds that internal dissent has a negative effect on the salience that parties 
attach to European integration (Edwards 2008; Spoon 2012; Steenbergen and Scott 
2004). However, it must be noted that Braun et al. (2016) cannot replicate this nega-
tive effect of intra-party conflict on issue salience in Euromanifestos for both, EU-
policy and constitutive issues for the parties covered by their analysis.  
 
Public opinion 
Much attention is also devoted to factors located on the demand side of politics. Vari-
ables based on the composition of the electorate, the relevance voters attribute to an 
issue and the positions they take on them are at the core of many studies on the sali-
ence strategies of political parties. In this regard, two aspects are discussed in detail: 
First, considerations that parties adapt the salience devoted to an issue in response to 
the policy positions of voters are explored. Second, the review deals with the question 
how parties react to the issue priorities of the electorate.  
Starting with voters issue positions, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) claim that parties 
are expected to strategically focus more on an issue, the better its own position fits 
with the position of the median voter and with the median party voter. Against the 
background of vote-seeking parties, such behaviour is particularly plausible, because 
emphasising issues on which a party agrees with most voters gives it a favourable 
image. The theory of issue yielding as developed by De Sio and Weber (2014) elabo-
rates this point systematically (see also De Sio et al. 2018). It argues that strategically 
acting and vote-seeking parties will particularly highlight issues which allow them to 
win new voters while keeping old ones. This is the case if a policy is supported by a 
large proportion of party voters as well as by voters from the overall electorate. If 
policies are characterised by “larger support than from the existing party base and are 
also positively associated with the party”, they speak of “bridge policies” (De Sio and 
Weber 2014: 875). These issues are particularly attractive for vote-seeking parties.  
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Turning to voters’ issue priorities, it is argued that parties “ride the wave” in the sense 
that they highlight issues that also figure prominently on the agenda of the electorate 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994: 337). Parties are expected to take cues from the 
issue priorities of the electorate in an effort to “signal responsiveness to their voters” 
(Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016: 384). Thus, in order to avoid the risk of appearing “out 
of touch” with voters (Sides 2007: 467), parties might focus an issue because it fig-
ures high on the voters’ agenda. Therefore, is it often argued that the salience parties 
devote to an issue is higher, the more important voters find it (Klüver and Sagarzazu 
2016; Spoon et al. 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014).  
In addition, it is claimed that the responsiveness of political parties to the concerns of 
voters is dependent upon party characteristics. For instance, the participation in coali-
tion governments is expected to decrease parties’ responsiveness (Klüver and Spoon 
2017). Coalition parties, defined as “parties that govern in a multiparty government 
with at least one other party” (Klüver and Spoon 2017: 794), cannot independently 
choose their policy positions but must take into account the viewpoints of other par-
ties in the cabinet. This is especially the case if these parties are assumed to be office-
seeking (Green-Pedersen 2012; Klüver and Spoon 2017). If an issue is controversial 
within the cabinet, coalition parties will ignore it as a consequence of their office-
seeking motivation (see Klüver and Spoon 2017: 796).  
Empirical research finds evidence for the effect of voters’ position on issue salience. 
Steenbergen and Scott (2004: 180) show that parties emphasise an issue more, the 
closer their own position is to the mean voter and the mean party voter. Thus, parties 
focus more on issues when the position they offer appeals to (their) voters. Moreover, 
in line with the theory of issue yielding, empirical analyses reveal strong support for 
the idea of parties strategically highlighting “bridge policies” (De Sio et al. 2018; De 
Sio and Weber 2014). Against this background, it can be concluded that parties have 
a strong preference on issues on which their own position already is close to voters’ 
attitudes. This is very much in line with the idea that adapting the salience of an issue 
is easier for a party than changing its position in case it does not fit with the elec-
torates stance on a topic (see Klingemann et al. 1994: 24).  
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Regarding the issue priorities of voters, parties are also responsive. Spoon et al. 
(2014) for instance report that the more voters find environmental issues important, 
the more parties highlight them in their manifestos. This is confirmed by Spoon and 
Klüver (2014) on broader set of topics at national elections. In addition, Klüver and 
Sagarzazu (2016) find this relationship not only during elections but also between 
consecutive campaigns. Moreover, it is shown that parties are particularly responsive 
to voters’ issue priorities on highly polarised issues. Under such a situation parties 
devote even more attention to an issue in order to communicate their position in detail 
(Spoon and Klüver 2015). Moreover, the negative moderating effect of governing in 
coalition parties on this relationship is found to be rather small (Klüver and Spoon 
2017). Given these findings, Klüver and Sagarzazu (2016: 394), conclude that “party 
issue attention can best be explained by the riding the wave theory as parties respond 
to voters’ issue priorities both during normal times of political debate but also during 
election campaigns”.4  
 
2.2.2. Position Taking 
Salience theory assumes that party competition is mostly defined by issue competi-
tion in the sense that parties hold similar positions on issues and therefore try to high-
light topics on which voters see them as more sincere or competent (Budge 2015; 
Budge and Farlie 1983a). Spatial approaches of party competition sharply differ from 
this perspective. Here, the positioning of parties in the party system is put centre 
stage. Rather than the emphasis parties put on an issue, the positions they take on a 
given set of topics are found to be crucial to understand party behaviour, vote choice 
and the quality of political representation (Adams et al. 2005; Benoit and Laver 2006; 
Downs 1957). 
Spatial models commonly assume that voters have preferences on policies and vote 
accordingly (Achen and Bartels 2016: 23). During election campaigns, parties are 
 
4 However, it must also be that this finding is not in line with research from Wagner and Meyer (2014) 
who report no systematic relationship between voters’ issue priorities and parties’ issue attention in 
their analysis of party manifestos. 
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then expected to provide policy positions so that citizens are able to choose which 
view fits best with their own stance (Manin et al. 1999). In a political space, which 
only consists of one ideological dimension, as assumed by Downs (1957), this leads 
to voters choosing the party which is closest to their ideal point on that single dimen-
sion. Moreover, parties are commonly assumed to be vote-maximising and therefore 
take positions which make them the best choice for as many voters as possible. In a 
party system with two parties, this leads to the expectation that both parties provide 
the same position, namely the position which represents the median voter (Downs 
1957). 
According to this – normatively very appealing – view on democratic elections, the 
role of political parties is crucial, because parties determine the set of positions that 
voters can choose from. If parties provide positions that fit with voters’ ideal points 
as suggested by the classical spatial approach, they are also able to successfully pro-
vide a link between citizens and the government (Adams et al. 2005; Dalton 1985). 
Following the model of “responsive party-government”, democratic elections can be 
expected to establish such a congruence between the policy positions of voters’ and 
political parties (Dalton 2008: 226). Ultimately, this should lead to government poli-
cies which fit best the preferences of most voters (see Dahl 1956: 37).  
Even for established democracies, it is debated whether parties are able to provide 
such a functioning link in election campaigns. Achen and Bartels (2016: 51) summa-
rise various critical objections in this regard and conclude that the understanding of 
democratic elections as outlined above, which they call the “folk theory of democra-
cy”, “suffers from grave logical and practical problems”. They claim that the idea of 
voters minimizing the distance between their own position and the party they intend 
to vote for, as suggested by the spatial model of party competition, is logically only 
possible under the over simplistic assumption of a unidimensional political space 
(Achen and Bartels 2016: 23-27). In addition, they argue that the effect of issue-
voting on individual vote choice is extremely low. That is, voters hardly make use of 
information on the proximity between their own positions and the positions of the 
parties running for election when casting a ballot (Achen and Bartels 2016: 41-45).  
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These objections put the idea that parties strategically position themselves in the party 
system according to the positions of voters in question. If issue-voting only plays a 
limited role, why should rational and strategically acting parties put effort in adapting 
and reformulating their positions according to changes in voters’ attitudes? These 
points of criticism towards the general logic of spatial models of party competition 
and democratic theory are well justified. However, neither the logical imperfections 
of spatial models of party competition nor the limited evidence of issue-based voting 
behaviour contradict the expectation that parties try to strategically position them-
selves. This is the case, because it is sufficient to assume that parties think that it 
might have positive effects on their performance at the polls when they appear as 
responsive.  
Against this background, analysing the drivers of party positions on policy issues is 
highly relevant. In the following, three sets of determinants of party positions that 
figure prominently in the literature on party positioning are distinguished. First, fo-
cusing on parties’ considerations to maximise votes and to win elections, their strate-
gic positioning as a response to the positions of voters is discussed. Second, ap-
proaches based on considerations of parties’ re-positioning in response to party sys-
tem change and the emergence of new competitors is examined. Third, the role of a 
party’s ideological legacy as a constraint of strategic re-positioning is explored.  
 
The positions of voters 
As argued above, a fundamental assumption in spatial theories of party competition is 
that voters have preferences on a given set of policies at the time of an election and 
choose parties which match their preferences best. Consequently, parties take posi-
tions on policies which are closest to the position of as many citizens as possible (see 
Benoit and Laver 2006: 38). This point of view corresponds with a “bottom-up” per-
spective on the elite-mass-linkage (Steenbergen et al. 2007: 14). Rather than parties 
cueing voters in the sense that the former shape the preferences of the latter (see 
Druckman et al. 2013; Zaller 1992), it is suggested that parties take up voters’ prefer-
State of Research 
29 
 
ences and take positions accordingly. If parties listen to the policy preferences of the 
electorate on a given issue and adapt their own position in response and not vice ver-
sa, one can speak of an “electoral connection” between voters and parties (Carrubba 
2001: 142). 
In this regard, it is objected that considerations on parties’ responsiveness are strong-
ly centred on their reactions to the mean or median voter (Adams et al. 2004). An 
important additional question is whether parties are responsive to attitudinal changes 
in the electorate as a whole or only to specific sub-groups. One expectation is that 
parties change their positions only when their own voters change their attitude. Ezrow 
et al. (2010: 276) therefore propose a “partisan constituency model” of party position-
ing which focuses on the mean party voter as opposed to a “general electorate model” 
which is concerned with the mean position of the overall electorate to capture both 
variants of positional responsiveness (see also Lehrer 2012). 
Which model applies to a party is expected to be highly dependent on characteristics 
of the party itself. On the one hand, it is hypothesised that the “general electorate 
model” primarily applies to mainstream parties, while the “partisan constituency 
model” explains positional shifts for niche parties. Mainstream parties are found to be 
particularly “vote-maximising” and “centre-oriented” (Ezrow et al. 2010: 278). These 
parties are assumed to strongly rely on information from polls, which makes them 
particularly responsive to the mean voter (see Ezrow et al. 2010: 278). By contrast, 
niche-parties are assumed to mainly react to shifts among their supporters. While 
shifting position generally comes with the risk of losing credibility (Tavits 2007), it is 
especially risky for niche parties. If these parties adapt their position to the mean vot-
er, they might appear less sincere in representing the frequently more extreme view-
points of their supporters. Therefore, niche-parties are expected to hesitate in their 
reactions to changes in the position of the general electorate and only adjust their po-
sitions in response to attitudinal shifts of their supporters (see Ezrow et al. 2010: 
279). More specifically, this leads to niche-parties not only ignoring shifts in the gen-
eral electorate when the electorate moves away from the party’s position (Adams et 
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al. 2006), but even to take more extreme positions when the median voter moves to-
wards them (Ferland 2018: 2). 
On the other hand, party organisation is expected to moderate the responsiveness of 
parties to voters’ attitudes (Lehrer 2012; Schumacher et al. 2013). Following 
Schumacher et al. (2013: 464), parties’ responsiveness “is contingent upon the degree 
to which leaders or activists dominate intraparty decision making”. Similar to the 
argument on the moderating effect of party type outlined above, the mechanism sup-
posed to be responsible for these differences is that party goals vary with regard to 
their organisational structure (see Lehrer 2012: 1297). With party leaders being more 
office-seeking than activists, parties dominated by the former are more responsive to 
the general electorate, because this maximises the short-term likelihood of achieving 
this goal. Consequently, “leadership-dominated parties”, where power is strongly 
centralised on party leaders, are expected to respond to the mean voter, while “activ-
ist-dominated” parties with powers decentralised and shared by many activists are 
sensitive to the position of the party supporters (Schumacher et al. 2013: 466-467).  
In addition to characteristics at the party level, electoral rules are expected to “indi-
rectly influence ideological congruence by affecting elite responsiveness” (Golder 
and Ferland 2017: 230). Two competing arguments are put forward in this regard. On 
the one hand, scholars argued that proportional systems favour positional responsive-
ness to voters’ attitudes more than majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). 
Since proportionality favours multi-party systems, it allows for more different and 
diverse viewpoints on the supply side of politics and thereby promotes elite-voter 
congruence. On the other hand, it is claimed that such systems have severe negative 
consequences. As they favour the establishment of parties with extreme positions, 
they are assumed to reduces elite-voter congruence (see Blais and Bodet 2006: 1246).  
Overall, empirical research on the nexus of public opinion and party positions pro-
vides support for the idea that parties are responsive to the electorate (Adams et al. 
2004; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow et al. 2010; Ferland 2018; Lehrer 2012; 
Schumacher et al. 2013). Moreover, it is found that differences between the electoral 
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systems concerning elite-voter responsiveness are modest (Ferland 2016; Golder and 
Stramski 2010). Nevertheless, this general insight must be strongly qualified, because 
the relationship is strongly contingent upon individual party characteristics. First, 
research find strong evidence that mainstream parties listen closely to the mean voter 
(Ezrow et al. 2010). Hence, the behaviour of these parties can be described best by 
the “general electorate model”. In contrast, the behaviour of niche-parties is found to 
be driven by shifts of their own supporters and follows the logic of the “partisan con-
stituency model” (Ezrow et al. 2010). These differences are substantial. Niche parties 
are not only found to be less responsive to the mean voter than mainstream parties; as 
pointed out by Ferland (2018: 8), these parties are even “resistant to shifts in public 
opinion. Second, there exist also striking differences in the behaviour of parties de-
pending on party organisation. “Leader-dominated” or “exclusive” parties are in fact 
more responsive to the general electorate, while “activist-dominated” parties shift 
their positions in response to changes in the attitudes of their own supporters (Lehrer 
2012; Schumacher et al. 2013). It is therefore concluded that the stronger the role of 
party activists and the policy-orientation of the party, the more it is only sensitive to 
attitudinal shifts among its supporters. In contrast, the stronger the role of party lead-
ers the more parties react to shifts of the mean voter.  
 
Mutual responsivity 
Voters’ attitudes are not the only driver of party positioning. In addition, research 
claims that parties react to their competitors as well. More precisely, parties are ex-
pected to respond to electoral gains of their competitors on the one hand and to the re-
positioning of other relevant parties in the party system on the other hand (e.g., 
Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Meijers 2017).  
First, following the idea that vote-seeking parties tend to converge in the positions 
they take, it is assumed that parties move in the same direction. That is, “if one party 
unilaterally shifts its position, the other party can be expected to shift its policies in 
the same direction in order to re-establish convergence” (Adams and Somer-Topcu 
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2009: 827-828). It is expected that this effect is particularly strong for parties with 
similar positions. One reason for this expectation is that parties’ electoral success 
most strongly depends on the positions of their most proximate competitor. Vote-
seeking parties will therefore have an explicit focus on the action of rivals which po-
sition close to themselves in the party system. Specifically, this means “that left-wing 
parties are particularly responsive to the policy shifts of other left-wing parties, while 
right-wing parties respond disproportionately to other right-wing parties”(Adams and 
Somer-Topcu 2009: 828).  
Second, the idea of parties being responsive to past election results is especially used 
as an explanation of mainstream party behaviour. It is claimed that large mainstream 
parties react to the actions of challenger parties and adjust their positions. Challenger 
parties are defined as parties which put a strong emphasis on issues that were previ-
ously rather neglected by existing parties on the one hand and the radical position 
they take on these issues on the other hand (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and de 
Vries 2015). It is assumed that the electoral success of such challengers strongly de-
pends on the actions of other parties in the party system, especially on the actions of 
mainstream parties (Meguid 2005). Mainstream parties which decide not to ignore 
them and remain silent about the issues addressed by these “issue entrepreneurs” 
(Hobolt and de Vries 2015), they can still choose between two different options. As 
suggested by Meguid (2005), mainstream parties can then either employ an accom-
modative (policy convergence) or an adversarial (policy divergence). The former 
strategy is intended to signal voters that the new “challenging the exclusivity of the 
niche party’s policy stance” (Meguid 2005: 349). The latter strategy, by contrast, 
leads to an open contest between the position of the new challenger and the main-
stream party on the issue emphasised by the newcomer. 
Both expectations are corroborated by empirical research. Studying more than 300 
elections, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) find that parties significantly adjust their 
position in the direction to which their competitors shifted in the preceding election. 
Thus, parties are found to react on each other and that these reactions show a clear 
trend of positional convergence. Moreover, it is reported that the effect of positional 
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changes is larger for parties from the same party family (Adams and Somer-Topcu 
2009). Parties are especially sensitive to positional shifts from competitors which 
hold similar positions. 
Furthermore, studies on the reactions of established parties in response to new chal-
lengers located at the fringes of the party system reveals that mainstream parties 
mostly prefer an accommodative strategy. For the issue of immigration, Van Spanje 
(2010) shows that party systems become more negative in their stance on the issue in 
response to challengers from the radical right and that this is particularly the case for 
mainstream parties. Similarly, Abou-Chadi (2016) finds evidence that mainstream 
parties develop more negative views in immigration in response the electoral gains of 
radical right parties. Moreover, Meijers (2017) finds evidence that mainstream parties 
respond to electoral gains of Eurosceptic challenger parties by taking more negative 
EU-related positions, especially when these challengers emphasise European issues.  
Taken together, this research clearly shows that parties react on each other when de-
ciding on their position on an issue. Again, however, there is much evidence that 
these general effects are the result of very sensitive mainstream parties which are 
likely to adapt their positions in response to rival parties’ policy shifts and electoral 
gains of challenger parties.  
 
Historical legacies and party ideology 
Arguments about positional shifts of political parties in response to changes in their 
environment at least implicitly assume that parties can and do strategically adapt their 
position to achieve their goals. These considerations start from the observation that 
“at almost every election, political parties change their policy position” (Schumacher 
et al. 2013: 464). However, there are good reasons to argue that parties’ are particu-
larly constrained when it comes to changing their issue positions (see Harmel et al. 
2018: 284). An explicit counter-argument to the idea of parties’ positing great space 
for strategic re-positioning and the role of contagion effects in this regard is provided 
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on the grounds of cleavage theory (see Hooghe and Marks 2018; Marks and Wilson 
2000; Marks et al. 2002). 
As argued by Marks et al. (2002: 586), cleavage theory, as formulated by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), assumes that party positions “reflect divisions in the social structure 
and the ideologies that provoke and express those group divisions". From this point of 
view, parties are not simply collective goal-oriented actors aiming to enhance their 
electoral fortunes to bring benefits to its members. Rather, parties have a historical 
legacy and are based on ideological grounds; and these ideologies “filter the response 
of parties to new issues that arise on the agenda” (Marks et al. 2002: 586). Put differ-
ently, “a political party has its own 'bounded rationality', that shapes the way in which 
it comes to terms with new challenges and uncertainties. (Marks and Wilson 2000: 
434)”.  
From this perspective, the constraints under which political parties can act strategical-
ly in order to reach goals like vote-maximisation via positional adjustments appear 
much more powerful than assumed by Downs (1957). The reason is that parties are 
embedded in a specific cleavage structure in which they emerged and developed as 
the agents of social groups. Rather than being subject to rapid changes resulting from 
strategic interaction, party positions are expected to be highly stable over time, be-
cause this legacy strongly shapes their positions and puts a constraint on strategic 
position shifting (Hooghe and Marks 2018).  
Based on this argument, the belonging to a certain party family is assumed to be a 
long-term predictor of party positions (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002). 
Hooghe and Marks (2018) claim that changes in European party systems against the 
background of rising concerns of voters on European integration and immigration 
support this idea. In this sense, changes in national party systems are the result of the 
rise of new challengers and not due to strategic re-positioning of existing parties. As 
the positions of established parties show little variation over time, they assume that 
„the positional flexibility of political parties is heavily constrained” (Hooghe and 
Marks 2018: 126).  
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It is important to note that it is difficult to bring this result in line with research show-
ing that parties are highly sensitive to shifts in public opinion for instance. This is 
even more the case since Hooghe and Marks (2018) claim that it is established main-
stream parties which do not adjust their positions. Exactly this group is found to be 
particularly responsive to the preferences of the mean voter in other research (Ezrow 
et al. 2010). One explanation could be that studies on party responsiveness strongly 
focus on economic issues and parties’ general orientation on a left-right line of politi-
cal contestation, while Hooghe and Marks (2018) explore the transnational cleavage 
by focusing on immigration and European integration. Against this background, these 
contradicting insights could be attributed to the different issues these studies focus 
on. But why should mainstream parties have difficulties to shift their position espe-
cially on these issues? Following Kerscher (2018) such an issue specific argument 
would even lead to the conclusion that the space for strategic re-positioning of estab-
lished mainstream parties is especially large when it comes to immigration and Euro-
pean integration. Since these topics are not integrated in the left-right line of political 
conflict along these parties emerged (Kriesi et al. 2008), their ideological legacy pro-
vides less guidance and constraints for “new issues”. Consequently, it is difficult to 
resolve these contradictory findings based on theoretical considerations about differ-
ences in party behaviour depending on peculiarities of individual issues. 
An “extended and dynamic” model of cleavage formation allows to bridge this gap 
between structuralist and strategic models of party positioning (Kriesi et al. 2012; 
Kriesi et al. 2008). From this perspective, the fact that parties are organisations which 
represent divisions in the social structure via their ideology does not imply that par-
ties have no space to maneuver strategically (see Grande and Kriesi 2012: 11). Ra-
ther, such a perspective on cleavage formation acknowledges the role of parties’ his-
torical legacies as they are embedded in existing cleavage structures, but also gives 
“particular weight to the strategies of political elites, their framing of issues, and their 
strategic reactions to new challengers” strategically (Grande and Kriesi 2012: 11). 
This makes the degree to which parties are able to adapt their position on an issue 
strategically in a competitive space an empirical question that depends on the specific 
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characteristics of parties and party families (Kerscher 2018). More specifically it al-
lows explaining why established parties are found to change their positions especially 
on new political issues like European integration or immigration (Kerscher 2018; 
Meijers 2017; Van Spanje 2010).  
 
2.2.3. Personalisation 
Personalisation is another crucial aspect of party behaviour. In the context of election 
campaigning, it can be understood as “a stronger focus on candidates/politicians in-
stead of parties, institutions, or issues” (Kriesi 2012: 826). Following this definition, 
the degree to which a party personalises its election campaign, is higher, the more the 
attention rests on persons instead of other potential topics (see Brettschneider 2008) 
or on the political party as a collective actor (Karvonen 2009). In addition, the litera-
ture on personalisation is also concerned with the distribution of attention over specif-
ic actors. In this regard, it is particularly interested in the degree to which the com-
munication that addresses individual politicians is concentrated on a limited number 
of very visible actors or is dispersed on a large number of different politicians (see 
Kriesi 2012: 828). Thus, two different facets of personalisation must be distinguished. 
On the one hand, we can differentiate between campaigns with high and low levels of 
personalisation. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that campaign commu-
nication can also vary with regard to the focus on specific politicians. It can either be 
characterised by the presence of a broad range of different actors or be dominated by 
a very limited number of highly visible politicians. In their review of different under-
standings of personalisation, Van Aelst et al. (2011: 207) suggest to speak of the 
“general visibility” of politicians to describe the former dimension of the concept and 
to label the latter as “concentrated visibility”. They claim that both dimensions are 
part of an “individualisation” of politics,5 which can be understood as a trend towards 
centring campaigns on politicians.  
 
5 “Concentrated visibility” is also often labelled as presidentialisation (see Poguntke and Webb 2005).  
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Both sub-dimensions - the degree to which persons in general are present in a cam-
paign (general visibility) and the degree to which specific politicians dominate this 
process (concentrated visibility) - are crucial to understand contemporary election 
campaigns. This is particularly the case for two reasons: First, many scholars expect a 
strong increase in personalisation over time (Farrell and Webb 2002; Holtz-Bacha et 
al. 2014; Kriesi 2012; McAllister 2007; Van Aelst et al. 2011). While Kitschelt 
(2000) assumes that the reliance on personal charisma of party leaders has ever since 
constituted an alternative strategy to communicating policies, it is frequently claimed 
that “image and style [are] increasingly pushing policies and substance aside” (Farrell 
and Webb 2002: 132). Second, especially for parliamentary democracies, the person-
alisation of election campaigns is often claimed to be a rather problematic phenome-
non. In these systems “traditionally the party, not the candidate, stood at the center of 
the political process” (Van Aelst et al. 2011: 206). As pointed out by Kaase (1994: 
213), parliamentary systems give preference to parties instead of individual politi-
cians: “[I]t is the parties who put up candidates for political office, and it is the parties 
which vote a government and its leader into power, or out of power”. Thus, increas-
ing levels of personalisation can be assumed to create tensions between the role that 
parties as collective actors should play according to the constitution on the one hand 
and the politics of personalised and leader-centred election campaigning on the other 
hand (Kaase 1994). Or, as Balmas et al. (2012: 47) put it, “[c]hanging the balance 
between groups and individuals may affect the mechanisms that limit and constrain 
the power of leadership”. 
Televised campaign debates in parliamentary systems, are a striking example in this 
regard. The core feature of a parliamentary system is that the head of government is 
not only elected by the members of parliament, but also depends on support from the 
parliament during the legislative period (Steffani 1979). However, televised debates 
between the “lead candidates” suggest voters that they must decide between two 
competing individual politicians, which is only the case in presidential systems. Ac-
cordingly, the introduction of “American-style televised debates” (Reinemann and 
Wilke 2007: 92) in countries with parliamentary systems like Germany for instance 
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might be misleading for voters as the set-up of such debates does not reflect the logic 
of the electoral system in the country.  
From a perspective of party behaviour, these consideration lead to the question how 
parties contribute to a personalisation of electoral politics and what drives their deci-
sions to rely on personalised campaign communication (Balmas et al. 2012). The 
same holds for the effect of these strategies on parties’ appearance in the mass media 
and how voters perceive them (see Van Aelst et al. 2011). Similar to the literature on 
issue salience and position taking, research on personalisation assumes that parties 
are strategic actors (Enli and Skogerbø 2013; Kriesi 2012). Hence, parties are ex-
pected to carefully choose the degree to which they personalise their campaigns and 
what candidates and personal attributes they emphasise (Eder et al. 2015; Enli and 
Skogerbø 2013; Kriesi 2012; Van Aelst et al. 2011). However, unlike the literature on 
issue salience and position taking, studies on personalisation focus much more on the 
description of trends in personalisation than on explaining variation between parties. 
Taking this peculiarity into account, the following sections deal with explanations of 
the extent of personalisation and with variation in parties’ personalisation strategies 
on the one hand and the degree to which these explanations are context sensitive on 
the other hand. Initially, factors contributing to high levels of personalisation and 
developments which even amplify such behaviour are debated. Subsequently, differ-
ences in these regards and the moderating role of institutional aspects are discussed.  
 
Has personalisation increased over time? 
The relation between issue-related and personalised statements in an election cam-
paign can be understood as a trade-off. The idea that the reliance on personal charis-
ma of party leaders constitutes an alternative strategy to communicating policies as 
formulated by Kitschelt (2000) reflects this point. In the literature on personalisation, 
it is generally assumed that campaigns are highly personalised and that the overall 
visibility of politicians in election campaigns as well as the concentration on a limited 
number of extremely visible individuals has even increased over the last decades.  
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There are several reasons for parties to generally rely on personalisation (see 
McAllister 2015: 337). First, it is easier for parties to get their message out if voters 
can directly relate it to an individual politician representing the parties’ positions. 
Second, party leaders themselves are sympathetic to personalised campaigning, be-
cause this form of communication creates stronger ties between them and the elec-
torate and therefore strengthens their personal power in the party. Consequently, vote-
seeking and office-seeking parties are likely to rely on strategies of personalisation. 
Parties which try to enhance their electoral fortunes personalise their campaigns and 
link their issue positions to individual politicians; and individual politicians within 
these parties will not hesitate to take the chance of being put centre stage in an elec-
tion campaign by their parties.  
In addition, there are also a number of arguments supporting the idea of an increase in 
personalisation over time in democratic political systems. First, a greater volatility in 
the voter market due to processes of de-alignment are claimed to contribute to such a 
trend (Holtz-Bacha et al. 2014; Norris 2000). Following this argument, the decrease 
of cleavage-based voting and the rise of the “’unreliable’ voter” (Holtz-Bacha et al. 
2014: 154), is expected to lead parties to substitute issue-based messages by commu-
nication about individual politicians and their personal virtues. Thus, due to the de-
cline of the role of “traditional party loyalties” for voting behaviour, it is often hy-
pothesised that the role of individual politicians and their personal attributes are in-
creasingly present in election campaigns (Kriesi 2012: 826). Second, it is argued that 
processes of denationalisation and Europeanisation reduce the degree to which parties 
at national elections can credibly state to tackle important problems, because many 
issues cannot be addressed effectively at the national level anymore. Consequently, 
parties are assumed to shift their attention away from suggesting solutions to political 
problems and focus more strongly on personalised communication (Holtz-Bacha et 
al. 2014). Third, technological innovations are expected to contribute to an increase in 
personalisation strategies of political parties as well. Not only televised campaign 
coverage but also more recent developments like campaign communication on social 
media create a strong tendency to produce and present visual materials. Since indi-
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viduals are “visually more appealing for the viewer” (McAllister 2015: 337), these 
trends could result in more personalised campaigns. Finally, the professionalisation 
of parties in contemporary democracies is also said to contribute to changes in their 
campaign focus. According to Farrell and Webb (2000), parties have become more 
centralised when it comes to campaigning, which results in increased powers of party 
leaders. Because of this “power-shift”, party leaders themselves also become more 
visible in the parties’ campaigns (Farrell and Webb 2002: 132).  
However, rather than engaging in the question which of these explanations is respon-
sible for trends of increasing personalisation, the existing literature has devoted much 
attention on detecting whether such a trend actually exists. In this regard, some schol-
ars argue that personalisation has indeed increased rapidly within the last decades. 
McAllister (2015: 337) for instance finds that “[t]here is little doubt that national 
election campaigns in the established democracies have become more personalized”. 
However, in their systematic review of the literature on personalisation, Van Aelst et 
al. (2011) come to a more nuanced conclusion. On the one hand, they report findings 
of an increase in personalisation in Austria, France, the Netherlands Norway, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom and the USA. On the other hand, for Belgium and especial-
ly for Germany, such a trend cannot be observed (Wilke and Reinemann 2001). 
Moreover, covering six West European countries (Austria, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) over a period of more than 30 
years, Kriesi (2012) finds evidence for an increase in personalisation in the sense of 
higher general visibility of politicians as well as with regard to a stronger concentra-
tion on party leaders only in one country, namely the Netherlands. 
Most important, this mixed evidence for increasing personalisation does not conflict 
with the idea that contemporary election campaigns are strongly centred on individual 
politicians. Rather, the reason why some studies fail to provide evidence for a posi-
tive trend over time is due to already high levels of personalisation in early election 
campaigns (Van Aelst et al. 2011: 210). As shown by Wilke and Reinemann (2001), 
personalisation in Germany did not increase between 1949 and 1998. Rather all elec-
tions were characterised by a strong focus on individual politicians.  
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Explaining the level of personalisation 
As shown above, personalisation is a crucial aspect in election campaigns. In many 
political systems, it became an even more present feature of election campaigns over 
the last decades. Therefore, the question is how these insights vary across political 
systems. In this regard, institutional factors are expected to explain variation in the 
degree of campaign personalisation across countries. In presidential systems, candi-
dates running for election are usually put centre stage by the party they belong to and 
even have campaign teams independent from the party itself. U.S. presidential elec-
tion campaigns are a striking example in this regard (Kreiss 2016b). These campaigns 
are not only strongly candidate-centred, but also extremely “capital-intensive” (Norris 
2000: 178). Moreover, in contrast to parliamentary systems with electoral systems 
strongly based on the principle proportional representation, candidates from parties 
with a realistic chance of winning the election are particularly likely to heavily domi-
nate an election campaign. This “implies both a greater amount of personalisation of 
politics in general, and a greater concentration of the attention on top leaders than in 
parliamentary systems” (Kriesi 2012: 827). Thus, presidential systems are expected to 
lead to a higher general visibility of candidates and to a more pronounced concentra-
tion on a very limited number of promising candidates.  
Focussing on personalisation in in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland and the United Kingdom, Kriesi (2012) finds strong evidence for this argu-
ment. In line with the idea of such systems favouring the visibility of individual poli-
ticians in relation to communication from parties as collective actors, campaigns in 
France, the only country with presidential elections under scrutiny, are characterised 
by much higher levels of personalisation (Kriesi 2012: 831). This finding not only 
holds for the general visibility of persons in relation to parties, but also for the con-
centration of attention on specific politicians. In France, more than 90 percent of per-
sonalised communication is centred on the top ten of the most visible politicians and 
more than 40 percent of communication stems from in the top two candidates. Sum-
ming up, “all the campaigns in parliamentary systems are not only much less person-
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alized, but they also concentrate attention much less on a limited number of candi-
dates” (Kriesi 2012: 832-833). 
 
2.3. Research Gap: Communication Platforms and Electoral Arenas 
This literature review on three crucial aspects of party behaviour – issue salience, 
position taking and personalisation – points out that there exists a large body of liter-
ature on explanations party behaviour. A striking finding in this regard concerns the 
role of conditionality. Crucial relationships in all three domains of party competition 
under study are found to be highly contingent upon party-specific factors (e.g., party 
type) or institutional factors (e.g., regime type). In the remainder, it is argued that, our 
understanding of the conditionality of explanations of party behaviour is nevertheless 
incomplete. Specifically, it is shown that situational context factors, in particular the 
role of electoral arenas and communication platforms, were widely neglected in ex-
isting research. Given that research highlights the importance of moderating factors 
of party behaviour, this creates an important research gap. The following examples 
illustrate this point.  
Starting with communication platforms, existing knowledge is strongly based on 
manifesto research (see Dolezal et al. 2018). While personalisation has been studied 
on various platforms (Dolezal et al. 2018; Enli and Skogerbø 2013; Kriesi 2012), this 
holds particularly for issue salience (e.g., De Sio and Weber 2014; Dolezal et al. 
2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014) and position taking (e.g., Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow 
et al. 2010). This begs the question how insights gained from the study of these doc-
uments can be used to draw conclusions about how parties behave on other platforms 
like the mass media, in their press releases, in public campaign speeches, televised 
campaign advertisements or on their social media accounts. Since such communica-
tion platforms are used much more by voters to get information about political parties 
and their positions, this creates a particularly pressing research problem.  
Considerations about issue salience are a good starting point in this regard. Do the 
drivers of issue emphasis discussed above vary regarding the platform on which par-
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ties compete? Salience theory assumes that parties highlight owned issues in these 
documents strategically in order to appeal to voters (Budge 2015; Thesen et al. 2017). 
In a very similar fashion, approaches focusing in public opinion like issue yield theo-
ry (De Sio and Weber 2014) and the riding the wave theory (Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar 1994; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016) assume that parties emphasise issues in 
order to appeal to voters. On the one hand, in public campaign debates, parties com-
pete over attention with other parties and have to circumvent the gate-keepers like 
journalists (Merz 2017). This might put constraints on their ability to communicate 
over preferred issues and consequently weaken the relevance of these theories as ex-
planations of party behaviour beyond direct campaign communication. On the other 
hand, manifestos also serve the purpose of giving a full account of a party’s policy 
positions and therefore have a very broad issue scope (Dolezal et al. 2014). Conse-
quently, salience strategies could be even more relevant for party communication on 
social media for instance (see De Sio et al. 2018). Focussing on the role of agenda 
dynamics brings similar questions to the fore. Since research on this factor is also 
strongly centred on manifesto content (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015), it 
is difficult to say how strong the role of such systemic pressures is in more competi-
tive communication environments like public campaign debates. The second study 
(Chapter 6) of the thesis tackles this research gap and explores how issue ownership 
and systemic issue salience play out in newspaper reports during election campaigns 
(Schwarzbözl et al. 2018). Moreover, the third study (Chapter 7) examines whether 
issue competition on social media systematically differs from patterns well-known 
from manifesto research (Schwarzbözl 2018). 
The described research problem is also relevant in research on party competition be-
yond the exclusive domain of issue salience. While existing research points out that 
not all issue-related party messages are equally likely to gain media attention (see 
Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017; Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Meyer et al. 2017), 
there is an ongoing controversy with regard to how individual party strategies trans-
late into visible conflicts in mediated campaign debates. In particular, the role of pop-
ulist radical right parties as issue entrepreneurs is debated in this literature on issue 
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politicisation (Dolezal and Hellström 2016; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Kriesi et 
al. 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2015). Since this strand of research is strongly based on 
the analysis of a single source of data, it could benefit from exploring different plat-
forms comparatively. This allows disentangling most clearly the strategic efforts of 
parties and the politicisation of an issue in public debates. The first study of this thesis 
(Chapter 6) on the politicisation of immigration issues explores exactly this relation-
ship by combining data from various platforms (Grande et al. 2018).  
Turning to electoral arenas, it must be noted that research on party behaviour is dom-
inated by studies on national election campaigns (e.g., Kriesi 2012; Wagner and 
Meyer 2014). In particular, comparative research across electoral arenas is scarce. 
Whether party behaviour follows a similar logic in subnational and European elec-
tions is widely unexplored (see Golder et al. 2017). Especially at the European level, 
where the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 created 
a number of “unintended consequences” (see Van der Brug and De Vreese 2016), 
analyses on the drivers of party behaviour in comparison to the national level are im-
portant to better understand deficits in the electoral connection at this level of govern-
ance. Recent research by Braun and Schmitt (2018) shows that patterns of party posi-
tioning are rather stable across arenas, while issue salience varies considerably be-
tween national elections and elections to the EP (see also Dolezal 2012). Moreover, 
public opinion as an important driver of issue salience is found to play out differently. 
In their analysis of national party manifestos and parties’ Euromanifestos, Spoon and 
Klüver (2014) find that the positive effect of voters’ issue priorities, which usually 
plays an important role (see Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016), cannot be observed in EP 
elections. In contrast to national elections, parties seem to “ignore the issue priorities 
of citizens in elections to the European Parliament” (Spoon and Klüver 2014: 55).  
These findings are instructive, because they illustrate that insights on party behaviour 
gained from studies focusing in national election campaigns do not necessarily hold 
in another context. Nevertheless, they also leave at least two important questions un-
answered. First, given that party behaviour deviates in some respects between the 
national and the European level, the structure of political conflict in EP elections 
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might also deviate from patterns well-known from the study national elections. How-
ever, due to a strong focus of existing research in this regard on the national electoral 
arena (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 
2008), the degree to which conflict structures diverge across arenas and how this af-
fects political representation are widely unexplored.6  
Second, other aspects of party behaviour than salience and position taking have been 
largely neglected in research of party behaviour across electoral arenas. Focussing on 
personalisation, it is found that presidential systems as compared to parliamentary 
systems are characterised by a stronger focus on politicians instead of issues in quali-
ty newspaper, tabloids and in televised campaign debates (Kriesi 2012). Hence, there 
is strong evidence that regime type affects the degree to which campaigns are person-
alised. By contrast, there is no research on the effect of electoral arenas. Research on 
personalisation also strongly focuses on national election campaigns. This begs the 
question whether personalisation is an equally present feature of election campaigns 
in second-order elections at the sub-national or at the European level. At the Europe-
an level, this question gained relevance with the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten system in the 2014 EP elections. Similar to national elections in parliamentary 
systems, this step was intended to link a vote for a specific party to a lead candidate 
that aims to become head of the European Commission (Hobolt 2014). While it was 
expected that this would intensify and personalise parties’ election campaigns as it is 
the case in national elections (Corbett 2014; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hobolt 2014; 
Priestley et al. 2015), the actual positive effects of this institutional innovation were 
modest at best (Hobolt 2014). As argued by Braun and Popa (2018), addressing the 
institutional innovation of the Spitzenkandidaten itself as a campaign strategy con-
flicts with the incentives of strategically acting parties. Against this background, it is 
crucial to explore whether parties’ reluctance to address the Spitzenkandidaten in 
person in EP elections can also be attributed to such considerations. The fourth study 
of this thesis (Chapter 9) therefore explores parties’ emphasis on the Spitzenkandi-
 
6 An ongoing research project led by Daniela Braun and Edgar Grande, which is based at the LMU 
Munich and funded by the German Research Council, deals with exactly this topic.  
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daten in the 2014 EP elections and the rationales behind their decision to put them in 
the spotlight or to ignore them (Braun and Schwarzbözl 2019). 
To sum up: Many aspects regarding the role that situational context factors play for 
party behaviour are largely unexplored. On the one hand, insights are mostly gained 
from manifesto research. On the other hand, research is strongly dominated by studies 
on national election campaigns. This makes it difficult to tell whether other platforms 
of direct party communication parties’ social media accounts or mass-mediated party 
communication follow different logics. Likewise, it is hard to say whether party be-
haviour follows a different logic in subnational or European elections.   
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3. Theoretical Considerations 
Before the presentation of the empirical studies, this section discusses the broader 
theoretical argument of the research project. Specifically, the idea that party behav-
iour is contingent not only upon party type but also regarding the specific circum-
stances in which election campaigning takes place is discussed. It is claimed that var-
iation in two factors is key to understanding why context matters for party behaviour 
- party strategy and the constraints parties face to act in line with their strategic con-
siderations. First, it is assumed that parties have specific goals which they try to reach 
via strategic action. Following behavioural theories, parties are expected to have mul-
tiple identifiable goals. More precisely, parties seek for maximizing votes, office, or 
policies (Strom 1990) and try to avoid party disunity (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). 
Second, it is equally important to note that the space for strategic action can vary 
since parties’ manoeuvrability can be constrained by various internal and external 
factors. Thus, parties are also expected to face constraints regarding the degree to 
which they can take strategic action in order to reach their desired goals (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2015).  
Both drivers are crucial to understand why party behaviour can vary depending on the 
specific context of election campaigning. As demonstrated in the literature review, an 
assumption, which is largely shared within research on party behaviour, is that differ-
ent parties are also likely to behave differently. Parties can be distinguished on sever-
al characteristics like size (Meguid 2005), “nicheness” (Bischof 2017), government 
participation (Van de Wardt 2015) or internal organisational structures (Wagner and 
Meyer 2014). It is convincingly argued that these features of a party influence its be-
haviour in election campaigns, because they affect the strategic goals that parties pur-
sue and the degree to which they can act in accordance to reaching these goals 
(Ezrow et al. 2010).  
A related, albeit different argument is that party behaviour not only varies between 
different parties but also differs depending on the context conditions under which 
they campaign. That is, the notion of parties as strategic actors implies that they are 
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also context sensitive in the sense that they adapt their behaviour in accordance to the 
specific circumstances they face in an election campaign.  
With a focus on political institutions, this idea is systematically discussed by Strom 
(1990), who argues that political institutions, like a country’s electoral system, influ-
ence the relevance which parties attribute to different goals and therefore affect par-
ties’ campaign strategies. According to this argument, “regardless of their organiza-
tional characteristics, [parties] face different incentives in different institutional set-
tings” (Strom 1990: 579) and these different incentives lead to variation in party be-
haviour. For instance, vote-seeking behaviour is especially expected in elections with 
majority voting-systems. Under such circumstances, usually two parties compete for 
the majority in an electoral district. Consequently, “voting power leads virtually di-
rectly to policy influence and office benefits” for political parties competing in these 
systems and this leads to parties strongly focusing on the concerns of the mean voter 
(Strom 1990: 592).  
This argument also applies to variation in party behaviour across electoral arenas 
within the same countries. The reason for this expectation is that elections at different 
levels of governance provide different opportunity structures for political parties, 
which are likely to affect their campaign strategies. A crucial characteristic of many 
multi-level political systems is that “electoral systems vary across electoral arenas” 
(Golder et al. 2017: 8). Moreover, what is at stake for a party in an election and what 
mobilises voters also differs across levels of governance. In this regard, the special 
position of national elections in relation to regional or local elections on the one hand 
and elections at the European level on the other hand is reflected by the differentia-
tion between first order and second order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Thus, 
even if it is usually the same national parties which compete in elections at different 
levels of governance (e.g., Hix and Lord 1997), it is likely that elections held in a 
given country follow different electoral rules depending on the level of governance. 
Assuming that parties strategically decide how to design their campaigns in response 
to the specific circumstances in which an election takes place, the same parties are 
expected to behave differently in different electoral arenas, because the goals they 
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pursue and the strategies they think to make them reach these goals vary (Golder et 
al. 2017). Consequently, elections at different levels of governance can create differ-
ent incentives for strategically acting political parties and result in distinct logics of 
political competition.  
Similarly, the idea of party strategies being context sensitive also applies to variation 
in campaigning activities across platforms of campaign communication. If the oppor-
tunities of different channels of direct party communication vary, it is likely that par-
ties strategically use them for different purposes in an election campaign. Especially 
at the time of elections, professionalised parties use various channels to get their mes-
sages out. Advertising in the news media and on television have a long-lasting tradi-
tion in Western democracies in this regard (see Norris et al. 1999: 54). Parties and 
candidates spend much money to reach voters via advertisements in print media or 
through TV spots (Kaplan et al. 2006). In addition, parties put up posters in public, 
circulate campaign ads via mail, engage in door-to-door canvassing (Broockman and 
Kalla 2016) and try to engage with potential voters through speeches at public events. 
More recently, parties also spend much money on advertisements on the internet, 
especially on social media. For instance, spending on Facebook ads in the UK in-
creased from £1.3 million in the general elections in 2015 to £3.2 million in the 2017 
elections7. Moreover, parties strongly rely on other, less cost-intensive forms of direct 
campaign communication like the publication of party manifestos (Dolezal et al. 
2018), the publication press releases (e.g., Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016) or spread in-
formation via their own social media accounts (e.g., Jungherr 2016; Nulty et al. 2016; 
Stier et al. 2018).  
The (technological) opportunities these platforms offer vary greatly. Social media 
communication and party press releases for instance allow to instantly react on ongo-
ing events during the campaign or on the behaviour of other parties (De Sio et al. 
2018). The opposite holds for party manifestos. Since these documents are usually 
published in advance of the crucial phase of the campaign and require much planning 
 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/23/facebook-digital-politics-tories-labour-online-
advertising-marketing, last: 03.09.2018. 
Theoretical Considerations 
50 
 
and internal agreement, they do not allow reacting on short-term changes in the cam-
paign agenda. In addition to variation in reactivity, some platforms also favour much 
more the use of personalisation as a campaign strategy. Even though Dolezal et al. 
(2018: 240) demonstrate that personalisation is far from absent in Austrian party 
manifestos, one might argue that such a campaign strategy is even more strongly em-
ployed on platforms which particularly facilitate the use of visual materials like pic-
tures and videos. This is of course the case in televised campaign ads as well as on 
parties’ social media accounts. Thus, if a party aims to strongly personalise its cam-
paign, such behaviour is particularly likely to be observed on these platforms (e.g., 
Enli and Skogerbø 2013). Moreover, it is likely that the scope of information also 
varies regarding the platform of party communication. Unlike party manifestos, 
channels like campaign posters or flyers, but also in individual messages on social 
media, parties are not expected to provide a complete account on the policy positions 
it takes and wants to emphasise is limited. This allows them to choose more freely on 
the content they want to present to voters and makes such communication platforms 
even more likely to be used for strategically targeted messages than manifestos (see 
De Sio et al. 2018: 1217). Due to this variation in the opportunities offered by differ-
ent platforms of direct party communication, it is likely that voters following the 
campaigns via different channels do not receive the same messages. Rather, different 
channels of direct campaign communication are expected to create different incen-
tives for strategically acting parties regarding the content they present to the elec-
torate.  
Another argument on the conditionality of party behaviour is concerned with the con-
straints that parties face in election campaigns. In this regard, it is important to note 
that parties’ space for strategic action is not only restricted by internal factors in the 
sense that a parties historical legacy restricts its positional manoeuvrability (Hooghe 
and Marks 2018; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002). Similarly, strategic 
actions of parties can be constrained or counteracted by external factors. Consequent-
ly, the degree to which parties can take strategic action in order to reach their desired 
goals varies. This is particularly expected for campaign debates as covered by the 
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mass media. More specifically, parties may be forced into unpleasant debates on is-
sues they initially wanted to avoid during the election campaign when their competi-
tors successfully put them on the agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; 
Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Furthermore, in public campaign debates, parties’ mes-
sages must pass gatekeeping journalists (Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017; 
Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Merz 2017; Meyer et al. 2017). This can also im-
pose tough constraints on the degree to which a party can act in line with its initial 
strategy. In particular, parties cannot be sure that the topics they want to emphasise 
for strategic reasons are also the ones covered by the media (Norris et al. 1999). Issue 
competition in mediated environments is therefore expected to be strongly affected by 
agenda-setting dynamics and the fight for attention. Explanations of strategic party 
behaviour on platforms directly controlled by a party might therefore be of limited 
relevance under mediated circumstances, where parties must fight the “conflict over 
conflicts” with their competitors on the one hand (see Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 
2010: 261) and bypass gatekeeping journalists who strongly rely on aspects of news-
worthiness as a selection criterion of party messages on the other hand (Meyer et al. 
2017). Consequently, party behaviour and the relevance of different explanations in 
this regard is expected to vary also between directly controlled communication plat-
forms and mediated communication platforms.  
Summing up, these considerations allow deriving the general expectation that party 
behaviour is conditional upon situational context. Thus, the main theoretical argu-
ment of this thesis is that party behaviour depends on the specific circumstances in 
which election campaigning takes place. On the one hand, this idea is rooted in the 
assumption that the circumstances under which parties compete, affect their own stra-
tegic considerations and that they adapt their behaviour depending on their environ-
ment. On the other hand, it is based on the idea that the degree to which parties can 
act in line with their initial strategy is also context dependent.  
This argument about the context sensitivity of party behaviour is very general. How-
ever, as demonstrated in the subsequent empirical chapters, it allows deriving specific 
explanations that help to understand pressing research problems in the literature on 
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party behaviour and party competition like variation in party behaviour in national 
and European elections or potential gaps between what information parties try to 
communicate and what of this information is presented in the news media to the elec-
torate. In the next chapter considerations about suitable research designs which ena-
ble to test such specific hypotheses and to take advantage of the context sensitivity of 
party behaviour to arrive at new insights in research on party behaviour are presented.  
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4. Methodological Remarks 
Studying how party behaviour varies across electoral contexts and communication 
platforms is a challenging task. In the following section, it is discussed what research 
designs allow testing such differences. In this regard, two arguments are presented. 
First, it is claimed that exploring the context sensitivity of party behaviour often re-
quires innovating from existing research designs in the field of party behaviour by 
combining and integrating different data sources. Second, it is argued that if the as-
sumption that different data sources on party behaviour reveal complementary infor-
mation, it enables researchers to gain new insights by exploiting these differences. 
More specifically, in addition to comparing data sources for the purpose of cross-
validation, a focus on structural differences between sources of information on party 
behaviour can inspire new research designs which explicitly take advantage of such 
differences.  
In order to test empirically, to what degree party behaviour is context sensitive, or to 
take advantage of the fact that data on party behaviour from different sources reveals 
complementary information, makes it necessary to compare party behaviour across 
electoral arenas and communication platforms. Consequently, gaining new insights 
on this aspect of party behaviour is particularly demanding, because it requires the 
creation of new datasets. To understand how party behaviour varies across electoral 
levels for instance, information on campaign behaviour from elections other than the 
national level must be explored and put in comparison to it (e.g., Spoon and Klüver 
2014). Similarly, to explore how party behaviour varies over communication plat-
forms, data for the same parties on different platforms must be gathered and analysed 
comparatively (e.g., Merz 2017). 
Existing large-scale integrated datasets in the field do not provide such information. 
Focusing on manifesto data for instance, the Manifesto Research Project (Marpor) 
provides information about the emphasis parties devote to different policy issues and 
the positions parties take on these issues in their national election manifestos (Budge 
2015; Lehmann et al. 2017). By contrast, the Euromanifesto project only reveals in-
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formation about the salience and the positions of political parties in manifestos writ-
ten for elections to the European parliament (Schmitt et al. 2018). In addition, new 
data on manifesto content from the Local Manifesto Project (LMP) focuses exclusive-
ly on elections at the local level (Gross and Jankowski 2018). In order to understand, 
how the content that parties publish during election campaigns varies across different 
levels of governance, such information must first be combined (see e.g., Braun and 
Schmitt 2018). Such steps are also necessary, to study how party communication dif-
fers across communication platforms.  
Consequently, exploring the conditionality of party behaviour concerning variation 
across electoral contexts and communication platforms is much more demanding than 
exploring how party behaviour differs between different types of parties. Regarding 
the latter, it is possible to use existing large-scale datasets like the Marpor data or data 
from the Euromanifesto project. These datasets not only provide information on issue 
salience and policy positions but also on characteristics at the party level such as vote 
shares. This allows exploring potential differences in party behaviour based on large 
numbers of observations without the constructing new datasets. More specifically, it 
is possible to test how such party characteristics moderate the relevance of general 
hypotheses on party behaviour by running regression models with interaction effects 
between these characteristics on the one hand and variables bearing information about 
general drivers of party behaviour.  
The idea to combine and compare information from different data sources to gain 
additional insights in research on party behaviour is not entirely new (Norris et al. 
1999). However, for many aspects of election campaigning, researchers only recently 
began to create datasets which allow exploring variation in party behaviour depend-
ing on electoral context and communication platforms. Dolezal (2012) for instance 
provides first insights on differences in party behaviour and the structure of political 
conflict in campaign debates across electoral contexts by replicating analyses from 
national election campaigns for elections to the European Parliament. Similarly, 
Spoon and Klüver (2014), combines data from national and European election mani-
festos, to explore variation in parties’ responsiveness to voters across electoral con-
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texts. Moreover, Meyer et al. (2017) merges information from press releases and 
newspaper content for Austrian parties to explore what attributes of a message en-
hance its likelihood to appear in newspaper articles. In subsequent publications, this 
data is also used to explore differences between news outlets with varying partisan-
ship (Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017) and the effectiveness of negative campaign 
messages (Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017). In addition, Merz (2017) merges data 
from campaign debates with manifesto data to explore how parties campaign strate-
gies play out in mediated environments.  
These efforts go beyond the idea of comparing indicators on crucial aspects of party 
behaviour with the purpose of cross-validation (e.g., Helbling and Tresch 2011). Ra-
ther, they assume that comparing similar indicators based on different data sources 
reveals additional insights about how parties behave in varying circumstances. The 
research designs presented in this thesis follow exactly this logic. Based on original 
data collected from different communication platforms and electoral arenas, they al-
low shifting the boundaries in our knowledge on party competition.  
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5. Contribution of the Thesis and Outlook 
To test the idea that party behaviour varies across electoral arenas and communica-
tion platforms, the thesis presents four individual studies. Each study tackles an im-
portant aspect of the research gap outlined above. Specifically, this research reveals 
that there exist notable differences in party behaviour depending on the platform on 
which party competition is observed. Especially for the case of issue salience, it is 
demonstrated that parties’ strategies and the degree to which they can act in accord-
ance with these considerations, vary across communication platforms. Furthermore, it 
is shown that electoral arenas also affect parties’ strategic considerations, which sug-
gests significant deviations in party competition between elections at the national and 
the European level. 
Focussing on immigration issues, the first study (Chapter 6) demonstrates how the 
strategic efforts of political parties are related to issue politicisation in the dynamic 
context of public campaign debates (Grande et al. 2018). The second study (Chapter 
7) shows that two important explanations of issue salience in direct party communica-
tion – issue ownership and systemic salience – play out differently in campaign de-
bates as covered by the mass media (Schwarzbözl et al. 2018). The third study (Chap-
ter 8) argues that party communication on social media websites is particularly driven 
by strategic considerations, which leads to deviations in patterns of issue competition 
well-known from the study of established platforms (Schwarzbözl 2018). The fourth 
study (Chapter 9) explores personalisation strategies in elections to the EP and 
demonstrates that party strategies vary strongly depending on electoral arena. While 
personalisation centred on lead candidates plays a crucial role in national election 
campaigns, it is largely absent in direct party communication at EP elections (Braun 
and Schwarzbözl 2019). 
First, these studies demonstrate that party competition must be studied on different 
communication platforms to arrive at an encompassing understanding of democratic 
elections. Patterns of party competition in public campaign debates are found to vary 
across communication channels. Thus, information extracted from party manifestos 
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for instance is not congruent with party competition as observed on social media or in 
mediated campaign debates. Second, the context sensitivity of party behaviour re-
garding electoral arenas implies that generalisations derived from a specific type of 
election do not necessarily hold for elections at other territorial levels. In particular, 
patterns of party competition observed at national elections might play out differently 
at the subnational or the European level. 
These results have important implications. The dynamics found in party competition 
as observed in public campaign debates are not congruent with parties’ initial cam-
paign strategies and these differences vary depending on the size of a party 
(Schwarzbözl et al. 2018). This finding points out that the critical role played by 
small challenger parties for the restructuration of European party competition cannot 
be understood solely on the grounds of direct party communication (Grande et al. 
2018). The dynamics of public campaign debates are a crucial factor in this process as 
well. Moreover, the presented findings are particularly relevant given the rise of new 
platforms of campaign communication. They indicate that social media websites par-
ticularly strengthen the strategic opportunities of smaller and new political parties. 
These actors struggle to gain visibility in mediated campaign debates which are dom-
inated by established mainstream parties. New platforms, where parties can engage 
with potential voters without the need to circumvent strong gatekeepers and powerful 
competitors, play a crucial role in contemporary election campaigns as parties use 
them strategically for campaigning (Schwarzbözl 2018). Furthermore, with party be-
haviour varying across territorial levels of electoral competition, the external validity 
of insights gained from the study of national elections campaigns is highly limited. 
This implies that policy recommendations to facilitate turnout at second-order elec-
tions at the subnational or European level derived from the study of first-order na-
tional elections should be made with great caution (Braun and Schwarzbözl 2019).  
These insights invite future research on the context sensitivity of party competition. 
The presented findings show for selected aspects of party competition that situational 
context factors strongly shape party behaviour. This suggests that such variation also 
plays an important role for aspects of party competition and drivers of party behav-
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iour not explicitly addressed in one of the four presented studies. For instance, the 
findings are instructive for research on the relationship of intra-party conflict as a 
driver of issue salience. It has been shown that such a connection exists for salience 
strategies in direct party communication (Spoon 2012) and based on information on 
issue salience from expert surveys (Edwards 2008; Steenbergen and Scott 2004). 
Against the background of the findings presented in this thesis on issue salience and 
its driving forces, it is an open empirical question whether results on this relationship 
obtained from direct party communication also hold in a more competitive environ-
ment such as campaign debates as covered by the media. Another example departs 
from the observation that party strategies vary depending on the electoral arena in 
which parties compete. Consequently, patterns of political conflict uncovered in na-
tional elections might play out differently at European elections. Therefore, compara-
tive analyses of party competition in national and European elections are needed to 
better understand the peculiarities of EP elections and the problems of political repre-
sentation at the European level. By combining different data sources, such research 
allows gaining new insights on party competition well beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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6. Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe8 
 
Abstract 
Immigration has become a hot topic in West European politics. The factors responsi-
ble for the intensification of political conflict on this issue are a matter of considera-
ble controversy. This holds in particular for the role of socio-economic factors and of 
radical right populist parties. This article explores the politicization of immigration 
issues and its driving forces in the electoral arena. It is based on a comparative study 
using both media and manifesto data covering six West European countries (Austria, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) for a period from the early 
1990s until 2017. We find no association between socio-economic factors and levels 
of politicization. Political conflict over immigration follows a political logic and must 
be attributed to parties and party competition rather than to “objective pressures”. 
More specifically, we provide evidence that the issue entrepreneurship of radical 
right populist parties plays a crucial role in explaining variation in the politicization 
of immigration. 
 
 
  
 
8 This chapter is identical to a paper co-authored with Edgar Grande and Matthias Fatke. It is published 
as Grande et al. (2018). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my co-authors. I also want to thank 
the reviewers and the editors of the Journal of European Public Policy for their support during the 
publication process. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In the last decade, European countries have witnessed a new wave of immigration 
which has been nurtured from diverse sources, among them labour market-driven 
migration within the EU after Eastern enlargement and refugees and asylum seekers 
from politically unstable and economically less developed regions in Africa and Asia. 
Likewise, public attention of immigration issues has increased in Western Europe and 
political conflict has intensified both at the domestic and the European level (Messina 
2007; van der Brug et al. 2015). At the European level, existing legal obligations and 
commitments, for example in the field of asylum policy, have caused controversies 
among member states and met with domestic resistance. Within EU member states, 
immigration has become a “hot topic” (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). Conflicts 
over immigration have become salient in national elections; they played a major role 
in some national referenda (most consequentially in the ‘Brexit’ campaign); and they 
have had a significant impact on the political agendas of governments. 
Conventional explanations of the politicisation of immigration in Western Europe 
hold that it is the combined result of two factors: a significant increase of immigration 
in recent years, which is overstraining the capacities of national states to control their 
borders and to accommodate and integrate new migrants, on the one hand; and the 
successful exploitation of these challenges by radical right populist parties, on the 
other hand. The decisive role of these parties in the emergence of new political con-
flicts on issues such as immigration and European integration has been emphasised 
by several strands of research, among them (neo-)cleavage theory (Hooghe and 
Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008), post-functionalist integration theo-
ry (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and the theory of issue entrepreneurship (Hobolt and de 
Vries 2015). These theories argue that the new issues are most successfully mobilised 
by “populist, non-governing parties” (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 21), radical right 
populist parties using nationalist-identitarian frames in particular. 
Such arguments find only limited support in the literature on the politicisation of im-
migration, however. While there is conclusive evidence of an increasing salience of 
immigration issues since the 1990s (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Van der Brug et 
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al. 2015), we find remarkable disagreement on the driving forces of politicisation. 
The most comprehensive study on this topic by van der Brug et al. (2015) attributes 
increasing salience of immigration issues neither to socio-economic factors nor to the 
mobilising force of radical right challenger parties. They conclude that “politicization 
is very much a top-down process, in which government parties play an especially 
important role” (van der Brug et al. 2015, 195). This is in line with work by Bale 
(2008), Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) and Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) 
who argue that mainstream centre-right parties are the main drivers of the politiciza-
tion of immigration issues in Europe.  
Evidently, despite a rapidly expanding literature on the politics of immigration, our 
understanding of the main factors responsible for politicising immigration issues in 
Western Europe is still unsatisfactory. This is partly due to a narrow focus of previ-
ous research on specific aspects of politicisation, either on the positioning of parties 
on immigration issues or on their salience. Moreover, most studies rely on a single 
data source (media data or manifesto data) to analyse partisan conflicts over immigra-
tion assuming that each of these data sources provides a full picture of the most rele-
vant activities of political parties.  
This article contributes to this research in two related ways. First, by using a multi-
dimensional concept of politicisation which combines salience and polarisation as 
suggested in the recent literature on politicization (De Wilde 2011; Hoeglinger 2016; 
Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Kriesi 2016), we provide a comprehen-
sive analysis of the development of political conflict over immigration issues in na-
tional elections in the period from the early 1990s until 2017. Our comparative analy-
sis includes six West European countries, namely Austria, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. Second, by combining media data and mani-
festo data for the analysis of political conflict over immigration in the electoral arena, 
we provide a more nuanced picture of the driving forces of the politicization of im-
migration issues by political parties. Most importantly, our approach allows distin-
guishing between strategic drivers of politicization on the one hand, and the visibility 
of political parties in election debates, on the other hand. 
Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe 
63 
 
Which factors are actually responsible for the politicization of immigration issues in 
national election campaigns? Three findings of our analysis deserve mention. First, 
politicization of immigration is not correlated with socio-economic factors such as the 
annual change in the number of immigrants entering a country or the level of unem-
ployment. Political parties enjoy substantial strategic leeway in responding to immi-
gration challenges in election campaigns. Second, our analysis of manifesto data con-
firms that radical right populist parties are issue entrepreneurs which strategically 
drive the politicization of immigration issues. This is not to say that the strategic ef-
forts of challenger parties to emphasise the immigration issue in their manifestos nec-
essarily results in high visibility of these parties in public election campaigns. Our 
analysis of campaign debates suggests that both radical challenger parties and main-
stream parties can dominate these debates. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
The politics of immigration include a broad range of topics including public attention 
to immigration issues, the positioning of political parties towards these issues and 
political protest and violence, to mention only some of the most important ones. The 
dependent variable of our analysis is the level of politicization of immigration issues 
in national election campaigns. Our conceptualisation of politicization emphasises 
political conflict, the “scope of conflict” more specifically (Schattschneider 1975 
[1960]: 16). Our analysis investigates situations of intense political conflict on immi-
gration issues among political parties in the electoral arena. In line with the scholarly 
literature, we focus on “party political attention” (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017: 2) 
to immigration as previous research shows that other political actors such as civil 
society groups and social movements are of secondary importance with regard to the 
politicization of immigration in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2012). Key questions 
then are: What drives the politicization of immigration issues? How relevant are po-
litical forces as compared to other factors, such as socio-economic variables? 
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In the literature on migration, socio-economic variables figure prominently. These 
variables include national migration patterns, the composition of the migrant popula-
tion, models of integration and economic conditions such as the level of unemploy-
ment or the annual rate of economic growth. The relationship between these factors 
and various political aspects related to immigration (e.g., popular attitudes towards 
immigrants, the strength and electoral success of anti-immigration groups and parties, 
the politicization of immigration issues in public debates and elections) have been a 
recurring topic in the scholarly literature (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Van der Brug et al. 2015). Arguments focusing on 
immigration patterns assume that politicization is a response to an increase in the mi-
grant population and of its composition. In this context, Green-Pedersen and Otjes 
(2017) show that party political attention to immigration is positively correlated to 
increases in the number of foreign born in the population. Sociological theories of 
realistic group conflict and the theory of ethnic competition suggest that ethnic con-
flict intensifies if different ethnic groups find themselves competing for key resources 
such as jobs and housing (Olzak 1994; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Political parties may 
respond to such conflicts by emphasising these issues in electoral competition. There-
fore, we expect that a significant increase in the migrant population and economic 
grievances resulting from rising unemployment and major economic crises will inten-
sify political conflict on immigration issues in electoral politics. We formulate this 
expectation in our first hypothesis. 
H1: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicised, if immigration or 
unemployment rates are high. 
 
The explanatory power of socio-economic variables has been contested in the schol-
arly literature, however. In their review of research on public attitudes towards immi-
gration, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) find little evidence that immigration atti-
tudes are strongly related with personal economic circumstances. The negative con-
sequences of economic globalisation and immigration are certainly distributed une-
qually within societies, but the resulting threats are filtered by many factors, as shown 
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by Ferrera and Pellegata (2018). The comparative study of van der Brug et al. (2015) 
on the politicization of immigration issues in public debates also finds no effect of the 
proportion of migrants on politicization but a significant negative effect of unem-
ployment on the salience of migration issues. In sum, the contribution of socio-
economic factors such as the share of immigrants, the composition of the migrant 
population and economic grievances to the explanation of the level of politicization in 
European countries remains a matter of controversy. 
Against the background of these findings, a significant leeway for political parties to 
mobilise or downplay the issue in election campaigns can be assumed. In the follow-
ing, we therefore discuss approaches, which – referring to saliency theory of party 
competition (Budge and Farlie 1983b; Robertson 1976) – each emphasise the im-
portance of issue competition in elections, but arrive at different conclusions with 
regard to the partisan actors who dominate this competition.  
The theory of issue entrepreneurship has made a specific type of party, namely chal-
lenger parties, a focus of attention (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Issue entrepreneurs 
are defined as parties actively promoting a previously ignored issue and adopting a 
position which is different from the mean position in the party system (Hobolt and de 
Vries 2015: 1161). With regard to immigration issues, it is mostly radical right popu-
list parties which are assumed to act as issue entrepreneurs and which are expected to 
be responsible for the politicization of such topics in the existing literature (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mudde 2007). This expectation 
has been confirmed by Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017) on the basis of manifesto 
data. To test this expectation, we formulate a ‘challenger party hypothesis’. 
H2: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicised, if radical right 
populist parties employ issue entrepreneurial strategies in their party manifestos. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that mainstream parties were also found to con-
tribute to the politicization of immigration (see van der Brug et al. 2015).9 Meyer and 
Rosenberger (2015) argue on the basis of media data that radical right parties only 
play a subordinate role in the politicization of immigration and that the contribution 
of mainstream parties to raising issue salience has been underestimated. This holds 
for moderate right parties in particular, as shown by Bale (2008) and Green-Pedersen 
and Krogstrup (2008). For this reason, we also formulate a ’moderate right party hy-
pothesis’. 
H3: Immigration issues in the electoral arena are highly politicised, if moderate right 
parties employ issue entrepreneurial strategies in their party manifestos. 
 
The literature on the politicization of immigration suggests that the two hypotheses 
on the role of radical right populist and mainstream parties are mutually exclusive. 
However, the controversies on the question which parties are responsible for politicis-
ing immigration issues in national election campaigns may at least partly result from 
the fact that they reflect different aspects of electoral competition. A party which 
drives the politicization of immigration issues by issue entrepreneurship in its mani-
festo must not necessarily be the most visible one in the subsequent public debate. In 
order to explore this aspect, we analyse the structure of public election debates in 
more detail. This allows distinguishing between strategic drivers of an issue in party 
competition on the one hand and the visibility of a party in a public election debate, 
on the other hand.  
Two competing expectations about actors dominating public election debates on im-
migration issues can be derived from the literature. On the one hand, available re-
search suggests that parties, which strongly emphasise an issue in their manifestos, 
will also play an important role in campaign debates as covered by the mass media. 
Research shows that despite the gate keeping role of the media, the issue emphasis 
 
9 It is also argued that mainstream parties in opposition are especially likely to emphasise new issues 
(Van de Wardt 2015). We only find modest evidence for this expectation in our data, which is present-
ed in the appendix. 
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strategies as found in party manifestos are translated into the news coverage of politi-
cal parties (Merz 2017). Against this background, we expect that radical right popu-
list parties employing issue entrepreneurial strategies in their manifestos are particu-
larly visible in the media, provided that the issue is politicised. 
H4: Radical right populist parties are the most visible actors in highly politicised 
public election debates on immigration issues. 
 
On the other hand, the scholarly literature provides several arguments why main-
stream parties of the moderate left and moderate right can be expected to dominate 
politicised debates on immigration even if they do not employ an issue entrepreneuri-
al strategy. Mainstream parties may decide for strategic reasons to respond to an issue 
emphasised by a challenger parties either by accommodating to its position or by tak-
ing an adversarial stance (Meguid 2005). These parties are found to be particularly 
sensitive to the actions of their competitors and pick up issues that figure prominently 
on the party system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). Moreover, there 
is evidence that mainstream parties may be forced into a debate by “systemic pres-
sures” (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). This may result in “contagious effects” as iden-
tified by van Spanje (2010) for anti-immigration parties. As a result, moderate right 
and moderate left parties may become the most visible actors on an issue in an elec-
tion debate, even if they do not emphasise it in their manifestos, as shown by Dolezal 
and Hellström (2016) for European integration issues.  
Hypothesis 5: Mainstream parties are the most visible actors in highly politicised 
election debates on immigration issues. 
 
6.3 Research Design and Methods 
To analyse the politicization of immigration in Western Europe in national elections, 
we present a comparative study of 44 national election campaigns in six countries 
(Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Our 
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focus is on 38 elections between the early 1990s until 2017, including elections after 
the “refugee crisis”. Our data includes every parliamentary election since the early 
1990s. In addition, we include one election from the mid-1970s, which serves as a 
point of reference from a period when politicization of immigration is commonly 
assumed as being low. 10 An overview of the elections covered in our analysis is pro-
vided in Table 7 in the appendix. 
This data provides a broad empirical testing ground for the hypotheses laid out above. 
Our sample includes those four liberal states which have been the focus of empirical 
research on the policies and politics of immigration in Europe, namely Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In addition, we include two West 
European countries in which radical populist right parties have been particularly suc-
cessful in the last two decades, namely Austria and Switzerland. As emphasised by 
Kriesi (2016), the six West European countries covered by our study are distinct from 
East and South European countries with regard to the structuring of political conflict 
and the importance of the new ‘demarcation-integration’ cleavage. For this reason, 
we are cautious with generalisations of our findings.  
To study the politicization of immigration, we opt for data on political contestation 
during election campaigns based on two different data sources that provide different 
windows of observation of party behaviour in an election campaign. We use party 
manifesto data to study the strategic efforts of parties to emphasise immigration is-
sues in an election; and we rely on quantitative data collected from mass media to 
analyse party behaviour in public election debates.  
Data on public election debates is taken from projects led by Hanspeter Kriesi and 
Edgar Grande (Kriesi 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008). It is based on a 
quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles. For each country, a quality news-
 
10 In the French case, we considered the first round of the presidential elections, because these elec-
tions are considered as being the most important national elections. Data on the election for the 1970s 
is only available for the parliamentary election in 1978. The election in 1988 is the first presidential 
election included in our sample. In the Austrian case, the snap election of 1995 is not included. 
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paper and a tabloid newspaper were chosen.11 Articles referring to politics were se-
lected and subsequently coded using the core sentence approach, a method developed 
by Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001). It treats ‘core sentences’, which consist of a 
relation between a subject (party actors) and an object (issues) as the unit of analysis. 
The approach allows building an issue category on immigration which comprises of 
all statements of party actors on immigration and integration policies.  
In line with the scholarly literature (De Wilde 2011; Hutter and Grande 2014), we 
conceptualise politicization as a multi-faceted process which includes both the public 
visibility of conflict (i.e., its salience) and the polarisation of actors on a contentious 
issue. Following Hutter and Grande (2014), Hutter et al. (2016) and Hoeglinger 
(2016), we measure politicization of the immigration issue in election campaigns by 
multiplying the salience of the issue with its degree of polarisation.12 Regarding the 
issue of European integration, this literature shows that these two dimensions of polit-
icization are independent and that multiplying them provides meaningful results. This 
is confirmed by our own data, in which both dimensions of politicization are uncorre-
lated (r = -0.03, t = -0.16), i.e., they measure different aspects of politicization.13 Both 
variables are measured at the systemic level (i.e. at the level of the overall party sys-
tem) and are then multiplied to arrive at an overall indicator of politicization. Salience 
in this context refers to the visibility of the immigration issue in relation to other is-
sues in an election campaign. Accordingly, the indicator is operationalised as the per-
centage share of core sentences on immigration compared to the number of all obser-
vations during an election. Polarisation is measured as the positional variance be-
tween parties about the immigration issue. We also calculate the mean of these varia-
bles over all issues covered by our data set to arrive at benchmarks that allow distin-
guishing between elections with comparatively high or low levels of politicization. 
 
11 Newspapers included are: Die Presse & Kronenzeitung (Austria); Le Monde & Le Parisien (France); 
Süddeutsche Zeitung & Bild (Germany); NRC Handelsblad & Algemen Dagblad (Netherlands); The 
Times & The Sun (UK); Neue Zürcher Zeitung & Blick (Switzerland). 
12 We do not include ‘actor expansion’, a third dimension of politicisation (see Hutter and Grande 
(2014), in our analysis because it is inherently associated with our main explanatory variable, namely 
issue entrepreneurship of challenger parties. 
13 The empirical analysis of van der Brug et al. (2015, 192) also shows for immigration issues that 
salience and polarisation are not correlated. 
Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe 
70 
 
To measure the visibility of party families in election campaigns, we calculate the 
percentage share of core sentences for a party family on immigration in relation to all 
coded observations on the issue at a given election. Details on the operationalization 
of the dimensions of politicization are provided in the appendix. 
Data on the strategic behaviour of parties is taken from party manifestos collected by 
the Manifesto Project (MARPOR). We adopt the concept of issue entrepreneurial 
strategies as developed by Hobolt and de Vries (2015) to analyse which parties try to 
politicise immigration issues strategically. An issue entrepreneur is a party that pro-
motes an issue and adopts a position that deviates from the mean position in the party 
system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1168).  
As the issue categories of the Manifesto Project do not include an issue category for 
immigration (see Lehmann and Zobel 2018: 2), we provide novel indicators for the 
issue attention of parties and their positions on this topic in party manifestos to meas-
ure the concept. For this purpose, we use the manifestoR corpus which enables apply-
ing text mining approaches to the manifestos covered by the MARPOR project 
(Lehmann et al. 2017; Volkens et al. 2017). In a first step, we use country-specific 
keyword lists to identify sentences addressing immigration issues. Based on this in-
formation, we calculate parties’ issue attention as the percentage share of sentences 
on immigration in relation to all sentences in a manifesto. In a subsequent step, we 
draw a sample of 20 sentences on immigration from each manifesto to manually code 
a party’s position. Here, we differentiate between supportive, neutral and sceptical 
positions and use the mean value from these codings to arrive at a position score for 
each party. Positional deviance is then calculated as the distance of a party’s position 
from the mean position of the party system at the time of the election. Following 
Hobolt and de Vries (2015: 1169), both variables are then multiplied to get an overall 
measure of a party’s entrepreneurial strategy.  
To validate this method, we use data on parties’ issue attention and positions on im-
migration also measured in party manifestos using a crowd-sourced coding approach 
(Lehmann and Zobel 2018). As many manifestos are covered in both studies, it is 
possible to use this study to validate our indicators. Due to very high correlations be-
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tween the indicators derived in the two studies, we conclude that our coding approach 
produces valid results. A detailed description of this approach and the validation pro-
cedure is provided in the appendix.  
Given the theoretical arguments presented above, we distinguish between two types 
of parties: mainstream and challenger parties. Challenger parties are characterised by 
the fact that they have not previously held political office and occupy positions which 
are distinct from the mean position in the party system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 
251). This definition encompasses all kinds of parties from radical left and radical 
right party families, as well as green, regionalist, and single-issue parties, but it ex-
cludes minor moderate parties. Since we are particularly interested in the role of radi-
cal right challenger parties, we only include parties belonging to this party family in 
our analysis of challenger parties. These are: the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) (Switzer-
land), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(BZÖ) (Austria), Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Germany), UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) (UK), Front National (FN) (France) and Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) and Party for 
Freedom (PVV) (Netherlands). The SVP and FPÖ are included in the category of 
challenger parties although these parties have been in government, thus violating the 
first criterion of a challenger party. However, both parties are consistently considered 
as main representatives of the family of new radical right populist parties (Kitschelt 
1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mudde 2007) and certainly meet the second criterion.  
Mainstream parties are defined as the electorally dominant parties from the moderate 
part of the political spectrum (Meguid 2005: 348). Hence, mainstream parties typical-
ly comprise moderate-left and moderate-right parties that compete for government 
(De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 250). In line with the coding by Meguid (2005) and oth-
ers, we code in our sample the SPÖ (Austria), Labour (UK), PS (France), SPD (Ger-
many), PVdA (Netherlands), and SP (Switzerland) as belonging to the moderate left, 
whereas ÖVP (Austria), Conservatives (UK), UDF and RPR/UMP (both France), 
CDU/CSU (Germany), CDA and VVD (both Netherlands), and CVP (Switzerland) 
are coded as part of the moderate right. Smaller liberal parties (e.g., the German FDP 
and the British Liberal Democrats) are not considered here. In line with Meguid 
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(2005), we do also not include the Swiss Liberal Party (FDP) in the category of mod-
erate right parties. For an overview of our coding of parties see Table 8 in the appen-
dix. 
Finally, to explore the effect of socio-economic factors on politicization, several indi-
cators are available. Regarding immigration, we use the annual share of incoming 
migrants in relation to the overall population of a country from the OECD’s Interna-
tional Migration Database as an independent variable.14 To study the role of griev-
ance effects, we show the results for the most conventional one, namely the annual 
unemployment rate in percent, as provided by the Comparative Political Data Set 
(CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 2016). We cross-checked the validity of these indicators 
by calculating the relationship between politicization and other socio-economic indi-
cators, and we also explored the impact of time-lags within this relationship. These 
additional tests corroborate the findings presented in the empirical section below and 
are shown in the appendix. 
 
6.4 Empirical Findings 
In the following, we present our empirical findings in four steps. First, we show de-
scriptive data on the dependent variable, namely politicization of immigration in na-
tional elections. Second, we investigate the relationship between politicization and 
socio-economic variables. Third, we analyse the impact of the strategies of challenger 
parties on politicization. Fourth, we explore the visibility of party families in cam-
paign debates on immigration issues.  
 
National patterns of politicization 
How strong is the politicization of immigration in the national electoral arena? How 
much variation is there over time and across countries? As shown in Figure 1, immi-
gration has become a highly politicised issue in national elections since the 1990s. 
 
14 http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=MIG&lang=en# (accessed 20.06.2018). No reliable 
information on the number of incoming migrants for France and for Germany in 2017 is available. 
Hence, these elections are excluded from analyses on the role of socio-economic factors.  
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We find several elections in which immigration has been a highly politicised issue in 
every country, except for the UK. This becomes apparent in comparison to the 1970s, 
when immigration issues were almost invisible in the electoral arena. As shown by 
Kriesi et al. (2008), immigration has become the main driver for the transformation of 
political conflict in this period. Average values for the entire period are rather moder-
ate, however, and values for individual dimensions indicate that politicization of im-
migration has been mainly driven by polarisation.15 
Figure 1 also reveals remarkable fluctuation between elections in each country. Ex-
cept for the UK, we observe striking ups and downs in the development of politiciza-
tion. This pattern is most pronounced in France where highly politicised elections in 
1988, 2002 and 2012 were followed by moderate levels of politicization in subse-
quent elections in 1995, 2007 and 2017. Moreover, there is considerable variation 
across countries. Among the six countries included in our sample, the UK is a clear 
outlier. Immigration has been a low key issue in national elections for most of the 
time, but politicization has been increasing to a moderate level since the mid-2000s 
not the least due to the Conservative Party’s efforts to acquire issue ownership while 
in opposition (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). The other countries witnessed pro-
nounced peaks of politicization in the 1990s, although with significant differences in 
timing. Elections after 2010 are often characterised by a sharp increase in the politici-
zation of immigration. The Dutch election in 2012 and the German election in 2017, 
where we measure the highest values in our sample, clearly stand out.  
 
15 Details on the level of politicisation as well as additional information on the two sub-dimensions of 
the concept of politicisation are provided in the appendix. 
Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe 
74 
 
Figure 1: The politicization of immigration in national elections per country  
 
Note: Graph shows the level of politicization of the immigration issue in national elections for each 
country over time in national election campaigns as covered by the media. The black dashed lines 
indicate the linear trend. The horizontal, grey dashed lines show the mean politicization calculated 
over all issues in our data and serves as a benchmark to distinguish between high and low levels of 
politicization. 
 
Socio-economic factors and grievances 
Is the politicization of immigration issues in national elections due to ‘objective’ fac-
tors such as the number of incoming migrants and economic grievances? In the left 
panel of Figure 2, we take the annual change in the number of immigrants entering a 
country as an indicator for the size of the ‘objective pressure’ exercised by immigra-
tion and relate it to the level of politicization of immigration issues in national elec-
tions. Evidently, the two variables are hardly correlated (r = 0.10; t = 0.58). These 
results are in line with the conclusions of van der Brug et al. (2015, 192) that no sys-
tematic relationship exists between politicization of immigration and immigration-
related variables such as the number of immigrants living in a country, the number of 
immigrants entering the country, or the composition of the immigrant population. 
Neither is politicization driven by economic grievances. As we can see in the right 
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panel of Figure 2, no positive correlation exists between the politicization of immi-
gration and unemployment (r = 0.05; t = -0.29). This also holds for other economic 
variables on which data is available in Armingeon et al. (2016). The results of these 
analyses are shown in the appendix. 
Taken together, these analyses contradict the hypothesis on the importance of socio-
economic factors (H1). Politicization is neither correlated with ‘objective’ properties 
of immigration nor with economic grievances of the native population. These find-
ings add to the insights of studies which emphasise the importance of political fac-
tors, and particularly political parties, for politicising immigration issues (see, e.g. 
Kitschelt 1995; Messina 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2015). 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between politicization and socio-economic factors 
 
Note: The left panel shows the level of politicization of immigration in relation to the annual share of 
incoming migrants as a percentage of the total population of a country. The right panel shows the rela-
tionship between the politicization of immigration and the unemployment rate in the country. Black 
lines show the linear fit, grey areas show the standard error.  
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The role of issue entrepreneurship of radical right challenger parties 
The increase in immigration in Western Europe has been accompanied with the surge 
of anti-immigration groups, in particular radical right populist parties (Messina 2007: 
54-96). The organisation of this ‘nativist backlash’ and its political relevance varies 
considerable among the six countries of our sample. France and the Netherlands are 
characterised by the emergence of electorally successful new radical right populist 
parties; in Austria and Switzerland, two established moderate right parties radically 
changed their programmatic profiles and adopted restrictive positions on immigration 
issues in the 1990s; whereas in Germany and the UK, efforts to establish a radical 
right populist party at the national level have not been successful in most of the peri-
od covered by our study. Hence, radical right populist parties have not been relevant 
in all the countries included in our sample. Are there differences in the strategic em-
phasis of immigration issues between party families in their election manifestos? And 
how are these strategies related to the politicization of immigration issues in public 
election debates? 
Figure 3 shows the efforts of party families (moderate right, moderate left and radical 
populist right parties) to emphasise immigration issues in their manifestos. Compar-
ing issue entrepreneurship between these three groups reveals significant differences. 
On average, radical right populist parties put considerably more effort in politicising 
immigration issues than other parties (mean = 5.01; sd = 3.17). In contrast, parties of 
the moderate right (mean = 1.17; sd = 1.13) and parties of the moderate left (mean = 
0.72; sd = 0.99) show much lower average levels of issue entrepreneurship. The high 
average value of radical populist right parties is due to higher scores on both compo-
nents of issue entrepreneurship: Radical right populist parties put more emphasis on 
the issue on average (mean = 6.03) than parties of the moderate right (mean = 3.10) 
and moderate left (mean = 2.08). Moreover, they also deviate more strongly from the 
mean position in the party system (mean = 0.79) than parties of the moderate right 
(mean = 0.36) and moderate left (mean = 0.32). These findings provide no evidence 
that moderate right parties play a prominent role as strategic drivers of immigration 
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issues in the electoral arena as suggested by parts of the scholarly literature (e.g. Bale 
2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008).  
 
Figure 3: Issue entrepreneurship on immigration issues by party family 
Note: Issue entrepreneurship is measured as the product of the salience a party puts on immigration 
issues and its positional deviance from the mean position in the party system based on party manifesto 
content. Bars indicate the mean values for each party family. Spikes represent the 95% confidence 
interval. 
 
These results indicate that immigration issues are of greater strategic importance for 
radical right populist parties in election campaigns compared to other party families. 
However, this does not imply that these efforts necessarily lead to the politicization of 
immigration issues in public election debates. To explore the role of radical challeng-
er parties and mainstream parties of the moderate left and moderate right in this re-
gard, Table 1 shows the results of regression analyses which treat the level of politici-
zation as the dependent variable and issue entrepreneurship of party families as the 
main independent variables. Model 1 shows that issue entrepreneurship of radical 
right populist parties is positively and statistically significantly related to the level of 
politicization in election campaigns, while this is not the case for mainstream parties. 
In the former case the increase in politicization levels is, in fact, quite sizeable. Politi-
cization ranges from a below-average value of 1.8 when issue entrepreneurship of 
radical right populist parties is at the lower quartile to an above-average value of 3.0 
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when it is at the upper quartile. This difference corresponds to 12% of the range of 
politicization values. Thus, we do find evidence for our ’challenger party hypothesis’ 
(H2), but not for the ’moderate right party hypothesis’ (H3). Politicization of immi-
gration issues is driven by issue entrepreneurial strategies of radical right populist 
parties rather than by efforts of other party families.16 
To explore this finding in more detail, we additionally check whether the association 
remains significant when controlling for the vote share of radical populist right par-
ties. That is indeed the case as Model 2 shows. The fact that the coefficient for the 
vote share of these parties is close to zero and fails to reach statistical significance, 
provides further evidence that it is not simply the presence of radical right populist 
parties that fuels the politicization of immigration, but their strategic focus on immi-
gration issues.  
 
Table 1: Linear regression models of politicization of immigration issues 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimate std. Error Estimate std. Error 
Intercept 1.79*** 0.47 1.80*** 0.50 
Radical populist right 0.20* 0.07 0.21* 0.10 
Moderate right 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.23 
Moderate left -0.18 0.13 -0.16 0.15 
Vote share (RRPs)   -0.01 0.03 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: White’s robust standard errors clustered for countries are computed; * p<.05 ** p<.01; N=38.  
 
 
16 The finding of a strong and significant coefficient for issue entrepreneurship of radical right populist 
parties remains the same, when we estimate, as a robustness test, robust standard errors or log-
transform the skewed dependent variable. When including other party families in the analysis like 
green parties or liberals, we also find no significant associations for these actors, while the coefficient 
for radical right populist parties is still significant. Moreover, we find no evidence that the coefficient 
of issue entrepreneurship of one of our party families is conditional on the behaviour of others as all 
interaction effects between issue entrepreneurship of different party families fail to reach statistical 
significance. 
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The visibility of different party families in debates on immigration  
The strategic impact of radical challenger parties on politicization must not be equat-
ed with their visibility in public election debates. In the last step of our analysis, we 
explore the actor composition in mass mediated election debates with above average 
levels of politicization on immigration. This allows us to uncover the relative im-
portance of party families in public election debates. Figure 4 shows the results for 
the 29 elections with high levels of politicization. Our analysis reveals that moderate 
mainstream parties are the most visible actors in more than half of these elections. 
Taken together mainstream parties from the moderate left and moderate right account 
for more than 50 percent of all coded core sentences on the issue in these elections. 
This even holds true for elections in which mainstream parties were confronted with a 
strong challenger party from the radical right as it was the case in the 2017 German 
election, where more than 70 percent of all coded statements can be attributed to the 
moderate left (SPD) or the moderate right (CDU/CSU). Moreover, the visibility of 
mainstream parties is not positively related to the mobilising efforts of these parties 
as measured in their manifestos. We observe no significant correlation between issue 
entrepreneurship and visibility for parties from the moderate right (r = 0.22, t = 1.16) 
and the moderate left (r = -0.19, t = 1.01). Thus, in line with Hypothesis 5, and simi-
lar to the findings reported by van der Brug et al. (2015), we find that mainstream 
parties are very visible actors in politicised election debates on immigration, irrespec-
tive of the campaign strategy they pursue in their manifestos.  
This is not to say that challenger parties are always marginalised by mainstream par-
ties in these debates. In line with Hypothesis 4, Figure 4 also shows elections in 
which radical right populist parties are highly visible. Most evidently, this holds for 
Switzerland where the SVP is by far the most visible party on immigration issues in a 
number of elections. The Swiss SVP is a special case, however. As it has been in 
government in the entire period it is not a typical example of a challenger party. More 
instructive are the French election in 2002 and the Dutch election in 2012, which 
show that new non-governing challenger parties can also dominate election debates 
on immigration. Moreover, in contrast to the findings for moderate mainstream par-
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ties, we find a positive and significant relationship between issue entrepreneurship 
and visibility for radical right populist parties (r = 0.58, t = 3.71). In sum, these re-
sults provide mixed support for both hypotheses on the visibility of party families in 
politicised election debates on immigration issues.  
 
Figure 4: Visibility of party families in politicised election debates on immigra-
tion 
 
Note: Stacked bars represent the relative visibility of a party family in relation to other party families 
in a campaign debates on immigration issues as covered by the media. The dashed horizontal line 
allows identifying elections where moderate mainstream parties account for more than half of all cod-
ed observations. Only debates where the politicization of immigration is above our benchmark are 
reported. Bars are sorted by the joint visibility of mainstream parties. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis provides mixed support for the arguments advanced in the 
scholarly literature on the politicization of immigration in Europe. Three conclusions 
stand out. First, our analysis confirms earlier findings which observe a significant 
increase in politicization of immigration issues since the 1990s in Western Europe for 
the electoral arena (Kriesi et al. 2012; Messina 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2015). Im-
migration has become a highly controversial issue in national election contests. We 
found evidence for strong politicization in every country we analysed, but we also 
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found remarkable variation over time and across countries. The extreme fluctuation in 
the intensity of political conflict over immigration within countries is one of the most 
puzzling features of politicization of this issue. The marked peaks in politicization 
and the consistently high polarisation values suggest that the potential for politiciza-
tion has been huge in the entire period, but this potential has not been fully exploited 
in every election thus far. 
Second, politicization is not correlated with socio-economic factors such as the share 
of immigrants in a country or the level of unemployment. Therefore, our first hypoth-
esis (H1) must be rejected. It is certainly true that the existence of some immigration 
has been a necessary precondition for political mobilisation, but there is no direct 
relationship between the intensity of political conflict and socio-economic grievances. 
This is not to say that socio-economic factors are entirely irrelevant in our context; 
but they do not translate directly into manifest political conflict among political par-
ties in the electoral arena.  
Third, previous findings on the political actors responsible for the politicization of 
immigration in the electoral arena must be qualified. Our results support arguments 
which claim that the issue entrepreneurship of radical right populist challenger parties 
leads to higher levels of politicization. Contrary to some scholarly expectations, we 
found no similar effect for moderate mainstream parties. This is not to say that the 
strategic efforts of challenger parties to emphasize the immigration issue in their 
manifestos necessarily results in high visibility in public election campaigns. Our 
analysis of campaign debates suggests that both radical challenger parties and main-
stream parties can dominate these debates.  
Summing up, political conflict over immigration follows a ‘political logic’ (Messina 
2007) and must be attributed to parties and party competition rather than to ‘objective 
pressures’ in Western Europe. The fact that political parties have significant room for 
strategic manoeuvring regarding immigration issues makes it even more important to 
understand what they make of these opportunities. 
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7. Comparing Channels of Communication17 
How party-issue linkages vary between election manifestos and media con-
tent 
 
 
Abstract 
So far, research on party behaviour has largely focused on the drivers of issue sali-
ence in direct party communication. However, less is known about party-issue link-
ages in election campaigns as covered by the mass media, from where most voters get 
their information about parties and their issue positions. Against this background, we 
explore how two important drivers of issue salience in direct party communication – 
issue ownership and systemic salience – play out in the media. Based on considera-
tions about the news value of specific party-issue associations, we expect both rela-
tionships to be particularly important there. Despite substantial similarities in party-
issue linkages across platforms, a comparison of manifesto and newspaper content 
reveals evidence for this claim. In particular, smaller parties are found to be hardly 
covered in the news on issues they do not own, while large parties are especially cov-
ered on salient topics. These findings contribute to our understanding of issue compe-
tition in mediated environments. 
  
 
17 This chapter is identical to a manuscript co-authored with Matthias Fatke and Swen Hutter. After a 
decision to revise & resubmit the manuscript, it is again under review at West European Politics as 
Schwarzbözl et al. (2018). 
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7.1 Introduction 
Representative democracy depends on political parties providing visible statements 
about substantive issues (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]). This makes agenda setting in 
election campaigns by political parties highly relevant, and unsurprisingly issue sali-
ence has become a major topic in research on party competition. However, most in-
sights on the driving forces of parties’ issue attention are based on the analysis of 
direct party communication like election manifestos. This is unfortunate, as party-
issue linkages presented in the mass media seem particularly relevant for voters’ per-
ception of electoral contests in present-day democracies (Hopmann et al. 2012; 
Meyer et al. 2017). Moreover, research shows that issue salience in direct party 
communication is related to the coverage of parties’ issue statements in the media 
(Merz 2017), but it also points out that not all issue-related party messages are equal-
ly likely to gain media attention (Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017; Haselmayer, 
Wagner, et al. 2017; Meyer et al. 2017). This begs the question to what degree issue 
salience, as observed by voters in the media, deviates from patterns found in direct 
party communication.  
Against this background, this paper explores how two key explanations of issue sali-
ence – issue ownership and systemic salience – play out in mass media as compared 
to direct party communication in election manifestos. According to issue ownership 
on the one hand, parties are expected to address particularly those issues that they 
‘own’, in the sense that they should focus on topics they are associated with or seen 
as competent in dealing with (e.g., Egan 2013; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; 
Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003; Rauh 2015; Thesen 
et al. 2017; Wagner and Meyer 2014). On the other hand, the agenda-setting litera-
ture, in particular, has suggested that parties adapt to the prevailing issue attention of 
other parties (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; 
Green-Pedersen et al. 2015). 
When applied to the context of mass media, we expect that the two theoretical expla-
nations play a more important role as compared to party manifestos. First, the posi-
tions of issue owners are expected to be particularly newsworthy. Second, the me-
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dia’s tendency to strongly focus on a very limited set of issues, which are broadly 
debated, should amplify the role of systemic effects. In addition, the size of a given 
party is arguably a crucial conditional factor in this regard. More precisely, we expect 
the ‘issue ownership’ argument to apply mostly to smaller parties: In the media, small 
issue owners are particularly covered on issues they own. The ‘systemic salience’ 
expectation, in contrast, should especially hold for large parties: Irrespective of own-
ing an issue or not, large parties receive disproportionately high attention, when an 
issue is broadly covered in the news. This effectively leads to a stronger relationship 
between systemic salience and issue attention in mass media. 
To test our arguments, we draw on two different datasets on party-issue associations 
in text documents. The first dataset is an updated version of data collected by the Pro-
ject ‘National Political Change in a Globalizing World’ (Hutter and Kriesi 2019; 
Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008) and contains partisan statements as reported in 
two national newspapers during the two months before national elections. The second 
dataset is the party manifesto data collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2015). The empirical analysis in this paper covers 34 na-
tional election campaigns in six West European countries in the period from 1988 to 
2013. The specific countries under scrutiny are Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
The results show that party-issue linkages in both data sources resemble. Issue own-
ership and systemic salience are positively related to a party’s linkage with an issue in 
both party manifestos and the news. However, the relationship with issue ownership 
is even more pronounced in the mass media than in manifesto, whereas the effects of 
systemic salience are not significantly different across the two communication chan-
nels. Moreover, we do find that both effects are conditional on party size. That is, the 
differences of the issue ownership effects across the two datasets are particularly 
large for small parties, while systemic salience plays a greater role in the news media 
only for large parties.  
These findings contribute to a better understanding of issue competition in election 
campaigns. They show that systematic deviations do exist between party-issue link-
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ages in the media as compared to direct campaign communication, but these devia-
tions should not be exaggerated. Despite the importance of the media as a gatekeeper 
of information during election campaigns, general patterns of party-issue linkages 
found in direct campaign communication like party manifestos are also present in 
campaign debates covered by the mass media in newspaper articles. Nevertheless, 
systematic differences exist between small parties that are hardly covered by the me-
dia on issues with which they are not associated, and large parties whose positions are 
particularly likely to be reported when a topic is broadly discussed in the news. Put 
differently, especially the visibility of smaller parties in the media depends on the 
specific issues which dominate a campaign. These results have implications not only 
for political fairness and the content and polarization of public debates in mediated 
campaign communication, but also for the choice of data in research on party compe-
tition. Data from direct and mediated party-issue linkages conveys similar but not 
identical information. This indicates that findings on party competition are context 
sensitive. Hence, generalisations based on results on direct party communication for 
mediated environments and vice versa should be made with caution. By contrast, re-
searchers should exploit the combination of different data sources to fully understand 
the dynamics of political conflict in contemporary democracies. 
 
7.2 Exploring Party-Issue Linkages Across Communication Channels 
In order to assess the degree to which parties highlight or downplay an issue or are 
associated with certain topics, the concept of issue salience proved to be particularly 
relevant. It is commonly defined as a party’s communication share on a specific issue 
in relation to its overall topic-related communication during a given period of time. 
Relying on this measure, we explore the role of its driving forces with a special focus 
on their relevance for party-issue linkages on different communication channels.  
Concerning direct party communication in election campaigns, a central argument is 
that “parties emphasise certain issues to gain an electoral advantage” (Spoon et al. 
2014: 365). Based on this assumption, the literature derived various explanations for 
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variation in issue emphasis of political parties. On the one hand, parties are expected 
to strategically highlight issues with which they are generally associated, or if voters 
view them as most competent in tackling a given issue (Budge 2015). On the other 
hand, they are assumed to react to the party system agenda by adapting their salience 
strategies in accordance to issues debated by their competitors (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2015) and in response to voters’ issue priorities (Klüver and Sagarzazu 
2016). Moreover, they are expected to ignore issues on which they are internally di-
vided (Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  
These considerations are particularly relevant for direct party communication. How-
ever, when it comes to party-issue linkages reported in the news, not only salience 
strategies of parties, but especially the gate-keeping role of the media plays a crucial 
role (Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017; Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Helfer and 
Aelst 2016; Hopmann et al. 2012; Merz 2017; Meyer et al. 2017). Due to space re-
strictions in media outlets in combination with considerations about the newsworthi-
ness of political messages, the likelihood of party-issue linkages is expected to vary, 
because journalists and editors use their position to select messages with high news 
value (Staab 1990). For instance, statements of more powerful politicians and politi-
cal parties are found to have greater news value (Tresch 2009; Van Aelst and 
Walgrave 2016). The same holds for messages which transport negative content 
(Soroka 2014). Surprising messages, where parties make unexpected statements, are 
also assumed to create a greater news value than predictable ones, but continuity is 
just as important since the media aims to keep existing stories going (Helfer and Aelst 
2016). Finally, relevance increases the chances of a message being covered in news 
reports about political issues, which makes generally salient topics more likely to be 
covered (Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017). To sum up, the selection of party-issue 
linkages in media reports is assumed to be highly dependent on their news value 
(Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Helfer and Aelst 2016; Merz 2017; Van Aelst and 
Walgrave 2016). 
Given these differences between direct and mediated campaign communication the 
question is, to what degree party-issue linkages differ across platforms. Against this 
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background, we provide a systematic comparison and explore how drivers of party-
issue linkages which play an important role in existing research on direct party com-
munication play out in a mass-mediated environment. Specifically, we first discuss 
the impact of issue ownership and the argument that its effect is particularly strong in 
newspaper articles compared to direct party communication in party manifestos. Sec-
ond, we develop an argument, as to why systemic issue salience should also play an 
even more important role in the media. Third, we elaborate why these arguments are 
expected to depend on the size of a party. Overall, this allows evaluating, in what 
ways party-issue linkages in the media diverge from what we know from the study of 
party manifestos.  
 
Media reporting as an amplifier of issue ownership 
The concept of issue ownership is based on the idea that parties acquire a long-term 
reputation in handling different policy issues (Budge and Farlie 1983a; Petrocik 
1996; Petrocik et al. 2003). Voters do not perceive parties as equally competent in 
dealing with issue specific problems. Rather, as Petrocik (1996: 826) puts it, “a histo-
ry of attention, initiative and innovation toward these problems […] leads voters to 
believe that one of the parties (and its candidates) is more sincere and committed to 
doing something about them.” In such a situation, a party owns an issue in the sense 
that it is perceived as having a copyright on the best solutions concerning problems in 
this issue area.  
This definition of issue ownership focuses on the associative dimension of the con-
cept rather than its competence-based part (Banda 2016; Walgrave et al. 2012). In this 
understanding, issue ownership is defined as “an established link between a party and 
an issue” in the sense that voters frequently have a party in mind, when they are con-
fronted with a certain issue (Walgrave et al. 2012: 773). Moreover, the definition 
does not restrict the number of parties owning an issue, as various parties can be as-
sociated and perceived as competent in tackling it. For example, radical left-wing 
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parties and social democrats may be equally associated with welfare related policies 
(Wagner and Meyer 2014: 1021).  
As is well known, the main expectation of issue ownership on the behaviour of politi-
cal parties is that they highlight issues they own (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Thesen 
et al. 2017). Parties are assumed to selectively promote a topic, when voters see them 
as competent in tackling it or perceive them as associated with the issue. Acting this 
way allows parties to appear more credible to voters. This, in turn, should enhance the 
likelihood of people casting their ballot for these parties. Observing such behaviour is 
therefore particularly likely during election campaigns, where parties try to gather 
votes by acting as competent and trustworthy agents. Efforts of populist right-wing 
parties that own law and order issues highlighting the topic to gain electoral grounds 
may serve as a striking example in this regard (Smith 2010).  
Although most parties cover a broad range of topics in their manifestos, existing em-
pirical studies based on manifesto data provide evidence for the issue ownership hy-
pothesis in direct party communication (Dolezal et al. 2014; Wagner and Meyer 
2014). How does this relationship play out in a mediated environment, where consid-
erations about the relevance of a party’s stance and the availability of its positions to 
journalists are crucial (see Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Hayes 2008; Hopmann 
et al. 2012)? One expectation is that it exerts a negative effect on the coverage of is-
sue-related party statements. Based on the idea that rare and unexpected events have a 
particularly high news value, Helfer and Aelst (2016: 63) argue that messages about 
issues, which parties are not associated with and which they seldom address, bear a 
“surprise element” making them more appealing to journalists who try to attract their 
readers’ attention, than statements on issues where a parties stance is already well-
known. Following this argument, issue ownership can be expected to reduce the like-
lihood of party-issue statements to be reported (Helfer and Aelst 2016). Accordingly, 
the positive relationship between issue ownership and issue salience found in mani-
festo research is assumed to be much weaker in news coverage or even works in the 
opposite direction on such platforms.  
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However, it can also be argued that the positive relationship between issue ownership 
and issue salience is likely to play a particularly important role in the media coverage 
of parties. This argument starts from the assumption that a party, which is generally 
associated with a certain issue area, usually has clear positions on the discussed topic 
that are also well-known and therefore easily available to political journalists (Van 
Camp 2018). What is more, due to the long-term reputation of parties in connection 
with the topic at hand, the positions of issue owners are particularly newsworthy. Re-
porting on such parties’ positions allows journalists to contrast and contextualise po-
sitions of other actors. Thus, even if the initial reason for covering an issue is due to 
the (unexpected) activity of other parties, the positions of issue owners are especially 
likely to be reported as well. To test this expectation, we formulate the following hy-
pothesis: 
H1: The difference in a party’s issue attention due to issue ownership is larger in 
news coverage than in party manifestos. 
 
Media reporting as an amplifier of systemic salience 
Notwithstanding that parties’ strategies of selective issue emphasis are driven by is-
sue ownership, an alternative explanation is suggested by the agenda-setting litera-
ture. As highlighted by the notion of party competition as a “conflict over conflicts”, 
this literature conceives the process as a game of strategic interaction (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010: 261). In that sense, parties adjust their behaviour ac-
cording to the actions of their competitors. The agenda-setting approach, therefore, 
qualifies the argument of salience theory by adding that parties are not always equally 
successful at emphasising their preferred issues, but also react to the currently exist-
ing issue agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). They face a decision be-
tween simply ignoring unpleasant issues and responding to them, whilst simultane-
ously trying to shape the agenda according to their own preferences. When the latter 
is not feasible, parties are likely to address issues other parties put forward in the in-
terest of maintaining public visibility. 
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At the level of party systems, the degree of issue convergence of political parties is 
notably high (Damore 2004; Dolezal et al. 2014; Green-Pedersen 2007b; Kaplan et al. 
2006; Sides 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004). In consequence, following the conver-
gence approach to issue emphasis, parties frequently address the same issues 
(Sigelman and Buell 2004). Although studies on individual party behaviour often 
treat systemic issue salience merely as a control variable, they, too, generally provide 
empirical evidence of parties addressing issues that their competitors put on the agen-
da (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Hoeglinger 2015; Meyer and Wagner 
2016; Spoon 2012; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Tresch et al. 2018).  
Again, we expect the positive relationship between systemic salience and a party’s 
issue attention to matter more for parties’ issue competition if reported by the media 
than in direct party communication as observed through their manifestos. Media cov-
erage can be characterised by ‘cascading’, referring to “the fact that actors imitate 
other actors such that an exponentially increasing number of imitators lead to explo-
sive adjustments to the system” (Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2010: 1148). Most of 
the news programme is therefore devoted to the few issues dominating the agenda. 
This expectation is very much in line with the idea of continuity and relevance as 
factors boosting a story’s news value (Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 2017; Helfer and 
Aelst 2016). In sum, this leads to the expectation that intensely discussed topics are 
more likely to feature a broad range of positions from various parties. From the per-
spective of parties, chances of being mentioned are low on topics that are granted 
little space in the news. By contrast, it is expected to be especially high on salient 
issues. This is a crucial difference to party manifestos as a channel of direct commu-
nication, where parties – despite disproportionate emphasis on preferred issues – aim 
to offer a broad overview of the policy positions they stand for (see De Sio et al. 
2018: 1217). Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H2: The difference in a party’s issue attention due to systemic issue salience is larger 
in news coverage than in party manifestos. 
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The role of party size in explaining issue salience on different communication plat-
forms 
The two hypotheses offer two different expectations for issue salience in the media, 
in comparison to direct communication platforms. The first hypothesis assumes that 
ownership matters more in the media; the second hypothesis claims that parties re-
ceive more attention on issues that figure prominently on the overall agenda in a me-
diated environment. These two expectations are logically not incompatible. Neverthe-
less, we expect them not to apply to all parties in the same way. More specifically, we 
elaborate why it is likely that they both depend on the size of a given party – a critical 
factor distinguishing the competitors in a party system 
Existing research on party behaviour highlights the importance of party size. Smaller 
parties, on the one hand, are found to rely on their owned issues, because they lack 
the money and the personnel to address a variety of topics (Wagner and Meyer 2014). 
Larger parties, on the other hand, are more sensitive to the party system agenda. For 
the case of the Austrian election in 2008, Meyer and Wagner (2016) show that espe-
cially resource strong parties are likely to engage in debates with each other. Similar-
ly, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015) find for the case of the Danish party sys-
tem that large mainstream parties are more responsive to issues on the party system 
agenda than other parties.  
We argue that the considerations about the news value of a party’s issue-associations 
mentioned above are likely to be contingent upon party size as well, which allows 
further qualifications of the hypotheses derived above. When a party is rather small, 
its position in the coverage of an issue is likely to be reported only if it is the issue 
owner. Under such circumstances, reporting a parties’ position, which is generally 
associated with the topic, provides an important anchor for readers to interpret other 
actor’s positions. An illustrative example is a news report on an environmental policy 
proposal of the government which emphasises not only the view of the mainstream 
opposition but also the one of the green party as the respective issue owner. However, 
when small parties are not issue owners (such as the radical right and the environ-
mental issue), their positions are unlikely to elicit the interest of news outlets or con-
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sumers. Accordingly, issue ownership is expected to matter more to the issue atten-
tion of small parties in news coverage, than in party manifestos, where these re-
strictions are absent.  
In contrast, for large parties, it is expected that news outlets report about their posi-
tions, regardless of them owning an issue or not. Election campaigns, even in parlia-
mentary systems, are characterised by a strong focus of attention on lead candidates 
and their parties (Kriesi 2012). Reports on important political issues during election 
campaigns that do not cover all large parties with good chances to govern after the 
election are extremely unlikely. This is particularly the case, when other parties are 
often mentioned on the issue. In such a case, news outlets will report in great detail 
on the position of a large party on the issue, regardless of the party being comfortable 
with the issue or not. Therefore, systemic issue salience is expected to be more im-
portant for issue attention in news coverage than in party manifestos, especially for 
large parties. This leads us to hypothesise:  
H3: Issue ownership matters more for issue attention of small parties in news cover-
age than in party manifestos. 
H4: Systemic salience matters more for issue attention of large parties in news cov-
erage than in party manifestos. 
 
7.3 Design and Data 
To test these hypotheses, we rely on newspaper data and party manifesto content. The 
study covers party behaviour during national election campaigns in Austria, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland between 1988 and 2013.18 
For the study of newspaper content, articles, that report on party politics, were identi-
fied and collected within a period of two months before an election in two national 
newspapers in each country. For each country, a leading quality newspaper and a tab-
 
18 The data used in this article originated from the research projects “National political change in a 
globalizing world (NPW)” (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). The data can be obtained from the authors of the 
research project. 
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loid newspaper were chosen: Austria: Die Presse & Kronenzeitung; France: Le 
Monde & Le Parisien; Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung & Bild; Netherlands: NRC 
Handelsblad & Algemen Dagblad; UK: The Times & The Sun; Switzerland: Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung & Blick. 
A representative sample of articles for each election was then coded according to the 
core-sentence approach (Dolezal 2008; Dolezal et al. 2016; Hutter et al. 2016; 
Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). A core sentence can be defined as the smallest 
syntactical unit of a sentence containing a relational statement between a subject actor 
and an object actor. For the analysis performed here, only party actors (subjects) posi-
tioning towards issues (object) are considered. To allow for a systematic comparison 
with party manifestos, we selected exactly the same elections and parties as included 
in the analysis of newspaper articles from the MARPOR database (Volkens et al. 
2015). Based on this data, we explore the salience of the following issues: welfare, 
economic liberalism, cultural liberalism, Europe, immigration and environment. In 
order to run comparable analyses for newspaper data and manifestos content, we re-
code the issues used in MARPOR accordingly. As these issues cover a large propor-
tion of party statements in manifestos and in the media, this allows a comprehensive 
analysis of our hypotheses on a broad range of topics and elections (see Table 10 in 
the appendix for a description of these categories and an overview of the recoding 
procedure).19 
The structure of the two datasets is very similar since they both comprise of party-
issue associations extracted from text documents. To additionally foster the compara-
bility between them, salience in media and manifesto data is measured according to 
the same logic. To calculate the salience of an issue in newspaper data, we use the 
percentage share of a party’s core sentences on an issue in relation to all its state-
ments during the election campaign. This indicator has two advantages. First, it is not 
affected by the overall visibility of a party in the media, which allows comparing par-
 
19 Overall, these six issue categories account for 69% of the issues reported in the media and 61% in 
party manifestos. 
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ties of different size.20 Second, it reflects the degree to which a party emphasises an 
issue in relation to other topics. The systemic salience of an issue is then measured by 
the number of core sentences about an issue in relation to all sentences coded during a 
campaign, excluding always the sentences of the party for which we calculate the 
systemic salience to avoid problems of endogeneity (see also Hoeglinger 2015). For 
party manifestos, salience scores are taken from the MARPOR database indicating 
the percentage share of coded quasi-sentences on a given issue in relation to all coded 
statements in a party’s manifesto. The systemic salience is calculated by the mean 
percentage share of statements on an issue in the party system. Again, a party’s own 
salience scores are excluded from the calculation (see also Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2015: 752). For both data sources, the calculation is based on all parties 
included in the analysis at a given election.  
There are various understandings and approaches to measure issue ownership 
(Lefevere et al. 2017; Walgrave et al. 2012). One way is to use survey data asking 
voters which party is most competent in tackling those issues they find important 
(e.g., Dolezal et al. 2014; Minozzi 2014). On the one hand, this competence-based 
dimension of issue ownership is difficult to measure (Stubager 2018) and suitable 
data for cross-country research over longer periods of time is not available. On the 
other hand, the argument provided in H1 is related rather to the associative dimension 
than the competence-based variant. In short, it claims that when a party is generally 
associated with an issue area, their positions have a higher news value and are there-
fore especially attractive for journalists and editors, regardless of these parties being 
 
20 The study includes all parties that are also coded in the Comparative Manifesto project that fulfil two 
additional requirements. First, parties need to achieve more than 5 percent of the votes at the election 
under study. This criterion guarantees that the overall results are not affected by very small parties, 
which are largely irrelevant for the logic of party competition. Second, a party is only included, when 
it is to some degree visible in the public debate. Therefore, the mass-media dataset must contain at 
least a total of twenty core sentences for a party related any kind of political issues. This threshold is 
necessary to secure the accuracy of the salience measure; extremely low overall numbers of core sen-
tences do not allow inferring a party’s emphasis on a specific issue. It is important to note that on most 
instances, parties either fail on both or none of these requirements. 
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perceived as competent in tackling a certain issue. Therefore, we follow the approach 
proposed by Wagner and Meyer (2014: 1025) that taps into this associative dimen-
sion of issue ownership. Specifically, we assign issue ownership dichotomously by 
relying on information from single country studies and taking cues from party family 
and the categorisation by Wagner and Meyer (2014) (See Table 11 in the appendix 
for an overview).  
To explore the role of party size as a moderator of issue ownership and systemic issue 
salience effects in different communication platforms, we use a party’s vote share at 
the election under study from the MARPOR database (Volkens et al. 2015). Addi-
tional indicators and control variables at the party level such as parties’ left-right po-
sitions are also taken from this data source. An overview of all the variables, their 
operationalisation, data sources, and descriptive statistics is provided in Table 12in 
the appendix. 
The final data set includes information about parties’ issue salience in newspapers 
and party manifesto data, on the issues mentioned before (see Table 13 in the appen-
dix for more information on the elections and parties covered). Since the issue sali-
ence corresponds to the share of a party’s statements, we estimate fractional logit 
regression models in order to account for the dependent variable being bound be-
tween 0 and 1. Models include fixed effects for country-years (34 elections) and for 
issues domains (6 issues). Standard errors are computed using bootstrapping to avoid 
inefficient estimation due to the skewness of the dependent variable and potential 
heteroskedasticity. Testing the robustness of our results, we consider several alterna-
tive model specifications. First, we specify Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-
inflated negative binomial regression models accounting for potential overdispersion 
in our data due to issues not being mentioned by some parties. Second, we compute 
Huber-White and clustered robust standard errors for parties. Third, we use a lagged 
variable of systemic issue salience based on the previous election campaign. Fourth, 
instead of vote share we apply an indicator for a party’s nicheness as proposed by 
Bischof (2017), who suggests to measure to concept as the differences in parties’ em-
phasis on a group of pre-defined niche segments and how narrow their offer on these 
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segments is based on party manifesto content. None of the alternative specifications 
substantially alter our findings or consistently turn out to be more conservative. In the 
following, we present results based on fractional logit regression models, which show 
the overall best fit. However, we will report the alternative specifications as robust-
ness checks at the end of the presentation of our results.  
The following analysis consists of three steps. First, we provide a brief descriptive 
overview of the distribution of issue salience in party manifestos and in the news and 
show how both variables relate to each other. In a second step, we test whether coef-
ficients of issue ownership and systemic salience differ between the two channels of 
communication by estimating interaction effects. Finally, we explore if these differ-
ences between data sources are conditional on the size of a given party. To that end, 
we include three-way interaction terms between party size according to vote share, 
communication channel, and issue ownership or systemic salience, respectively. 
 
7.4 Empirical Results 
To begin with, we explore the distribution of our two dependent variables – issue 
salience in party manifestos and in the media. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of both variables. Issue salience in manifestos, as well as in the news, is 
highly skewed as most issues only receiving little to no attention by political parties. 
Only rarely, parties devote much of their attention towards a single topic. Given the 
skewed distribution and potentially inefficient estimation due to heteroscedasticity, 
we therefore use bootstrapping to estimate standard errors.  
Exploring the similarity of both distributions in more detail, the right panel of Figure 
5 shows a scatterplot of both variables. In line with existing research (Merz 2017), the 
correlation between the two salience scores is notably high (r = 0.53, p < 0.01). Thus, 
issue salience in party manifestos and in newspapers show similar patterns. However, 
despite these similarities, deviations in salience scores are sufficiently large to ask 
whether the driving forces of parties’ issue attention play out differently as hypothe-
sised above. 
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Figure 5: Issue salience in manifestos and newspapers 
 
Note: The left panel shows the distribution of issue salience in manifestos and newspapers. The right 
panel shows a scatterplot of issue salience in manifestos and newspapers. Each circle represents the 
salience on an issue for a party in its manifesto and in the media (N = 990). The grey dashed lines 
mark the mean value for both variables; the black line shows the linear fit. 
 
In the next step, we investigate if differences in issue attention due to issue ownership 
(H1) and systemic salience (H2) are larger in news coverage than in party manifestos. 
First, we run two identical models using issue salience in party manifestos and news-
papers as the dependent variable. Results in Table 2 show that parties highlight issues 
significantly more often, when they own them as well as when other parties pay atten-
tion to an issue. This is the case for issue salience both in manifesto data (Model 1) 
and in newspaper data (Model 2) when estimated separately for each data source. The 
results not only corroborate existing findings on issue ownership and systemic sali-
ence in party manifestos (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Meyer and Wagner 
2016; Wagner and Meyer 2014). They also mirror these findings for newspaper data, 
speaking to the fact that both sources are, in principle, comparable. 
Regarding the control variables, all models include fixed-effects dummy variables for 
(34) elections and (six) issues. Therefore, the coefficients can be interpreted as aver-
age differences across all country-years and issues. Since not all issues addressed in 
manifestos and newspaper articles are covered by our study, variables for a party’s 
left-right position and its government status are included to control for systematic 
differences in attention on other topics. For instance, the negative coefficient of left-
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right position in the first model implies that parties further to the left devote, on aver-
age, more salience to the issues covered by the analysis in their manifestos holding all 
other variables constant. Most important, these control variables do not reach statisti-
cal significance in the other models, and none of the results are sensitive to the inclu-
sion or exclusion of any control variable. 
 
Table 2: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Manifesto only Media only Interaction w/ 
ownership 
Interaction w/ 
sys. salience 
     
Systemic salience (std.) 0.25** 0.46** 0.43** 0.46** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.49** 0.84** 0.56** 0.68** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1)   0.20** 0.33** 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership*Source   0.25**  
   (0.08)  
Systemic salience*Source    -0.10** 
    (0.03) 
Vote share -0.04+ 0.05 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right position -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -1.76** -1.98** -2.10** -2.17** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Observations 990 990 1980 1980 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.08 
AIC 673 749 1346 1346 
BIC 888 965 1603 1604 
Log pseudo likelihood -292 -331 -627 -627 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Second, we include interaction terms to test whether the effect of issue ownership 
(Model 3) and systemic salience (Model 4) are larger in media data. These analyses 
are based on an appended data set with a dummy variable differentiating between 
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newspaper and manifestos content. In line with H1, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between source and issue ownership in Model 3 is positive and highly signifi-
cant, but, contrary to the expectation formulated in H2, the interaction term in Model 
4 is negative. However, because of the non-linear model specification, we are cau-
tious to interpret these coefficients directly (Shang et al. 2018) and rather compare the 
differences using marginal effects plots.21 
Figure 6 illustrates how the increase in issue salience due to ownership (left panel) 
and systemic salience (right panel) differs in manifesto and media data. With regard 
to ownership, we find that a party devotes more attention to an issue when it is the 
issue owner. This difference is significantly larger in media data (0.11) than in mani-
festos (0.06), providing clear support for H1. This result is not necessarily at odds 
with the observation of Helfer and Aelst (2016) who find in an experiment with jour-
nalists that messages about issues not owned by a party are more likely to be selected. 
Rather, our findings suggest that even if such an unexpected message is the initial 
reason for a newspaper article covering an issue, the article is most likely to also re-
port on the position of the issue owner.  
Turning to systemic salience, reveals a different picture. While a party’s issue atten-
tion is higher when other parties address the issue, this increase does not differ be-
tween media (0.02) and manifesto data (0.02).22 This result refutes H2. Apparently, 
the systemic salience of an issue has a positive effect also in newspaper data. Howev-
er, contrary to H2, this effect is not stronger than in party manifestos. We therefore 
find no evidence that systemic features are generally more important for party-issue 
linkages in the media as compared to manifesto content.  
 
 
21 In fact, the significance of the interaction term in Model 4 does not hold up when we dichotomise 
the variable. 
22 Marginal differences for systemic salience are lower in size than those for ownership because the 
variable, when standardised, ranges from -1.33 to 3.99. Rescaling the variable to the range of the own-
ership variable from 0 to 1 results in estimates for the marginal differences (0.12) similar in size to 
those for ownership. 
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Figure 6: Marginal effects of issue ownership and systemic salience 
  
Note: The left panel is based on Model 3 reported in Table 1, the right panel on Model 4. Linear pre-
dictions of issue salience (bars) and 83% confidence intervals (spikes) with control variables held 
constant (left-right and vote share at their means, non-government party, welfare issue, 2013 German 
election). 
 
To explore how the different expectations on the role of issue ownership and systemic 
salience in the media can be reconciled through the conditional role of party size, 
Table 3 shows estimation results including a three-way interaction term between vote 
share, communication channel, and issue ownership (Model 1) or systemic salience 
(Model 2). Table 14 in the appendix also includes model estimations separately for 
the two data sources which support the presented findings. Since interpretation of 
these coefficients is not as straight-forward, we resort to a graphical presentation. 
Figure 7 plots marginal effects of ownership (left panel) and systemic salience (right 
panel) as a function of a party’s vote share (on the x-axis), which ranges from 3% to 
43%.  
In both panels, slopes for manifesto (solid lines) and media (dashed lines) data di-
verge significantly, indicating that party size indeed moderates the relationships. 
However, most importantly, the results suggest that it does so differently depending 
on the data sources. In manifesto data, marginal effects both for issue ownership and 
systemic salience only decrease slightly (from 0.07 to 0.04 and from 0.04 to 0.03, 
respectively). Thus, parties, irrespective of their size, always emphasise an issue in 
their manifesto more, when they own it and when other parties emphasise it in their 
0
.01
.02
.03
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
e
ff
e
c
t:
 S
y
s
te
m
ic
 s
a
lie
n
c
e
Manifesto Newspaper
Comparing Channels of Communication 
101 
 
manifestos. In media data, on the other hand, marginal effects for issue ownership 
and systemic salience manifest differently. For small parties, ownership of an issue 
matters more when considering media data (0.16). Here, small issue owners enjoy an 
advantage providing empirical support for H3. For larger parties, in contrast, the mar-
ginal ownership effect decreases markedly (0.02). In fact, differences in marginal 
effects between data sources are not significant anymore (as indicated by overlapping 
confidence intervals). When a large party is the issue owner, it does not get to empha-
sise the issue much more in the news – at least not much more than it emphasises it in 
its own manifesto. Indicated by an increasing slope, party size moderates the margin-
al effects of systemic salience in news data in the opposite direction. Thus, small par-
ties get to put actually less attention to an issue highlighted by others in the newspa-
per (0.03) than what is emphasised in their own manifesto (0.04). For larger parties, 
the contrary is true. Not only does their issue attention follow the saliency of the 
agenda more strongly, it also does so significantly more in news reporting (0.07) than 
in their manifestos (0.03). This conditional and more nuanced relationship is in line 
with H4. Moreover, it serves as explanation why the average marginal differences 
due to systemic salience in Figure 6 were virtually indistinguishable. 
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Table 3: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience with three-way in-
teractions 
 (1) (2) 
 Interaction w/ 
ownership 
Interaction w/ 
systemic salience 
   
Systemic salience (std.) 0.43** 0.48** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.57** 0.68** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.21** 0.34** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.23**  
 (0.08)  
Systemic salience*Source  -0.07* 
  (0.03) 
Vote share -0.04 -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership*Vote share -0.04  
 (0.04)  
Systemic salience*Vote share  -0.00 
  (0.02) 
Source*Vote share 0.20** 0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership*Source*Vote share -0.25**  
 (0.07)  
Systemic salience*Source*Vote share  0.11** 
  (0.04) 
Left-right position -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.09** -2.19** 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 1,980 1,980 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 
AIC 1,350 1,351 
BIC 1,624 1,625 
Log pseudo likelihood -626 -627 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Figure 7: Party size as a moderator of ownership and systemic salience  
 
Note: The left panel is based on Model 1 reported in Table 3, the right panel on Model 2. Linear pre-
dictions of issue salience and 95% confidence intervals with control variables held constant (left-right 
at its mean, non-government party, welfare issue, 2013 German election). 
 
Due to the conditional and non-linear nature of the relationship, these marginal ef-
fects are difficult to interpret in terms of size. Thus, we estimate predicted values of 
issue salience for minimum and maximum values of the interacting variables. Corre-
sponding to the solid lines in Figure 7, issue owners are predicted to devote between 
13% (small parties) and 17% (large parties) of their attention to a given issue in their 
manifestos. These numbers are only marginally (10% and 8%, respectively) lower for 
parties that are not issue owners. While they are also comparable to differences due to 
low systemic (5% for small and 4% for large parties), small (40%) and large (34%) 
parties are predicted to exhibit markedly more issue attention when issues are system-
ically salient. Corresponding to the dashed lines in Figure 7, differences in issue sali-
ence are greater in media data, where issue owners are predicted to devote between 
26% (small parties) and 17% (large parties) of their attention to a given issue, com-
pared to 9% and 15% of non-owners. When systemic salience is at its maximum, 
small and large parties are predicted to exhibit an even higher issue salience of 26% 
and 64%, respectively. In sum, these effects are quite sizeable, considering that the 
empirical scale of issue salience ranges from 0 to 75% (with a mean of 11%) in our 
data. 
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Finally, we review the robustness of our results. Table 15 to Table 19 in the appendix 
include tables with regression results of alternative estimations in order to ensure that 
they do not merely arise from a certain model specification. As mentioned above, the 
distribution of the dependent variable suggests overdispersion (variances of 104 and 
89 for media and manifesto data, respectively, exceeding means of 11 and 10 consid-
erably), but a non-excessive number of zeros (6% and 5% in media and manifesto 
data, respectively). Hence, we test modelling techniques for count data. Estimating 
Poisson, negative binomial, or zero-inflated negative binomial regression, however, 
yields exactly the same findings. Similarly, computing Huber-White or clustered ro-
bust standard errors for parties does not change our results either. In some models, 
standard errors appear to be somewhat larger, but do not affect the significance of any 
of the coefficients. We also consider alternative operationalisations of systemic sali-
ence and party size. Instead of the current election campaign, we use a lagged version 
of systemic salience in the previous one. Intuitively, we would assume that a party 
rather reacts to the issue addressed by its competitors in the past than during the same 
campaign. Instead of vote share, we use an indicator for a party’s nicheness as sug-
gested by Bischof (2017) to test whether ownership and systemic salience also have 
different effects depending on parties’ general focus on niche issue segments in their 
party systems. Interestingly, both changes produce results that are very similar to the 
findings presented above as the coefficients barely deviate from models based on our 
initial operationalisation.  
Next, we assess the robustness of the dichotomous operationalisation of issue owner-
ship. To that end, we re-estimate all models six times, each time excluding one issue 
category. The additional results of the 36 fractional logit regression models can be 
found in Table 20 to Table 25 in the appendix (each table referring to the re-estimated 
model and each table column referring to the excluded issue). In general, the results 
prove robust to the exclusion of issue categories as the coefficients of interest remain 
largely unchanged and significant. Only two models stand out: The effect of systemic 
salience does not differ significantly anymore between media and manifesto content 
when immigration issues are excluded, as does the interaction between systemic sali-
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ence and vote share when welfare issues are excluded. While this might point to the 
pivotal role of mainstream parties (owning welfare issue) and right-wing challenger 
parties (owning immigration issues) in these two specific instances, the consistency in 
the majority of models overall validates the dichotomous operationalisation. 
Finally, we explore the robustness of our results for different types of newspapers. 
For this task, we re-estimate all models presented above based on observations from 
quality newspapers and tabloids separately. The results of these additional analyses 
are presented in Table 26 to Table 28 in the appendix. Most important, we find no 
systematic deviations between the two types of newspapers. By contrast, all results 
directly relating to our hypotheses also hold in these separate analyses. We therefore 
find no evidence that the logic of party-issue linkages differs systematically between 
different types of newspapers.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
A central argument in research on direct campaign communication is that parties em-
phasise advantageous issues and downplay others to gain electoral grounds (e.g., 
Budge 2015). However, when it comes to party-issue linkages reported in the news, 
the media as a gate-keeper plays an important role (e.g., Merz 2017). Given that large 
numbers of voters get their information about political parties and the positions they 
stand for on relevant issues from such platforms, it begs the question to what degree 
patterns of issue salience identified in the literature on party-issue linkages in direct 
campaign communication can also be found in media reports during election cam-
paigns. 
Against this background, we studied in this paper how drivers of issue salience play 
out in direct and mediated channels of campaign communication. We argued that two 
theoretical explanations of issue salience – issue ownership and systemic issue sali-
ence –, which were found to be crucial for direct party communication, should be 
even more relevant in the media. Additionally, we claimed that focusing on the condi-
tioning role of party size in this regard is important. On the one hand, our findings 
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reveal important similarities across communication platforms. Focussing on party-
issue linkages in party manifestos and newspaper articles, we find that issue salience 
at the party level across these data sources is highly correlated. Moreover, issue own-
ership and systemic salience are relevant predictors for party-issue linkages in news-
paper and manifesto content. On the other hand, the analysis also reveals crucial dif-
ferences between direct and mass-mediated party communication. Most importantly, 
the results show that issue ownership plays a particularly important role for small 
parties in the media, while systemic salience is most pronounced for large parties in 
this data source.  
What implications do these findings entail? First, the findings contribute to a better 
understanding of issue competition in election campaigns. Despite substantial similar-
ities across data sources, they show that there also exist systematic differences be-
tween party-issue linkages in the media and in direct campaign communication. On 
the one hand, general patterns of party-issue linkages found in direct campaign com-
munication like party manifestos are also present in campaign debates as covered by 
the mass media in newspaper articles. On the other hand, especially small parties are 
found to be hardly covered in the media when it comes to issues with which they are 
not associated, whereas large parties’ positions are particularly likely to be covered 
when a topic is broadly discussed in the news. This finding is highly relevant with 
regard to political fairness in mediated campaign communication. Also, it points to an 
additional source of the further restructuration of European party competition and the 
role played by small challenger parties in this process. Second, our study has meth-
odological implications for research on party competition. Data from direct and me-
diated party-issue linkages convey similar but not identical information, indicating 
that generalisations based on results on direct party communication for mediated en-
vironments and vice versa should be made with caution. Most importantly, our find-
ings highlight that mass-mediated party communication presents the key conflicts of 
the day under a magnifying glass, while at the same time underestimating the ‘nor-
malisation’ of small niche parties. 
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Consequently, future research interested in systemic and dynamic features of party 
competition might therefore have a lot to gain from contrasting and combining data 
from mass mediated campaign debates with data from direct party communication 
like press releases (e.g., Meyer et al. 2017). With the increasing importance of elec-
tion campaigning on social media, it will also be crucial to explore differences in the 
content voters encounter on such platforms (De Sio et al. 2018). At the same time, the 
results invite comparative research regarding other drivers of party-issue linkages like 
the role of public opinion (see e.g., Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). 
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8. Issue Competition on Social Media23 
How parties use new platforms of campaign communication to spread policy-
related content 
 
Abstract 
Social media websites are now crucial platforms for party competition. How do par-
ties use them for campaign communication? Focussing on issue salience, this study 
argues that social media websites enable parties to highlight issues even more strate-
gically than in party manifestos. This is expected to result in a lower diversity of is-
sues addressed by a party. Moreover, issue ownership is assumed to play a more im-
portant role as a driver of salience strategy on such platforms. Consequently, a lower 
degree of issue convergence at the party system level is predicted. In order to test 
these expectations, the study relies on original data of campaign communication on 
Twitter and manifesto content. Most important, the analysis reveals that the issue 
diversity at the party level and issue convergence at the party system level are in fact 
lower on Twitter than in party manifestos. This finding has important implications for 
our understanding of the role social media plays for political parties. 
  
 
23 An earlier version of the paper was presented at the ECPR General Conference 2017 in Oslo. I thank 
the participants and organisers of the panel for their helpful comments. I also thank the participants of 
the colloquium of the Chair of Comparative Politics at the LMU Munich for their helpful sugestions.    
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8.1 Introduction 
Social media outlets constitute important communication platforms in election cam-
paigns (Aldrich et al. 2016; De Sio et al. 2018; Gibson 2015; Jungherr 2015; Kreiss 
2016a; Nulty et al. 2016; Stier et al. 2018). Parties and candidates heavily rely on 
sites like Facebook and Twitter to get their message out and voters strongly use this 
content as a source of political information or even actively participate in the debates 
(Bekafigo and McBride 2013; Bode and Dalrymple 2016; Evans et al. 2014; Gibson 
2015). Thus, party communication via social media constitutes an essential part of 
electoral contests in contemporary democracies. 
For research on party competition, this begs the question how parties use these plat-
forms. Does party behaviour on social media resemble well-known patterns found in 
the study of other platforms of campaign communication like party manifestos 
(Dolezal et al. 2014; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Wagner and Meyer 2014) 
or party press releases (Haselmayer, Meyer, et al. 2017; Haselmayer, Wagner, et al. 
2017; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Meyer et al. 2017). Or is there a linkage from 
“technological innovations to changes in political communication strategies” 
(Rodriguez and Madariaga 2016: 305), which would imply that party behaviour on 
such websites follows a distinct logic? 
Focussing on issue competition and the salience strategies of political parties, this 
study explores how parties make use of social media to communicate policy-related 
content during election campaigns. It departs from the assumption that patterns of 
party behaviour are contingent upon the platform on which parties compete, because 
the constraints and opportunities for strategic campaign communication vary across 
such communication channels (De Sio et al. 2018). Consequently, it is argued that 
established insights derived from research on other sources of campaign communica-
tion, must be reconsidered in the light of the specific technological opportunities 
these platforms offer to political parties.  
Against this background, the main argument of the study is that the technical oppor-
tunities of social media websites enable parties to highlight issues even more strategi-
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cally than in party manifestos. Four specific expectations about issue competition on 
social media are derived from this assumption. First, it is argued that social media 
websites are well-suited for strategic issue emphasis and therefore strongly used by 
parties for issue competition. Second, it is claimed that this feature also leads parties 
to focus only on a limited set of well-selected issues (De Sio et al. 2018: 1218). 
Third, in line with salience theory (Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983b; Dolezal et 
al. 2014), it is expected that parties’ issue emphasis is particularly driven by issue 
ownership. Fourth, focusing on the party system level, this is assumed to lead to low-
er levels of issue convergence than observed in the study of manifesto content. 
To test these expectations empirically, the study innovates by directly comparing par-
ties’ social media communication to a well-studied platform of direct campaign 
communication, namely party manifestos. It relies on an original data set of parties’ 
issue emphasis during the election campaign for the British House of Commons in 
2015 on Twitter and the manifestos of these parties. The results show that parties use 
Twitter for issue competition. Moreover, while issue salience on Twitter and party 
manifestos are highly correlated, there exist striking differences. Salience on Twitter 
is more unevenly distributed than in manifestos and the diversity of addressed topics 
is consistently lower for all parties on this platform than in party manifestos. While 
issue ownership plays an important role as an explanation for parties’ salience strate-
gies on Twitter, the relationship is not significantly stronger than for party manifesto 
content, however. Nevertheless, issue convergence is considerably lower on social 
media than in party manifestos.  
In sum, these findings confirm the expectation that parties use social media very stra-
tegically for issue competition. This makes the platform a valuable data source to 
study parties’ salience strategies (see also De Sio et al. 2018: 1218). In more general 
terms, the results suggest that the technological opportunities of social media enable 
political parties to strategically interact with competitors, the media and potential 
voters. This contributes to a better understanding of the role social media plays in 
election campaigns.   
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8.2 Issue Competition on Social Media in a Comparative Perspective 
It has long been argued that parties strategically highlight issues to gain electoral ad-
vantages (e.g., Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983a; Dolezal et al. 2014; Petrocik 
1996). This makes issue competition, defined as “party competition on which issues 
should dominate the party political agenda” (Green-Pedersen 2007b: 607) a crucial 
concept in the study of political parties and election campaigns. Given that social 
media websites now constitute important platforms of party competition in election 
campaigns, the question is how parties use these websites for issue competition.  
This study is based on the assumption that patterns of party behaviour are not only 
contingent upon the type of party or the electoral arena (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2015; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014), but might also 
vary regarding the platform on which parties compete (see also Merz 2017). Answer-
ing this question therefore requires exploring the opportunities social media websites 
offer political parties as a tool for campaign communication. Based on these consid-
erations, insights derived from research on other communication channels can be dis-
cussed in the light of the specific opportunities these platforms offer to political par-
ties. 
Most important in this regard, parties have full control over the content appearing on 
their accounts. First, parties can decide which topics to address. They can either re-
main silent about a topic or make a statement if they wish to do so since no gatekeep-
ers must be circumvented (Engesser et al. 2017). Second, the timing of a specific 
message can be targeted precisely. For example, it is possible to instantly comment 
on attacks from political opponents during televised debates, or to launch a campaign 
at a certain time. Third, social media accounts allow parties to determine the quantity 
of communication about an issue. There are no restrictions to post identical or similar 
content repeatedly on a single day or over a longer period. This creates the opportuni-
ty to highlight or downplay a certain topic by regulating the number of messages ad-
dressing it.  
Overall, these features make parties’ social media accounts well-suited to “capture 
their strategic political communication” (De Sio et al. 2018: 1218). Interviews with 
Issue Competition on Social Media 
112 
 
online campaigners, who claim to use social media to ”create a ’climate of opinion’ 
favourable to their candidate” (Kreiss 2016b: 1476), provide evidence for such be-
haviour. It is assumed that parties take advantage of this opportunity to affect the is-
sue agenda by strategically addressing policy-related content on platforms like Face-
book and Twitter. This expectation is summarised in the following hypothesis.  
H1: Parties strongly use social media for issue competition during election cam-
paigns. 
 
This freedom of communicating through social media yields another expectation. 
Regarding the specific issues parties address in their policy-related communication, it 
is assumed that the issues addressed are purposefully chosen. The general idea that 
parties selectively highlight issues for strategic reasons as argued by salience theory 
(Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983a) or the issue yield model (De Sio and Weber 
2014) was most systematically tested on the grounds of party manifestos (e.g., De Sio 
and Weber 2014; Dolezal et al. 2014; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Wagner 
and Meyer 2014). This choice of data is based on the assumption that issue emphasis 
is a “rather flexible part of the packaging of manifestos” (Harmel et al. 2018: 280). If 
parties want to downplay or highlight a topic in their campaign communication, it is 
expected that this strategic decision is reflected in the amount of space devoted to the 
issue in a party’s election manifesto.  
For issue emphasis on social media, this assumption is even more warranted. On both 
communication platforms, parties can freely choose the topics they want to address 
and control the amount of communication about a specific topic. However, party 
manifestos also serve various functions (Eder et al. 2017). Specifically, a look at the 
table of contents of a contemporary manifesto reveals that they provide a comprehen-
sive overview of a party's positions. Therefore, thy cover a wide range of different 
issue areas, not only a parties favorite topics (see De Sio et al. 2018: 1217). This does 
not contradict the idea that the share of communication concerning an issue in party 
manifestos serves as a valid indicator to explore parties’ issue priorities. Nevertheless, 
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the degree to which strategic considerations drive issue emphasis is expected to be 
higher for social media, where such constraints are absent. Consequently, issue em-
phasis at the party level is expected to be particularly concentrated on a limited num-
ber of selected topics on social media. This leads to the following hypothesis.  
H2: Parties’ issue attention is more concentrated on social media than in party mani-
festos. 
 
What drives issue emphasis on social media? Parties are often assumed to highlight 
issues they own (Budge 2015; Budge and Farlie 1983a; Petrocik 1996). They are ex-
pected to focus on an issue either when voters see them as competent in dealing with 
it (Dolezal et al. 2014; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016) or when they are generally asso-
ciated with that issue (Wagner and Meyer 2014). Empirical research based on party 
manifestos confirms this expectation. Dolezal et al. (2014) show that parties in Aus-
tria focus more on issues on which they are perceived as competent by voters in their 
manifestos. In addition, Wagner and Meyer (2014: 1028) find such a relationship for 
the associative dimension of issue ownership. Given that strategic considerations are 
assumed to be particularly relevant for issue emphasis on social media, issue owner-
ship is expected to not only drive issue attention also on such platforms (Meeks 2015) 
but that the relationship is even stronger than for the case of party manifestos. For 
instance, like the manifesto of any party, it is assumed that a Green party’s manifesto 
covers a broad range of issues. Nevertheless, given its strong association with envi-
ronmental issues, more attention is devoted to such topics. By contrast, concerning 
issue emphasis on social media, it is expected that many issues discussed in the par-
ty’s manifesto are hardly mentioned at all on these platforms. Rather, a large propor-
tion of policy-related messages is likely to address environmental issues. This argu-
mentation is summarised in the following hypotheses.  
H3a: Parties highlight especially issues they own in their campaign communication 
on social media. 
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H3b: The difference in a party’s issue attention due to issue ownership is larger on 
social media coverage than in party manifestos. 
 
The preceding considerations relate to the behaviour of individual parties. However, 
if party behaviour on social media deviates from what is observed in party manifes-
tos, issue competition in general is likely to differ as well. Focussing on the party 
system level, one expectation derived from the idea that parties use their social media 
accounts particularly to strategically highlight advantageous topics is that issue com-
petition on such platforms is characterised by a low degree of issue overlap. Accord-
ing to a very strict understanding of salience theory and the issue ownership hypothe-
sis, it follows that parties talk completely past each other in their campaign communi-
cation (see Kaplan et al. 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004). If each party exclusively 
addresses issues it owns, issue convergence, defined the degree of overlap in the “at-
tention profile” of a given pair of parties (Sigelman and Buell 2004: 635), is extreme-
ly small. Empirical research shows that this is not the case since issue agendas be-
tween parties largely overlap (Dolezal et al. 2014; Sigelman and Buell 2004). Never-
theless, if the focus on well-selected issues and the role of issue ownership is stronger 
on social media than in manifestos, this should be reflected in a lower degree of issue 
convergence on the former platforms. This expectation is summarised in the follow-
ing hypothesis. 
H4: Issue convergence is lower on social media than in party manifestos.  
 
8.3 Data and Methods 
To test the derived expectations empirically, party communication on Twitter for the 
election campaign for the British House of Commons in 2015 and the manifestos of 
these parties are analysed. Twitter is well suited to study campaign behaviour on so-
cial media since research shows it is especially used for campaign communication 
over political issues (see Stier et al. 2018: 51). It is a micro blogging service that ena-
bles registered users to post messages (Tweets) about any topic in a maximum of only 
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140 characters that allows spreading the content of others via the retweet function or 
to directly reply to them.24 The content of each user appears on its own user timeline 
and in the feed of people following the account with no reciprocal follower relation-
ship required. In politics, the platform has become an important source of information 
with large numbers of users following individual politicians or party organisations 
especially during election campaigns (Jungherr 2015; Nulty et al. 2016). All parties 
under scrutiny were highly active on their Twitter accounts during the time of the 
election campaign. Moreover, they all published party manifestos ahead of the elec-
tion. This makes it possible to test the derived hypotheses in detail. 
 
Measuring issue attention on social media and in party manifestos 
Concerning Twitter data, all messages from the official and verified accounts of the 
following six largest political parties were retrieved (account name in parenthesis): 
Conservatives (@Conservatives), Labour (@UKLabour), Scottish National Party 
(@theSNP), Liberal Democrats (@LibDems), United Kingdom Independence Party 
(@UKIP) and the Green Party (@TheGreenParty).25 The data was accessed and 
downloaded during the campaign and once more immediately after the election day 
using the Twitter Rest API via the TwitteR package for R (Gentry 2015). The period 
under study starts at 7th of March 2015 and ends at the day of election on 7th of May 
2015. In total, the merged data set contains 22,091 individual messages. 
To explore issue salience in this data, a slightly adapted set of issue categories from 
Kriesi et al. (2008) is used with 14 different issues which cover virtually all policies 
discussed in contemporary politics and one additional category for messages with no 
issue related content. Table 29 in the appendix provides an overview and a detailed 
description of these categories. Based on this coding scheme, Tweets that contain a 
 
24 The change in Twitter’s rule regarding the maximum length of a Tweet to 280 characters took place 
after the sampling period. 
25 Among other variables, the downloaded data set contains the Tweet itself, the respective account 
name, time-stamps as well as information whether an observation is an original tweet by the user, a 
retweeted message from another user or a reply. As all types of Tweets can equally carry information 
about the issue priorities of political parties, no observations were excluded from the analysis on this 
basis. 
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statement addressing a specific issue are classified accordingly without any additional 
requirements. This procedure assumes that each observation only addresses a single 
issue. Due to the maximum number of 140 characters for each Tweet, this is a realis-
tic expectation as the possibility of addressing several issues in such short messages 
is rather low (see also De Sio et al. 2018). To classify the large number of individual 
observations, a machine learning approach to document classification using support 
vector machine is applied. In the appendix, a detailed description of this procedure 
and a test of its validity are provided (see Figure 19 and Figure 20). Based on this 
classification, issue salience is measured as the percentage share of posts on a given 
issue in relation to all issue related statements of a party. 
The structure of party manifestos features significant differences to data from Twitter. 
Specifically, it is nested in large and complexly structured text documents. This re-
quires careful unitizing before such texts can be used to measure issue salience (Merz 
2017). One well-established approach for this task is the core sentence method (see 
Hutter et al. 2016; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 
2008).26 Dolezal et al. (2016) have demonstrated that the approach works well to 
study issue salience in party manifestos (see also Dolezal et al. 2014). Using this 
method, a random sample of 25 percent of the grammatical sentences in each mani-
festo was randomly chosen and coded. The manifesto of UKIP was coded completely 
to test the validity of this sampling strategy. Comparing the salience scores based on 
the sampled data set and the completely coded data set reveals very similar measures. 
It is therefore concluded that this sampling strategy produces valid estimates (see 
Figure 21 in the appendix for further details). To maximise the comparability with 
Twitter data, the same coding scheme is applied. Moreover, the operationalisation of 
issue salience is identical. For manifesto content, the variable is measured as the per-
centage share of core sentences coded for a party on a given issue in relation to ob-
servations on any issue for that party.  
 
26 A very close fit between the coding of Twitter data and manifesto content is assumed to be crucial 
for this research. As this is difficult to achieve by using existing codings of party manifestos based on 
different coding schemes as provided by the Marpor project (Volkens et al. 2017), an original coding 
of manifestos is used.  
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Independent and control variables 
Starting with issue ownership, it is important to distinguish between the competence 
based and the associative dimension of the concept (Lefevere et al. 2017; Walgrave et 
al. 2012). In this paper, the focus rests on the competence-based dimension. Thus, 
issue ownership is understood as the attribution of issue specific competences to-
wards political parties by voters. In this sense, parties own an issue, when voters see 
them as most capable of solving problems related to an issue (Dolezal et al. 2014). 
A common problem for the measurement of this variable is that most surveys do not 
include questions about the perceived competence of all relevant parties on a suffi-
ciently large number of different issues. One way to overcome this difficulty is to 
combine information from surveys asking respondents what they perceive as the cur-
rently most important issue and what party they think is most competent in dealing 
with it (Dolezal et al. 2014; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). As the attributed issue 
competence is of course strongly affected by a respondent’s party preference, voters 
are extremely likely to report that the party they vote for is most competent, which 
makes larger parties more likely to be stated as issue owners regardless of the specific 
topic. To control for this bias, relative issue ownership is calculated by subtracting a 
party’s vote share in the survey from the percentage share of people stating it is most 
competent in dealing with an issue (see Dolezal et al. 2014: 70). 
Following this approach, an indicator for issue ownership was constructed using data 
from the 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel (Fieldhouse et al. 2015). It con-
tains questions concerning the most important issue and the party they think is most 
competent in addressing the issue they claimed to be most important. As the study 
distinguishes more than 30 different issue categories for this question, the labels were 
recoded to fit the 14 categories used to classify the issue priorities of political parties. 
Table 29 in the Appendix provides a detailed overview of this procedure.  
Two important control variables are included in the study. First, while trying to push 
favourable issues, it is assumed that parties must nevertheless take the currently exist-
ing issue agenda as given (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). Consequently, par-
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ties are also expected to focus on issues that currently figure prominent on the party 
system agenda. To account for this relationship, systemic issue salience is calculated 
as the mean issue attention on the Twitter accounts of all six parties under study and 
in their party manifestos respectively. Following Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 
(2015), a party’s own salience score is not included in this calculation to avoid prob-
lems of endogeneity (see also Hoeglinger 2015). Second, the emphasis a party puts 
on an issue can also be driven by the issue priorities of voters. As argued by 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994) parties “ride the wave” in the sense that they adapt 
the attention to an issue according to the priorities of voters. Accounting for this, an 
indicator for voters’ issue priorities is constructed from the question concerning the 
most important issue (see e.g., Spoon and Klüver 2014). Specifically, the percentage 
share of answers on one issue category in relation to all answers is calculated to 
measure issue importance. 
 
8.4 Results 
Initially, results for the degree to which parties address policy-related topics are pre-
sented. In Table 4, the percentage shares and the absolute numbers of messages which 
contain references to policies are reported for each party. Most important, parties 
strongly make use of Twitter to publish policy-related content during the election 
campaign. On average, 45.45 percent of all messages fall in this category. This leads 
to more than 10,000 messages during the campaign touching upon policy-related con-
tent. Even though the analysis also reveals considerable variation in the degree to 
which parties focus on issues in their campaign communication, it can be concluded 
that this type of campaign communication plays an important role on Twitter. This 
finding is very much in line with H1. Moreover, it confirms existing research which 
also finds that parties talk to a considerable degree about issues on this platform (De 
Sio et al. 2018; Jungherr 2015). 
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Table 4: The role of policy-related party communication on Twitter 
Party Percentage share Total number  
Conservatives 58.04 2,180 
Greens 40.67 656 
Labour 52.24 1,689 
LibDems 41.95 3,444 
SNP 40.03 1,022 
UKIP 38.47 1,049 
All parties 45.45 10,040 
Note: Table entries show the percentage share of policy-related messages on Twitter in relation to all 
downloaded messages containing text and the total number of issue related messages for each party. 
 
How do parties use Twitter when they address policy-related issues? A comparison of 
issue salience on Twitter and in the manifestos of the parties under study reveals 
striking similarities. Both indicators are highly correlated (r = 0.73; t = 9.69). As 
shown in the left panel of Figure 8, issues that take a lot of space in a party’s manifes-
to do also figure prominently in its Twitter communication. Nevertheless, there are 
several issues that gain some relevance in the manifesto of a party, but do not play 
any role on in their online communication as indicated by dots located on the x-axis 
or only slightly above. In contrast, there are almost no observations for which the 
opposite holds. When an issue plays a crucial role in a party’s Twitter communica-
tion, it is also present in the manifesto of the party.  
To explore these differences in the distribution of issues in more detail, issue salience 
scores are used to explore the diversity of the issue agenda of each party in the two 
data sources under study. Following Boydstun et al. (2014), issue diversity is calcu-
lated using normalised Shannon’s H. It is a measure of homogeneity which can take 
values between zero and one. A value of zero is reached when a party’s attention 
completely rests on one issue, whereas a value of one indicates a uniform distribution 
of attention across all issues.27 Thus, higher values indicate that parties have more 
diversity in their issue related communication on a given platform. 
 
27 The indicator measures how strongly a party’s attention is dispersed over a set of given issues. For 
this task, the negative sum of proportions of attention 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) for each issue 𝑥𝑖 is multiplied with the 
Issue Competition on Social Media 
120 
 
The panel in the middle of Figure 8 shows issue diversity scores for both data 
sources. It stands out that issue diversity is consistently smaller in Twitter data as 
compared to party manifesto. In line with H2, the mean value for issue diversity, 
which is indicated by the dashed vertical lines, for Twitter data is 0.72 and 0.90 for 
the case of party manifestos. These averages in issue diversity differ significantly 
between the two sources under study (t = 3.53; p = 0.01). Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that there are striking differences between parties. While issue communication 
on Twitter is consistently more concentrated for all parties, the differences vary great-
ly. Concerning the Labour Party, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and the 
SNP, differences in issue diversity are sizeable. However, this is not the case for the 
Greens and UKIP. 
The right panel of Figure 8, which shows the distribution of issue attention for both 
platforms, substantiates this finding. Issue attention on Twitter and in party manifes-
tos is heavily skewed. While most issues receive only little or even no attention at all, 
some topics are addressed in detail. However, this feature is even more present in 
Twitter data. This is also reflected by the difference in the medians of issue salience. 
For Twitter data, it takes a value of only 2.15 percent, while it is 5.28 percent in party 
manifestos. In sum, these results corroborate H2. Parties focus more strongly on a 
smaller set of issues on Twitter as compared to party manifestos. This results in lower 
issue diversity scores.  
 
 
natural logarithm of these proportions. To facilitate interpretations, the indicator is normalized by 
dividing it by the total number of issues (N). It is based on the following formula: 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠′𝐻 =
 
− ∑ (𝑝(𝑥𝑖))∗ln 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
ln (𝑁)
. 
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Figure 8: Comparing issue salience on Twitter and in party manifestos 
 
Note: The left panel shows a comparison of issue salience on Twitter and party manifestos for all par-
ties and issues under study. The line shows the linear prediction; the shaded area represents the stand-
ard error (N=84). The panel in the middle shows the diversity of issues addressed by parties which is 
measured using normalised Shannon’s H. Higher values indicate a stronger diversity in the addressed 
issues. The dashed vertical lines represent the average diversity scores for each platform. The panels 
on the right show the distribution of salience scores in manifestos (upper right panel) and in Twitter 
data (lower right panel). The dashed vertical lines represent the median value. 
 
As suggested in H3a and H3b, these patterns of issue salience in Twitter data and 
party manifestos could be attributed to the role of issue ownership as a driver of par-
ty’ issue emphasis on both platforms. While H3a expects that issue salience on Twit-
ter is driven by issue ownership, H3b points out that this relationship might be even 
stronger on Twitter than in party manifestos. Both, the relatively high correlation be-
tween the two salience indicators and the fact that issue emphasis is more concentrat-
ed on Twitter point in this direction. To explore this aspect in more detail, Figure 9 
plots issue ownership against issue salience on Twitter (left panel) and in party mani-
festos (right panel).28 Following Dolezal et al. (2014: 70) the y-axis shows the devia-
tion in issue salience from the median of issue salience on an issue in each panel. 
Hence, values above the dashed horizontal line indicate salience scores above the 
median salience in the party system. This allows exploring whether issue ownership 
leads some parties to focus more on a given issue than other parties.  
 
28 The sum of scores for the relative issue ownership do not add up to 100 percent for each issue cate-
gory. This is because respondents can claim that no particular party or another party is best in tackling 
the issue, they find most important. 
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As indicated by the positive slope of the solid line in the left panel of Figure 9, which 
represents the linear fit for the two variables, issue ownership is positively related to 
issue emphasis on Twitter. In particular, in becomes obvious that issues with a very 
high net-ownership are strongly addressed by political parties on this platform. Since 
this correlation between the two variables is also statistically significant (r = 0.53; t = 
5.73), these results provide support for H3a. Issue ownership leads to stronger issue 
emphasis in Twitter data. However, as shown in the right panel of Figure 9, a similar 
correlation can be observed for issue ownership and issue emphasis in party manifes-
tos (r = 0.44; t = 4.48). In line with the results provided by Dolezal et al. (2014: 72) 
for Austrian parties, ownership and issue salience as measured in party manifestos are 
also positively related.  
 
Figure 9: Issue ownership and issue salience on Twitter and in manifestos 
 
Note: Due to missing values for the ownership of the issues ‘Energy’ and ‘Infrastructure’, observations 
for this issue category are not included in the presented models (N=72).  
 
At first glance, these results provide little support for the idea formulated in H3b that 
the role of issue ownership plays a more important role for issue emphasis on Twitter 
than in manifestos. To explore this expectation in more detail, several regression 
models are estimated. Specifically, fractional logit regressions are employed to ac-
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count for the fact that the dependent variable is bound between 0 and 1. Moreover, 
due to the skewness of the dependent variable shown in the right panel of Figure 8 
and potential heteroskedasticity, bootstrapped standard errors are estimated. First, 
separate models are presented to explore the main effect of issue ownership in both 
data sets. Second, interaction effects explore whether the relationship is in fact larger 
for the case of Twitter. To that end, a product term of issue ownership and a dummy 
variable indicating the data source is introduced. The dummy variable takes a value 
of one for Twitter data and a value of zero for manifesto data. Thus, a positive and 
significant interaction effect would support H3b.  
Table 5 shows the results of these models. Model 1 and Model 2, which are based on 
manifesto content, reveal that ownership is positively related to the salience a party 
attributes to an issue both in a bivariate setting as well as when controlling for other 
potentially relevant factors. The same result is found for Twitter data. Issue owner-
ship is positively related to the attention a party devotes to it. Again, this holds for the 
bivariate analysis in Model 3, but also when additional variables are included as 
shown in Model 4. Model 5 includes an interaction effect between a dummy variable 
indicating the data source and issue ownership. The interaction effect between issue 
ownership and the dummy variable is positive as expected in H3b. However, it fails 
to reach statistical significance.29 Together with the findings presented in Figure 9, 
this result refutes H3b.  
 
  
 
29 The results of a marginal effects plot (not shown) for the interaction effect estimated in Model 5 of 
Table 5 confirm this finding.  
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Table 5: Explaining issue salience on Twitter and in party manifestos 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (Manifesto) (Manifesto) (Twitter) (Twitter) (Both platforms) 
Issue ownership 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.04** 0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Systemic salience  0.05**  0.10** 0.07** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Most imp. Issue  0.01  0.01 0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Platform (Twitter = 1)     0.03 
     (0.13) 
Social media # ownership     0.01+ 
     (0.01) 
Constant -2.43** -3.03** -2.39** -3.71** -3.34** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) 
Observations 72 72 72 72 144 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.21 0.12 
AIC 43 45 43 41 83 
BIC 48 54 48 51 101 
ll -19.49 -18.65 -19.56 -16.72 -35.67 
Note: The table shows the results of fractional logit regression models with issue salience (proportion) 
as the dependent variable. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Due to missing values for the 
ownership of the issues ‘Energy’ and ‘Infrastructure’, observations for this issue category are not in-
cluded in the presented models. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
 
 
The relationship between issue ownership and issue emphasis is not stronger on Twit-
ter than in party manifestos. Nevertheless, issue emphasis is more concentrated on a 
low number of very salient issues on the former platform. Does this lead to parties 
talking more past each other on this platform than in party manifestos, as suggested in 
H4? Following Sigelman and Buell (2004: 635), issue convergence is analysed to 
examine this question. While the authors use it exclusively for the analysis of a two 
party system, Dolezal et al. (2014) have demonstrated that it can also be applied to a 
multi-party context. It is operationalised as follows:  
100 − (∑ |𝑃𝐴
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  𝑃𝐵|)/2 
The formula is based on the absolute difference of salience scores of two parties, de-
noted as 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵, for all n issues under scrutiny. Dividing this measure by two 
leads to outcomes ranging between 0 and 100. Subtracting these values from 100 al-
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lows then to measure similarity instead of dissimilarity (see Sigelman and Buell 
2004: 653).30 Thus, higher values indicate a stronger degree of convergence.  
Figure 10 shows the results obtained from this operationalisation of issue conver-
gence for campaign communication on Twitter and in party manifestos. The upper 
left panel of Figure 10 reveals the degree of issue convergence for each party-pair on 
Twitter. With values ranging from 51.5 to 83.1, issue convergence varies considera-
bly between the party-pairs. The mean value of issue convergence on Twitter is 63.4. 
Thus, the overlap in the issues addressed by two given parties on the platform is on 
average larger than 60 percent. To put these results in a comparative perspective, the 
upper right panel of Figure 10 shows the same analysis based on the manifestos of the 
six parties under study. Again, values range substantially from 65.7 to 83.0. Never-
theless, the mean issue convergence, which takes a value of 73.6 for party manifestos, 
is notably higher than the average value of issue convergence on Twitter. This differ-
ence of more than ten percentage points between the two platforms is also statistically 
significant (t = 3.65; p < 0.01). The results presented in the lower panel of Figure 10, 
which shows the difference between the convergence scores on Twitter and in mani-
festos for each party-pair substantiate this finding. Issue convergence is lower on 
Twitter in 13 out of the 15 party-pairs under scrutiny (black dots) while only two 
pairs (grey dots) show higher levels of issue convergence on Twitter than in manifes-
tos.  
Overall, these findings provide strong evidence for H4. Issue convergence is lower on 
social media than in party manifestos. However, the presented results do not lead to 
the conclusion that parties really talk past each other on Twitter. The obtained con-
vergence scores for party communication on Twitter are lower than in the manifestos 
under study. In addition, they are also lower than values obtained through analyses 
based on party manifestos in Austria (see Dolezal et al. 2014) and in presidential 
campaign debates as covered by the media (see Sigelman and Buell 2004). Neverthe-
 
30 According to this formula, an issue convergence score of 70 indicates for instance a 70% overlap in 
the issues addressed by two given parties.  
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less, with issue convergence consistently above 50, the analysis reveals that parties’ 
issue agendas provide significant overlap, even on Twitter.  
 
Figure 10: Issue convergence on social media and in party manifestos 
 
Note: The upper left panel shows issue convergence in Twitter data. The upper right panel shows issue 
convergence in manifesto data. Darker tiles indicate higher levels convergence. The individual values 
of issue convergence are shown in each tile. The lower panel shows the difference between the issue 
convergence scores shown in the panels above for each pair of parties under study (N=15). Since man-
ifesto scores are subtracted from scores obtained from Twitter data, negative values indicate that issue 
convergence in Twitter data is lower than in manifestos, while positive values indicate that issue con-
vergence in Twitter data is higher than in manifestos.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Campaigning on social media now makes an essential part of parties’ activities during 
election campaigns (De Sio et al. 2018; Jungherr 2015; Kreiss 2016a; Nulty et al. 
2016). This development triggers new questions for the study of party competition. 
Does party behaviour on social media resemble patterns well-known from existing 
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studies of other platforms of campaign communication? Or do the technological op-
portunities these platforms offer lead to different communication strategies? 
Focussing on issue competition, this study argues that social media websites enable 
parties to highlight issues even more strategically than on another crucial platform of 
issue competition, namely party manifestos. To explore this expectation, this study 
provides a comparison of Twitter communication and party manifesto content. Four 
findings stand out. First, parties strongly use Twitter for issue competition. Second, 
the diversity of addressed topics is consistently lower for all parties on Twitter than in 
manifestos. Third, this difference in issue diversity cannot be solely attributed to a 
greater relevance of issue ownership. Fourth, issue convergence is considerably low-
er on social media than in party manifestos. 
These findings show that parties use social media very strategically for issue competi-
tion. This confirms that such platforms are a valuable data source to study parties’ 
salience strategies (see also De Sio et al. 2018: 1218). Moreover, the findings high-
light that the technological opportunities of social media enable political parties to 
strategically interact with competitors, the media and potential voters. This might 
particularly strengthen smaller parties with fewer resources and less agenda setting 
power in public campaign debates covered by the mass media (Enli 2017). This in-
vites future research not only on variation across different social media platforms 
(Stier et al. 2018) but also on how different types of parties use these websites for 
issue competition in election campaigns.  
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9. Put in the Spotlight or Largely Ignored?31 
Emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten by political parties in their online campaigns 
for European elections 
 
Abstract 
This article contributes to the debate about the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten 
(lead candidates) in the 2014 European Parliament election. Focusing on parties’ 
efforts to make the candidates visible to voters, we argue that the multi-level charac-
ter of these elections creates large differences concerning individual parties’ incen-
tives to promote the Spitzenkandidaten in their campaigns. Analysing a novel dataset 
of campaign communication on Facebook, we find that only few parties highlighted 
them, while many did not. In line with our theoretical argument, this variation is sys-
tematic and can be attributed to lacking incentives for most parties. Especially nomi-
nating a candidate at the European level only has a modest positive effect on national 
parties’ willingness to put the candidates in the spotlight. This lacking commitment to 
the nominated candidates should be considered in discussions about the reform of the 
current Spitzenkandidaten system for the 2019 EP elections. 
 
  
 
31 This chapter is identical to a manuscript co-authored with Daniela Braun. It is published as Braun 
and Schwarzbözl (2019). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my co-author, Daniela Braun. I also 
want to thank Matthias Fatke for valuable comments and feedback on earlier versions of the manu-
script as well as the editors and reviewers of the Journal of European Public Policy for their comments, 
suggestions and the straightforward handling of the publication process. 
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9.1 Introduction 
The election for the European Parliament (EP) in 2014 was widely predicted to differ 
from previous elections (Corbett 2014; Hobolt 2014; Priestley et al. 2015; Treib 
2014). For the first time, the major political groups nominated lead candidates 
(Spitzenkandidaten).32 In line with the Lisbon Treaty, the lead candidate of the win-
ning EP party group should be elected as president of the European Commission. The 
aim of this institutional change was to trigger publicly visible debates on European 
topics, in order to better convey the relevance of these elections to voters, increase 
turnout and thereby tackle the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). 
While the candidate of the European People’s Party (EPP), Jean-Claude Juncker, 
which gained the highest share of the vote, became indeed the Commission president, 
the expected positive effects attributed to this institutional innovation turned out to be 
modest. On the one hand, the Eurovision debate led to increased cognitive and politi-
cal involvement and EU support (Maier et al. (2017), knowledge of the launch of the 
Spitzenkandidaten system amplified pro-European and Eurosceptics attitudes (Popa et 
al. (2016) and the recognition of the Spitzenkandidaten had a positive effect on citi-
zens’ decision to cast a ballot (Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa (2015). On the other hand, 
research reveals low levels of actual media coverage (Schulze 2016), little interest in 
the televised debate among the candidates (Maier et al. 2017) and voters lacking 
knowledge about the Spitzenkandidaten (Gattermann et al. 2016; Schmitt, Hobolt, 
and Popa 2015). 
How can this discrepancy between the high expectations put in the introduction of a 
Spitzenkandidaten system (see Follesdal and Hix 2006: 557) and the small magnitude 
of its actual effects in the 2014 EP election be explained? Research indicates that fo-
cusing on the role of political parties and their strategic considerations offers an an-
swer to this puzzle (Braun and Popa 2018). In EP elections as well, national political 
parties are the main political actors (Hix and Lord 1997). Consequently, the expected 
effects of the Spitzenkandidaten system only play out if parties are 'motivated to di-
 
32 Scholars tend to use the German term 'Spitzenkandidaten' for these lead candidates.  
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rect voters’ attention to the candidates for European Commission President and to the 
policies that those candidates propose' (Franklin 2014: 10). The crucial question thus 
is whether the Spitzenkandidaten system offers incentives for enough national politi-
cal parties to make the nominated lead candidates visible to their voters. Braun and 
Popa (2018) show that the Spitzenkandidaten system as an institutional innovation 
received only little attention in parties’ Euromanifestos, mainly because parties saw 
little strategic reason to emphasize the topic. However, parties’ emphasis on the lead 
candidates as a specific form of campaign personalisation has not been examined so 
far. 
Tackling this research gap, we argue that due to the multiple levels of the electoral 
system in which EP elections take place, insights gained from national elections, 
where parties strongly focus on lead candidates, must be reconsidered for EP elec-
tions. For this task, we rely on social media, which is not only a crucial place for 
campaigning, but also among the most likely platforms to observe strategies of per-
sonalisation (Enli and Skogerbø 2013). Therefore, a novel dataset of parties’ cam-
paign communication on Facebook in 13 EU member countries ahead of the 2014 EP 
elections is presented to test our expectations empirically.  
The analysis reveals systematic variations in parties’ emphasis on the Spitzenkandi-
daten. Few parties put the candidates in the spotlight, while others largely ignored 
them. Most importantly, taking part in the nomination of a candidate has a small posi-
tive effect on parties’ likelihood to focus on the lead candidates. Only the national 
party affiliation of a candidate provides a strong incentive to highlight them. These 
findings indicate that lacking incentives for strategically acting national parties to put 
the candidates in the spotlight are a major shortcoming of the Spitzenkandidaten sys-
tem that need to be addressed in ongoing reform discussions.  
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9.2 Why should Political Parties Emphasize the Spitzenkandidaten? 
EP elections are characterised by their second order character from the outset up to 
most recent elections (Reif 1984; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt and Toygür 2016). 
With regard to the behaviour of political parties, the second order model implies that 
the election campaigns have a relatively low salience compared to first order national 
elections and that parties mainly compete over issues not located at the European but 
at the national level (see Hix and Marsh 2011: 5). These features of EP elections are 
closely linked to the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU. Because of the 
low intensity of electoral competition and the dominance of national issues, voters 
lack the opportunity of choosing between competing parties with varying positions 
about the future course of the EU (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 552). The idea behind the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten was to change these aspects of EP elections. 
Like national elections in parliamentary systems, the vote for a specific party ought to 
be linked to a lead candidate that aims to become head of the European Commission 
(Hobolt 2014). It was expected that this would intensify and personalise national par-
ties’ election campaigns and thereby strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
(Corbett 2014; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Gattermann et al. 2016; Hobolt 2014; 
Priestley et al. 2015; Treib 2014).  
Accordingly, the success of the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system depends 
on national parties’ decisions to make the candidates visible to voters (see Hobolt 
2014: 1535). Focussing on these actors, we argue that parties’ decisions to personal-
ize their campaign around the candidates are driven by strategic considerations 
(Braun and Popa 2018), which are strongly shaped by the interaction of national and 
EU related factors (Golder et al. 2017; Van der Eijk and Schmitt 2008). Parties seek 
to enhance their electoral fortunes not only when it comes to policy issues (e.g., De 
Sio and Weber 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Wagner and Meyer 2014), but also 
with regard to efforts of personalisation (Enli and Skogerbø 2013; Kriesi 2012; Van 
Aelst et al. 2011). However, due to the peculiarities of the multi-level electoral sys-
tem in which EP elections take place, focussing on the Spitzenkandidaten is not as-
sumed to be an equally attractive strategy for all parties. Rather, the analogical argu-
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ment that EP elections after the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten will generally be 
characterised by a strong personalisation around the lead candidates – as found in 
national elections – must be reconsidered. Therefore, specific hypotheses to explain 
variation in party behaviour towards the Spitzenkandidaten are derived in the follow-
ing sections. 
 
Candidate Nomination 
Many national parties participated in the nomination of a candidate to become the 
Commission president via their EP party groups. Similar to parties in national parlia-
mentary campaigns, the party groups publicly announced the candidate for the Com-
mission presidency in case of their party group winning the largest vote share 
(Corbett 2014; Hobolt 2014). For instance, the parties in the European People’s Party 
(EPP) chose Jean-Claude Juncker at their transnational congress in Dublin, whereas 
those in the Party of European Socialists (PES) opted for Martin Schulz. Similar to 
national election campaigns, where lead candidates receive a remarkable share of 
attention (Kriesi 2012; Poguntke and Webb 2005), it is expected that the parties tak-
ing part in the nomination of the candidate focus more on the Spitzenkandidaten in 
their campaign communications for EP elections. Such parties can mobilise voters by 
arguing that casting a ballot is not only a vote to influence the composition of the EP 
but also on who should become the next president of the European Commission (see 
also Hobolt 2014: 1529). Therefore, they can claim that the slogan '[t]his time it’s 
different'33 particularly holds when voting for them. 
Due to the generally low turnout of second-order elections, the mobilization of sup-
porters is particularly important. Thus, such parties are likely to take advantage of the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system. However, this strategy of voter-
mobilization only works if the parties’ potential voters are aware of the nominated 
Spitzenkandidaten (see also Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa 2015). We therefore expect 
parties that took part in the nomination procedure to make the candidate visible to 
 
33 Slogan used in November 2013 on the EP homepage (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/top-
stories/20130902TST18451/this-time-it's-different, last 19.09.2017). 
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their voters in their campaign communications and consequently to contribute more 
to drawing attention to the Spitzenkandidaten in the EP elections than others. 
H1: Parties that nominated a candidate put more emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten 
than other parties (Nomination hypothesis). 
 
Voters’ EU positions and parties’ ideological congruence with their candidates  
Moreover, we expect that the positive effect of nominating a candidate is moderated 
by the position of a party’s supporters on European integration. As recent research 
supports the assumption of a link between parties and voters also at the EU level 
(Adams et al. 2014), the described strategy of voter-mobilization is particularly prom-
ising for a party when it can be sure that its voters are mostly pro-European. In this 
case, the parties are likely to approve measures to strengthen the democratic legitima-
cy of the EU, such as the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system. Emphasizing 
one’s own candidate is then a credible signal of one’s commitment to this goal. 
Therefore, such behaviour is more likely to be observed, the more pro-European the 
voters of parties, which participated in nominating a candidate, are. 
H2: The positive effect of nominating a candidate on the party’s emphasis on the 
Spitzenkandidaten is stronger the more pro-European their voters are (Voter position 
hypothesis). 
 
For parties that nominated a candidate, ideological congruence is expected to be cru-
cial as well, as not all parties within a party group are equally close to that candidate. 
For instance, while the German Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Hungarian 
Fidesz both belong to the EPP, the CDU is much closer to Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
party group’s candidate, when it comes to European integration. Parties with a close 
fit between their own position and their candidate’s stance have fewer difficulties to 
introduce her or him to its voters as a representative of the party’s own positions at 
the European level. A larger ideological congruence is therefore expected to result in 
more attention towards the Spitzenkandidaten. Although EU issues have gained rele-
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vance (Hutter et al. 2016), the left-right dimension is still a crucial conflict line as 
well (e.g., Dalton et al. 2011). We therefore examine this effect in terms of both di-
mensions.  
H3: The closer the link between the candidate and the national party on the EU and 
the left-right dimension, the more emphasis parties put on the Spitzenkandidaten 
(Congruence hypothesis). 
 
National party affiliation of the candidates 
Although many parties have participated in nominating a candidate, their individual 
relationships with her or him vary. Above all, each candidate was affiliated to only 
one of the national parties (e.g. the PES candidate, Martin Schulz, was affiliated to 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the EPP candidate, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, to the Christian Social People's Party (CSV) from Luxembourg). This pat-
tern creates a stronger incentive for these parties to use the candidate as a campaign 
tool than for others. Parties directly affiliated with the Spitzenkandidaten can mobilise 
voters with the argument that a candidate from their national party (and not merely 
the EP group they belong to) could become president of the European Commission. 
Accordingly, these parties have a strong incentive to communicate this argument to 
mobilise their supporters and, ultimately, maximise their electoral fortunes. We there-
fore expect the national parties affiliated with a candidate to provide a higher share of 
attention to the Spitzenkandidaten.  
H4: National parties to which a candidate belongs to put more emphasis on the 
Spitzenkandidaten than other parties (National party affiliation hypothesis). 
 
Candidates’ country of origin 
The literature on party behaviour shows that parties are very sensitive to the actions 
of their competitors. Concerning issue competition, parties strongly focus on the par-
ty system agenda, when deciding, which topics to emphasise or downplay during 
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electoral contests (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015, 2010; Meyer and Wagner 
2016). As a result, the degree to which they converge on the same issues is a striking 
feature of party competition (Dolezal et al. 2014; Sigelman and Buell 2004). Such 
patterns are also found in studies that particularly focus on the issue of European in-
tegration (Hoeglinger 2015; Steenbergen and Scott 2004). 
This is an important insight regarding parties’ emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten, as 
it indicates that parties can mutually influence each other’s behaviour and make them 
address topics they would not have chosen to talk about otherwise. Accordingly, par-
ties in national party systems that are confronted with a competitor, who strongly 
emphasises one of the Spitzenkandidaten, might react on this move. On the one hand, 
this can be done by addressing the same candidate. If one party in the national party 
system strongly highlights the skills or policy positions of its own candidate, others 
might react by attacking this candidate. In this case, one party’s emphasis on a lead 
candidate would cause other parties to pay attention to that candidate as well by en-
gaging in negative campaigning (Walter and Vliegenthart 2010). On the other hand, 
one party’s Spitzenkandidaten campaign can also lead to other parties emphasizing a 
candidate from their own party group to introduce an alternative lead candidate to the 
voters. Both reactions result in more attention towards the Spitzenkandidaten. If a 
candidate’s national party affiliation exerts a strong positive effect on another party’s 
motivation to put its candidate in the spotlight as argued in H4, a contagious effect of 
party communication about the Spitzenkandidaten is most likely to be observed in the 
home countries of at least one of the candidates. 
H5: Parties in the home countries of the candidates put more emphasis on the 
Spitzenkandidaten than parties in other countries (Home country hypothesis). 
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9.3 Design of the Study  
We focus on party behaviour on social media during the campaign for the 2014 EP 
election in 13 EU member states to test the outlined hypotheses. In the following, the 
choice of data source, the selection of countries and parties and the operationalization 
of the variables used in the study are discussed. 
 
Using social media data to study parties’ emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten  
The decision to use social media data is driven by three considerations. First, online 
campaigning via social media has become a crucial aspect during electoral contests 
(Gibson 2015; Jungherr 2016; Oelsner and Heimrich 2015). EP elections are no ex-
ception in this regard. Although online tools were used modestly during the 2009 EP 
elections (Lilleker et al. 2011; Vergeer et al. 2011), parties and politicians strongly 
rely on these websites to get their message out only five years later in the 2014 EP 
elections (Nulty et al. 2016; Rodriguez and Madariaga 2016). Second, social media 
allows studying direct party communication, which is not mediated by gatekeepers 
(Engesser et al. 2017). Third, while election manifestos are mainly characterised by 
their policy-oriented nature (Dolezal et al. 2014), social media is more open with re-
gard to the messages that parties communicate. Moreover, research shows that it is 
actively used for strategies of personalization (Enli and Skogerbø 2013). Thus, if par-
ties aimed at addressing the Spitzenkandidaten, it is most likely to be observed in 
their election campaign on social media.  
We therefore rely on data from the social media platform Facebook. The website is 
used by almost all parties in the EU, especially during electoral contests. This allows 
a study of the campaigning strategies across countries and political parties. We re-
trieve all Facebook posts on parties’ official accounts for a two-month period ahead 
of the election using the Rfacebook package for R (Barberá et al. 2017). 
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Selection of Countries and Parties 
The countries included in the study are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hunga-
ry, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. This sample consists of countries from different regions and covers most of 
the founding members of the European Community, as well as countries that joined 
the EU in the subsequent enlargement rounds. Moreover, the parties within this sam-
ple show significant variations regarding their relationship to the Spitzenkandidaten 
and the voters they represent. The sample consequently provides a broad testing 
ground for our hypotheses. We focus on all national parties included in the 2014 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Polk et al. 2017) that gained at least five percent 
of the national vote in the 2014 EP election. The appendix provides an overview of 
the parties and social media accounts included in the study (Table 30). 
 
Operationalization 
The dependent variable in our analysis is a measurement of the emphasis that parties 
put on the Spitzenkandidaten in their social media communication in the run-up for 
the 2014 EP elections. For this purpose, individual text messages downloaded from 
the Facebook accounts of the parties covered in the study serve as the unit of analysis. 
For each message, we differentiate between observations mentioning one or more of 
the Spitzenkandidaten (1) and those that do not (0). On the one hand, we use this cod-
ing to calculate percentage shares of messages, showing the degree to which parties 
refer to the Spitzenkandidaten in a descriptive analysis. On the other hand, the indica-
tor itself serves as the dependent variable in the multivariate part of the analysis. Fur-
ther information on the coding procedure is provided in the appendix.  
To test the hypothesis that parties put more emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten when 
they took part in nominating an individual candidate (H1), we construct a dummy 
variable indicating whether the party belonged to an EP party group that nominated a 
candidate (1) or not (0). In order to test whether this relationship is moderated by vot-
ers’ position on European integration (H2), data from the European Election Study 
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(EES) (see Schmitt, Hobolt, Popa, et al. 2015) is used to calculate the mean position 
on European integration for the voters of each party. The congruence between a party 
and the candidate it nominated (H3) on the topic of European integration and the left-
right dimension is measured as the absolute value of the difference between its own 
position and the stance of the candidate’s party based on data from the CHES 2014 
data set (Polk et al. 2017). Hence, higher values indicate lower congruence. To ex-
plore variation in the emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten driven by the national party 
affiliation of the candidates (H4), we construct a dummy variable that differentiates 
between national parties to which one of the Spitzenkandidaten belongs (1) and other 
parties (0). For instance, this variable is zero for all German parties except for the 
SPD and the Greens, as Martin Schulz (SPD) and Ska Keller (Greens) were lead can-
didates and affiliated with these national parties. Moreover, a dummy variable differ-
entiates between the home countries of at least one of the Spitzenkandidaten (1) and 
the other countries included in the study (0) to test H5. 
In addition, we include several control variables in our analysis. We add an ascending 
variable for the campaign day on which a message was published and control for the 
fact that individual messages vary in their length, which could have an impact on the 
probability of mentioning a lead candidate, by including the log-transformed number 
of characters a message contains. Moreover, we account for the fact that a higher at-
tention on the Spitzenkandidaten might be driven by parties’ greater focus on Europe-
an issues using EU salience scores from the CHES 2014 data set (see Polk et al. 
2017). From this data source, we also include a variable capturing a party’s general 
left-right orientation, a dummy variable indicating a party’s participation in the na-
tional government during the time of the election campaign, and a variable for a par-
ty’s vote share. Further details about the variables used in the analysis and descriptive 
statistics are provided in Table 31 in the appendix.  
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9.4 Results 
We present our main findings in two steps. First, we provide a descriptive analysis of 
party behaviour on Facebook during the campaign for the 2014 EP elections with a 
special focus on the level and the distribution of our dependent variable – parties’ 
emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten. Second, we test our hypotheses to explain varia-
tion in the attention on the candidates in their campaign communications. 
To begin with, it is important to note that the parties of all countries under study 
strongly relied on Facebook during the campaign (Figure 11, upper left panel). On 
average, parties posted 198 messages in the two months before the election (see Table 
30 in the appendix for details). Moreover, the platform was indeed used to address 
issues related to the EP election in this period with an average share of 32.8 percent 
Figure 11 (lower left panel). Despite considerable variation between countries, the 
possibility that a lack of emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten is simply the conse-
quence of a low engagement in campaigning in general can therefore largely be ruled 
out. 
To explore the prominence of the Spitzenkandidaten in parties’ campaign communi-
cations, Figure 11 (right panel) shows the percentage shares of attention that individ-
ual parties devoted to them on Facebook in the two months before the election. Two 
important aspects stand out. On the one hand, the mean level of attention on the can-
didates is very low, as indicated by the vertical dashed line. On average, only 2.9 per-
cent of parties’ Facebook posts mention at least one of the Spitzenkandidaten. On the 
other hand, the distribution of attention is highly uneven. Most parties devoted little 
or no attention to the Spitzenkandidaten, whereas a few parties – like the German 
social democrats or the French communist party – strongly focused on them. Taken 
together, these findings provide strong evidence that the introduction of the 
Spitzenkandidaten system did not automatically lead parties to highlight them to a 
similar degree. In contrast, few parties emphasised them strongly, while many others 
did not.  
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Figure 11: Attention on EP elections and Spitzenkandidaten 
 
Note: The upper left-hand panel shows the mean number of observations over parties in a given coun-
try; the lower left-hand panel shows the mean share of observations on the EP election for all parties in 
a country. The dashed lines represent the mean values calculated over countries (N=13). In the right-
hand panel, the dots show the share of Facebook posts that mention one of the Spitzenkandidaten. The 
vertical dashed line represents the mean share of attention over all parties (N=73). 
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In the next step, we explore whether the observed differences in parties’ emphasis on 
the Spitzenkandidaten feature systematic variations that can be attributed to the stra-
tegic considerations formulated in our hypotheses. For this task, we estimate logistic 
regression models treating mentions of the candidates and the overall institutional 
innovation in individual messages on the parties’ Facebook accounts as the dependent 
variable.34 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. First, as shown in Model 1, nomi-
nating a candidate is positively related to the attention parties devoted to the 
Spitzenkandidaten in their campaign communications. This initial support for the 
nomination hypothesis (H1) also holds true when controlling for other relevant fac-
tors as shown in Model 8. Second, in line with H2, the analysis reveals a positive and 
significant interaction effect between nominating a candidate and the position of a 
party’s voters as shown in Model 2. This suggests that the positive effect of nominat-
ing a candidate is stronger the more pro-European a party’s voters are. Third, the 
negative coefficients for the congruence between a party and the candidate it nomi-
nated on European integration and the left-right dimension reported in Model 3 to 
Model 5, which are based on all messages from parties that took part in the nomina-
tion of a candidate, are in line with H3. However, it must be noted that this effect is 
only statistically significant for the left-right dimension. Fourth, we find a positive 
effect for the party affiliation hypothesis (H4). In the bivariate setting of Model 6 and 
in the fully-specified regression in Model 8, national parties to which a candidate 
belonged, put more emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten. Moreover, the analysis pro-
vides only limited support for the home country hypothesis (H5). In the bivariate set-
ting of Model 7, we find a positive and significant association between the candi-
dates’ countries of origin and the attention paid to the Spitzenkandidaten, but when 
we control for the influence of other variables in Model 8, this effect disappears.35  
 
34 We also estimated models with alternative specifications. Using multi-level models with observa-
tions nested in countries and parties leads to the same conclusions as presented in the paper (see Ta-
ble 32 in the appendix). 
35 All our hypotheses make claims about the overall attention parties devote to the Spitzenkandidaten. 
However, one might argue that the mechanisms behind the derived hypotheses lead to the expectation 
Put in the Spotlight or Largely Ignored? 
142 
 
Table 6: Examining variation in parties’ emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Nominated 2.29*** -1.36      1.91*** 
 (0.41) (1.66)      (0.52) 
Nominated #   0.57*       
Position (voters)  (0.27)       
Congruence (EU)   -1.22  -0.12    
   (0.91)  (0.24)    
Congruence (LR)    -1.25* -0.88**    
    (0.58) (0.28)    
National Party   1.91***   1.49** 3.06***  1.90*** 
affiliation  (0.49)   (0.54) (0.41)  (0.48) 
Home country  0.87   1.05  1.81** 0.87 
  (0.57)   (0.74)  (0.63) (0.59) 
Position (voters)  -0.35   0.36**   0.10 
  (0.32)   (0.13)   (0.20) 
EU salience  0.29   0.21   0.32* 
  (0.16)   (0.20)   (0.16) 
Left-right  -0.30***   -0.37***   -0.27*** 
  (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.07) 
Gov. party  0.67*   0.33   0.52* 
  (0.29)   (0.24)   (0.27) 
Vote share  -0.71   -0.04   -1.17 
  (2.09)   (2.30)   (2.04) 
Length of   0.32***   0.29***   0.31*** 
message  (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.05) 
Campaign day  0.02***   0.02**   0.02** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Constant -5.35*** -7.26*** -2.55*** -2.41*** -7.97*** -4.12*** -4.42*** -10.00*** 
 (0.43) (2.51) (0.61) (0.58) (2.09) (0.32) (0.37) (2.19) 
N 11,747 11,747 6,685 6,685 6,685 11,747 11,747 11,747 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.23 
Note: Results show coefficients of logistic regression models with Spitzenkandidaten mentions as the 
dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
 
These findings provide initial support for four of our five hypotheses. However, given 
the large variation in party attention to the Spitzenkandidaten shown in Figure 11, the 
relevance of the presented findings strongly depends on the size of the estimated ef-
 
that a party only or particularly emphasises a specific candidate. Running the same analyses with de-
pendent variables which are sensitive to attention towards specific candidates, corroborates that the 
mechanisms suggested in our hypotheses are responsible for the effects presented in our main findings 
(see Table 33in the appendix). 
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fects. Figure 12 provides a more detailed analysis. Calculating predicted probabilities 
of mentioning the Spitzenkandidaten for parties that nominated a candidate and others 
that did not (H1) reveals that the former group is more likely to emphasize them in 
their campaign communications as shown in panel A of Figure 12. However, while 
this difference is statistically significant, it must be noted that the difference in the 
predicted probability of mentioning a candidate for a party that nominated one and a 
party that did not is extremely small (0.9 percentage points). Moreover, the predicted 
probability of mentioning a candidate is only 1.1 per cent, even when the party nomi-
nated a candidate. Therefore, nominating a lead candidate exerts a positive and statis-
tically significant effect on mentioning the Spitzenkandidaten that is, however, very 
small.  
Turning to the interaction effect between the nomination of a candidate and voters’ 
position on European integration (H2), panel B of Figure 12 shows whether candidate 
nomination causes parties to emphasise the Spitzenkandidaten more, depending on 
their voters’ position towards Europe. With higher scores on the x-axis indicating 
more pro-European positions, the analysis reveals that nominating a candidate makes 
no significant difference for parties’ attention on the Spitzenkandidaten when their 
voters show low levels of EU support. In contrast, in the case of parties with more 
pro-European electorates, there is a positive effect. It is concluded that especially 
parties with a pro-European electorate that nominated a candidate emphasise the 
Spitzenkandidaten. Nevertheless, also this effect should not be overstated.  
The predicted probability of mentioning a Spitzenkandidaten depending on the con-
gruence between a party and the candidate it nominated (H3) on the EU and the left-
right dimension are shown in panel C and panel D of Figure 12. Regarding the EU 
dimension, no difference in the probability of mentioning a candidate can be found, 
while parties with very similar positions as the candidates they nominated on the left-
right dimension have a higher probability of mentioning a candidate. Thus, we find 
modest support for H3 when looking at the left-right dimension, but not for the case 
of the EU dimension. 
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Figure 12: Driving forces of mentioning the Spitzenkandidaten 
 
Note: Panels A, E and F show the predicted probabilities of mentioning a candidate in a given message 
based on Model 8 in Table 6. Panel B shows the marginal effect of candidate nomination based on 
Model 2 in Table 6. Panel C and D show predicted probabilities of mentioning a candidate based on 
Model 5. Bars and shaded areas in all panels represent the confidence intervals at the 95 percent level. 
 
Focussing on the predicted probabilities for parties to which one of the Spitzenkandi-
daten belongs and parties for which this is not the case (H4), reveals statistically sig-
nificant and substantial differences. As reported in panel E of Figure 12, when hold-
ing all continuous variables at their means and all other dummy variables except the 
home country variable at 0, the predicted probability of mentioning a candidate in an 
individual message is 2.7 percent. However, this variable takes a value of 15.6 per-
cent when a candidate is affiliated to the national party. This remarkable difference in 
attention towards the Spitzenkandidaten provides evidence that national party affilia-
tion has a strong effect on a party’s incentive to put the spotlight on the Spitzenkandi-
daten. 
In contrast, there is no evidence for an influencing effect of the strong emphasis of 
parties to which a lead candidate belongs on other parties in the national party system 
(H5). The predicted probabilities of mentioning a candidate for a party from the home 
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country of one of the candidates and other parties for which this is not the case are 
both extremely low as shown in panel F of Figure 12. Moreover, the estimates do not 
differ significantly from each other. Hence, there is no evidence that parties in general 
made the Spitzenkandidaten more visible to their voters in countries where at least 
one of the candidates comes from.  
 
9.5 Conclusion 
The introduction of Spitzenkandidaten was expected to ease the second order charac-
ter of EP elections (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 557). However, research shows that the 
actual effects of this institutional arrangement introduced in the 2014 EP elections 
turned out to be modest. Based on the assumption that these expected positive effects 
depend on national parties’ efforts to promote not only the institutional change itself 
(see Braun and Popa 2018), but in particular to make the candidates visible to voters, 
this article explores their willingness to emphasise them in their online election cam-
paign via Facebook.  
Our findings clearly show that the overall attention that parties devoted to the 
Spitzenkandidaten by national parties was very low on average with few remarkable 
exceptions. Although parties were strongly engaged in campaigning, many remained 
silent on the lead candidates. This result fits with other research on the introduction of 
the Spitzenkandidaten system. The low average attention on the candidates, even on a 
platform where parties usually strongly rely on personalization strategies, is very 
much in line with other scholars’ impression that most parties made little efforts to 
put the Spitzenkandidaten in the spotlight of their campaigns (Corbett 2014; Hobolt 
2014) and with the results reported by Braun and Popa (2018) who show that the in-
stitutional innovation of the Spitzenkandidaten system was reluctantly addressed in 
parties’ Euromanifestos.  
Another crucial insight from this study is that the interplay between strategically act-
ing parties on the one hand and the constraints of the multi-level character of EP elec-
tions on the other is a key factor for explaining why the Spitzenkandidaten were not 
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able to make a difference in the 2014 EP elections. The presented results illustrate 
that only the national party affiliation of a candidate leads to a strong emphasis on the 
Spitzenkandidaten. Other factors have a positive effect as well, as for example the 
participation in the nomination of a candidate or a party’s ideological congruence 
with its candidate. Nevertheless, the scope of these factors is limited. It must there-
fore be concluded that the idea behind the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten to 
strengthen the relevance of these elections collides with most parties’ strategic con-
siderations to make the candidates visible to voters. 
These findings have two important implications. First, concerning future EP elec-
tions, it is indicated that if the institutional setting of Spitzenkandidaten is to be main-
tained, not only the role of the media (see Gattermann et al. 2016; Maier et al. 2017), 
but also the role of the national political parties needs to be reconsidered. Especially 
the nomination procedure of the lead candidates via the EP party groups is far from 
being a strong and credible commitment of the parties to promote them.  
Second, in more general terms, the study provides evidence on the context sensitivity 
of party competition. Insights gained from party competition at the national level do 
not necessarily apply to the EU level (see also Spoon and Klüver 2014). The intro-
duction of the Spitzenkandidaten system seeks to make 'European elections similar to 
parliamentary elections in national democracies' (Hobolt 2014: 1529). But our find-
ings illustrate that the EU multi-level system ‘is not simply a national political system 
writ large’ (Ladrech 2015: 586). Unlike national elections, where parties personalise 
their campaigns by putting the lead candidates on the centre stage (Kriesi 2012; 
Poguntke and Webb 2005), this was not the case in the 2014 EP elections. Thus, the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system shows that transferring insights from 
the national to the EU level is risky. Research on electoral politics in the EU therefore 
benefit from a multi-level perspective (see Laffan 2016) which takes the complex 
interactions and repercussions between the national and the European level into ac-
count. 
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Appendix 1: Politicising Immigration in Western Europe 
 
In this appendix, we provide additional information about the elections included in 
our analysis and on the classification of parties, namely challenger parties, moderate 
right parties and moderate left parties and the operationalization of the variables used 
in the study. Moreover, additional empirical analyses are presented. 
 
Overview of national elections covered by our dataset  
Table 7 gives an overview of the national elections covered by our dataset in each 
country. Our focus is on national parliamentary elections in all countries except for 
France, where we considered the first round of the presidential elections.  
 
Table 7: Elections covered in the analysis 
Country Benchmark 
election 
Elections included 
Austria* 1975 1994, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013 
UK 1974 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 
France** 1978 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 
Germany 1976 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 
Netherlands 1972 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 
Switzerland 1975 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
* In the Austrian case, the snap election of 1995 is not included. 
** In the French case, data on the parliamentary election in 1978 was collected for the 1970s. The 
election in 1988 is the first presidential election included in our sample.  
*** Most recent elections in Austria (2017), the Netherlands (2017), Switzerland (2015) and the Unit-
ed Kingdom (2017) are not included in the analysis since no manifesto data is available yet for these 
elections.  
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Coding of parties into party types and party families 
Table 8 summarizes our categorisation of challenger parties, moderate right parties 
and moderate left parties. While the classification of moderate left parties creates no 
problems in the countries covered by our study, the classification of four parties de-
serves further explanation: the Swiss Radical Party (Freisinn-Demokratische Partei; 
FDP), the Dutch Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), the 
Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei; SVP) and the Austrian Freedom 
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; FPÖ). The Swiss FDP is the most delicate 
case. Being in government since the late 19th century and holding moderate policy 
positions, good reasons exist for including it in the category of mainstream parties. 
We follow conventional classifications in the literature and exclude it (see, e.g., 
Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012). We checked the consequences of this classification 
with our data and found that including this party would make no difference. The 
Dutch VVD is another critical case. Being a liberal party on economic and cultural 
issues in the post-war decades, it has accommodated to a restrictive position on im-
migration in the last two decades. Since it has done so less consistently and in an op-
portunistic rather than ideological way, we include this party in the category of mod-
erate right mainstream parties. This is again in line with previous classifications 
(Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012). The Swiss SVP and the Austrian FPÖ also raise some 
classification problems. These parties have been in government for longer periods, 
thus violating the first criterion of a challenger party.36 However, both parties repre-
sent mainstream parties which have radically transformed their ideological profiles on 
issues such as immigration and European integration in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Because of their ideological stance and the role they have played in domestic 
politics in the last two decades, they can both be considered radical right challenger 
parties. For this reason, they are consistently included in the family of new radical 
populist right parties in the scholarly literature (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Mudde 2007). They certainly meet the second criterion of a challenger party and we 
therefore include them in the category of challenger parties as well. 
 
36 The Swiss SVP has held political office in the entire period of this study. The Austrian FPÖ was in 
government from 1983 until 1986 and from 2000 until 2006. 
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Table 8: Coding of parties per country 
 Challenger parties Mainstream parties 
 Radical right Moderate left Moderate right 
Austria FPÖ, BZÖ SPÖ ÖVP 
UK UKIP Labour Conservatives 
France FN PS UDF, RPR/UMP 
Germany AfD SPD CDU/CSU 
Netherlands LPF, PVV PVDA CDA, VVD 
Switzerland SVP SP CVP 
 
Operationalisation of salience, polarisation and politicization 
To study the politicization of immigration, we opt for data on political contestation 
during election campaigns collected from the mass media to analyse party behaviour 
in public election debates. This data on public election debates is taken from projects 
led by Hanspeter Kriesi and Edgar Grande (Kriesi 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et 
al. 2008). It is based on quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles. For each 
country, a quality newspaper and a tabloid newspaper were chosen. The newspapers 
included are: Die Presse & Kronenzeitung (Austria); Le Monde & Le Parisien 
(France); Süddeutsche Zeitung & Bild (Germany); NRC Handelsblad & Algemen 
Dagblad (Netherlands); The Times & The Sun (UK); Neue Zürcher Zeitung & Blick 
(Switzerland). Articles referring to politics were selected and subsequently coded 
using the core sentence approach, a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and 
Pennings (2001). It treats ‘core sentences’, which consist of a relation between a sub-
ject (party actors) and an object (issues) as the unit of analysis. The approach allows 
building an issue category on immigration which comprises of all statements of party 
actors on immigration and integration policies.  
In line with the scholarly literature (De Wilde 2011; Hutter and Grande 2014), we 
conceptualise politicization as a multi-faceted process which includes both the public 
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visibility of conflict (i.e., its salience) and the polarisation of actors on a contentious 
issue. Following Hutter and Grande (2014), Hutter et al. (2016) and Hoeglinger 
(2016), we measure politicization of the immigration issue in election campaigns by 
multiplying the salience of the issue with its degree of polarisation.37 This literature 
shows for European integration issues that these two dimensions of politicization are 
independent and that multiplying them provides meaningful results. This is confirmed 
by our own data, in which both dimensions of politicization are uncorrelated (r = -
0.03, t = -0.16), i.e., they measure different aspects of politicization. Both variables 
are measured at the systemic level (i.e. at the level of the overall party system) and are 
then multiplied to arrive at an overall indicator of politicization.  
Salience in this context refers to the visibility of the immigration issue in relation to 
other issues in an election campaign. Accordingly, the indicator is operationalised as 
the percentage share of core sentences on immigration compared to the number of all 
observations during an election.  
Polarisation is measured as the positional variance between parties about the immi-
gration issue. To ensure that the position of relevant parties has a greater influence on 
the indicator than that of small and less relevant parties, we weight this variable by 
the visibility of individual parties (Hutter and Grande 2014: 1008). The coded posi-
tions range from -1 to 1 (with three intermediate categories), which means that the 
polarisation between parties can take values between 0 and 1 with the latter indicating 
a maximum of polarisation.  
 
Overview of politicization scores by country 
Table 9 gives detailed information about the mean values of our politicization indica-
tor and its individual components (salience and polarization) by country for the peri-
od from 1990 until 2017. To facilitate interpretation, we include additional infor-
mation such as mean values for the entire period. 
 
37 We do not include ‘actor expansion’, a third dimension of politicisation (see Hutter and Grande 
(2014), in our analysis because it is inherently associated with our main explanatory variable, namely 
issue entrepreneurship of challenger parties. 
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 Table 9: Politicization of immigration in national elections 
Country Politicization Salience Polarisation 
Austria 2.57 6.81 0.36 
UK 0.83 5.03 0.19 
Germany 3.18 8.15 0.42 
Netherlands 2.51 6.70 0.38 
Switzerland 2.37 6.81 0.36 
France 3.46 11.78 0.2 
    
maximum 6.77 19.70 0.76 
minimum 0.00 0.84 0.00 
mean 2.34 7.51 0.32 
 
 
Additional analyses on the dimensions of politicization (salience and polariza-
tion) 
The focus of the article rests on the politicization of immigration. Our main depend-
ent variable is the national level of politicization of immigration issues. Our concep-
tualisation of politicization emphasizes political conflict, the “scope of conflict” more 
specifically, and refers to the “dynamics of the expansion of the scope of political 
conflict” (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]: 16). It assumes that politicization is a multi-
faceted process and focuses on the public visibility of conflict (i.e., its salience) and 
the polarisation of actors on an issue. Here, we provide additional insights on these 
two components of politicization (i.e., salience and polarization) and the issue entre-
preneurship of the party types and families under scrutiny.  
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Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the results of our analysis for individual dimensions of 
politicization, namely salience and polarization. These analyses provide additional 
insights into the development and the national patterns of politicization. A compari-
son of both figures reveals that politicization has been clearly driven by polarization. 
Polarisation has been above average in every country in most of the elections. We 
observe marked peaks in Germany in the 1990s, in France in 2002 and in the Nether-
lands in 2012. The trend line in the case of polarisation is less clear. Polarisation has 
been increasing in most countries compared to the 1970s with two remarkable excep-
tions, namely France and Switzerland, where polarisation was strong in the 1970s 
already. Figure 13 also shows an increasing salience of immigration issues. In con-
trast, we find less elections in which salience is clearly above average, and these elec-
tions are distributed across the entire period of our study. 
In sum, immigration has been a low salient but highly polarising issue in comparison 
to other issues in national elections. Because of its strong polarising force, the immi-
gration issue seems to be ideally suited for politicization.  
 
Figure 13: The salience of immigration in national elections per country  
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Figure 14: The polarisation of immigration in national elections per country  
 
 
Additional analyses on the relationship between socio-economic factors and the 
politicization of immigration 
In the main article, we use two indicators to analyse the relationship between socio-
economic factors and the politicization of immigration in election campaigns, namely 
the share of incoming migrants to a country in relation to the country’s population 
and the unemployment rate. On unemployment and other economic indicators we use 
the data provided by the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 
2016). Data on immigration is provided by the International Migration Database of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Data are 
available online on the website:  
http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=MIG&lang=en#.  
It includes officially registered immigration only. 
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To ensure the validity of our results, we carried out several additional analyses. We 
calculated (a) the relationship between our politicization indicator and the two inde-
pendent variables used in the main article (unemployment and immigration) with a 
one year time lag; (b) an alternative measurement of immigration (i.e., the inflow of 
asylum seekers as the percentage share of the total population38) in the year of the 
election and with a one year time lag; (c) an alternative measure of economic griev-
ances (i.e., the annual growth of the real and nominal GDP in the year of the election) 
and with a one year time lag of the independent variable; and (d) the relationship be-
tween the components of our politicization index (salience and polarisation) and so-
cio-economic factors (unemployment and immigration). The results are shown in 
Figure 15. They corroborate the findings presented in the main article as we find no 
strong positive relationship between politicization or its components and different 
socio-economic variables.  
 
38 Numbers of asylum seekers are again provided by the International Migration Database of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 
 http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=MIG&lang=en#. 
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Figure 15: The Relationship between politicization and socio-economic factors 
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Additional information on the measurement of salience and position in manifes-
tos and the validation of this approach 
A crucial step in the analysis presented in the main article is to measure the issue en-
trepreneurial strategies of different party families regarding immigration issues. Fol-
lowing Hobolt and de Vries (2015), we understand issue entrepreneurs as parties that 
promote an issue and adopt a position that deviates from the mean position in the in 
the party system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1168).  
To measure this concept in a way that is independent from our measurement of the 
politicization of immigration issues in mass mediated debates, we opt for data from 
party manifestos. We explore how much attention a party puts on immigration issues 
relative to other topics in its manifesto and the position it takes on this issue.  
The main difficulty in this respect is that the issue categories of the Manifesto Project 
do not include immigration (see Lehmann and Zobel 2018: 2). For this reason, we 
provide novel indicators for parties’ issue attention and their positions on the topic in 
party manifestos. We use the manifestoR corpus which allows applying text mining 
approaches to the manifestos covered by the Marpor project (Lehmann et al. 2017; 
Volkens et al. 2017). Our approach follows two steps. In a first step, we use country-
specific keyword lists to identify sentences addressing immigration issues. Based on 
this information, we calculate parties’ issue attention as the percentage share of sen-
tences on immigration in relation to all sentences in a manifesto. In a subsequent step, 
we draw a sample of 20 sentences on immigration from each manifesto to manually 
code a party’s position. Here, we differentiate between supportive (+1), neutral (0) 
and skeptical positions (-1) and use the mean value from these codings to arrive at a 
position score for each party. This coding was performed by the researchers in col-
laboration with student assistants with very good language skills.  
Since the positional deviance from the mean position of the party system is a crucial 
component of issue entrepreneurship that can only be calculated on the basis of in-
formation on all relevant parties in that party system, we not only coded the manifes-
tos of the party families on which our main theoretical focus lies in the paper, but for 
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all parties which gained more than five percent of the votes in the respective election 
under study. Positional deviance is then calculated as the distance of a party’s posi-
tion from the mean position of the party system at the time of the election. Following 
Hobolt and de Vries (2015: 1169), both variables are then multiplied to get an overall 
measure of a party’s issue entrepreneurial strategy.  
Keyword based approaches, like all methods of quantitative text analysis, require 
careful validation (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). To assess the validity of our coding 
approach, we first explore the face validity of the results. Figure 16 shows boxplots 
and the individual scores of all coded parties on the salience of and position on immi-
gration issues by party family. These results provide initial evidence for the validity 
of our findings. In line with the literature on issue entrepreneurial strategies, we find 
that parties of the radical right put weight on the issue. Moreover, the analysis reveals 
that these parties have by far the most negative stance on immigration, while green 
parties show the most positive positions, which is both very much in line with expec-
tations from the existing literature.  
In addition to this first inspection of the results obtained from our coding approach, 
we take advantage of the fact that a recent study conducted by (Lehmann and Zobel 
2018) also provides measure on the salience and position of parties on immigration 
based on a crowd-sourced coding approach of party manifestos that are also part of 
our analysis. This allows systematically comparing our results on issue salience and 
position on immigration based on the coding approach described above with the 
method of Lehmann and Zobel (2018) to test the validity of our findings.  
Manifestos from Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland are covered in both 
analyses and are used for this validation. The results of these comparisons show that 
both indicators for salience are highly correlated (r = 0.94, t = 20.31). The same holds 
true for the position on immigration issues (r = 0.82, t = 10.72). The scatter plots pre-
sented in Figure 17, which show separately for salience and position for each of these 
four countries, provide additional evidence in this regard.  
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Based on these results, we conclude that our coding approach provides a valid meas-
ure of issue salience and issue positions on immigration in party manifestos. This in 
turn allows measuring issue entrepreneurship for parties and party families at a given 
election in a way that is independent from our measurement of the politicization of 
the issue in mass mediated campaign debates.  
 
Figure 16: Salience and position as measured in party manifestos 
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Figure 17: Validation of salience and position  
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Additional analyses on differences between mainstream parties in government 
and opposition 
In the main article, we distinguish between mainstream parties of the moderate left 
and the moderate right and explore the role of issue entrepreneurship of these parties 
and how it relates to the politicization of immigration. In addition, one might argue 
that the behaviour of mainstream parties is influenced by its status in the political 
system rather than by its ideological orientation. Accordingly, especially mainstream 
parties in opposition are likely to emphasise new issues (Van de Wardt 2015). To 
explore this argument in more detail on the basis of our data, we coded two dummy 
variables which indicate for moderate left and moderate right parties whether they 
have been in government (1) or not (0) during the election campaigns covered by our 
dataset. We then calculated the mean issue entrepreneurship score for moderate left 
and moderate right parties depending on the composition of the government as pro-
vided by Armingeon et al. (2016).  
Figure 18 shows the results of this analysis. For moderate left parties (right panel), we 
find a difference in issue entrepreneurship depending on whether such parties are in 
opposition or not. This is in line with the expectation that parties in opposition have 
higher values of issue entrepreneurship. Issue entrepreneurship of moderate left main-
stream parties is more pronounced when they are not in government. Parties of the 
moderate right (left panel), also seem to mobilise the issue more when they are in 
opposition, although to a much lesser extent. However, both findings are not statisti-
cally significant. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the argument is difficult to 
apply for all the countries in our sample. For the case of Switzerland, we do not have 
moderate left or moderate right parties in opposition for the period covered by our 
analysis. Taken together, we find no clear evidence for the argument that mainstream 
parties in opposition put more emphasis more on the issue (Van de Wardt (2015). For 
this reason, we do not present them in the main text. 
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Figure 18: Issue entrepreneurship by status and party family 
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Table 10: Description of issues in media data and respective MARPOR catego-
ries 
Issue Description and examples MARPOR categories and codes 
Welfare Welfare related policies such as 
health care, disability care, family, 
retirement, measures against un-
employment, fighting poverty, 
consumer rights, social housing 
and other redistributive measures 
to achieve equality.  
Equality: Positive (per503), Welfare 
State Expansion (per504), Welfare 
State Limitation (per505), Labour 
Groups: Positive (per701), Labour 
Groups: Negative (per702), Middle 
Class and Professional Groups 
(per704), Underprivileged Minority 
Groups (per705), Non-economic De-
mographic Groups (per706) 
Economic lib-
eralism 
Economic policies relating to 
labour market regulations, free 
trade, agriculture, finance, eco-
nomic competition, deregulation, 
privatisation, Keynesian policies, 
promotion of specific sectors and 
statements on neoliberalism or 
Marxism.  
Free Market Economy (per401), Incen-
tives: Positive (per402), Market Regu-
lation (per403), Economic Planning 
(per404), Corporatism/ Mixed Econo-
my (per405), Protectionism: Positive 
(per406), Protectionism: Negative 
(per407), Economic Goals (per408), 
Keynesian Demand Management 
(per409), Economic Growth: Positive 
(per410), Controlled Economy 
(per412), Nationalisation (per413), 
Economic Orthodoxy (per414), Marx-
ist Analysis (per415), Anti-Growth 
Economy: Positive (per416), Agricul-
ture and Farmers: Positive (per703) 
Cultural liber-
alism 
Policies related to international 
solidarity, the promotion of peace, 
human rights, democratisation, 
tolerance, traditions, patriotism, 
LGBT, gender, abortion. 
Freedom and Human Rights (per201), 
Democracy (per202), National Way of 
Life: Positive (per601), National Way 
of Life: Negative (per602), Civic 
Mindedness: Positive (per606) 
Europe European related topics such as 
the deepening or enlargement, EU-
related policies and general state-
ments on the EU. 
European Community/Union: Positive 
(per108), European Community/ Un-
ion: Negative (per110) 
Immigration All policies related to immigration 
and integration including the role 
of Islam and xenophobia. 
Multiculturalism: Positive (per607), 
Multiculturalism: Negative (per608) 
Environment Environmental policies such as 
pollution, genetic engineering and 
climate change. 
Environmental Protection (per501) 
Note: The left column shows the issue categories from the Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) media date, which 
we use in the analysis. The middle column describes these categories in more detail. The right column 
then gives an overview how we recoded the Marpor data to fit with the media data. Overall, these six 
issue categories account for 69% of the issues reported in the media and 61% in party manifestos.  
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Table 11: Assignment of issue ownership 
Issue Germany Austria United Kingdom 
Welfare Social democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD); Party of democratic Socialism 
(PDS); The Left 
Social democratic Party of Austria 
(SPÖ) 
Labour 
Economy Union (CDU/CSU); Free democratic 
Party (FDP) 
Liberal Forum (LIF); Austrian Peo-
ple’s Party (ÖVP) 
Liberal Democrats; Conservatives  
Cultural liberalism Alliance '90/The Greens; Free demo-
cratic Party (FDP) 
Liberal Forum (LIF), The Greens Liberal Democrats 
Europe Union (CDU/CSU); Alternative for 
Germany (AFD) 
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) - 
Immigration Alternative for Germany (AFD) Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(BZÖ); Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) 
Conservatives 
Environment Alliance '90/The Greens The Greens - 
Continues on next page 
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Assignment of issue ownership (continued) 
Issue France Switzerland Netherlands 
Welfare Left Front; French Communist Party 
(PCF); Socialist Party (PS) 
Social Democratic Party of Switzer-
land (SPS); Independents’ Alliance 
Socialist Party; Labour Party; Peo-
ple’s Party for Freedom and Democ-
racy 
Economy Union of Democrats for the Republic 
(UDR); Rally for the Republic (RPR); 
Union for a Popular Movement 
(UMP) 
Radical Democratic Party;  Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
Cultural liberalism The Greens Green Party of Switzerland (GPS); 
Green Liberal Party 
D66; Green Left 
Europe Democratic Movement (MoDem) Swiss People’s Party (SVP) - 
Immigration National Front (FN) National Action for People and Fa-
therland; Swiss People’s Party (SVP); 
Freedom Party of Switzerland 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF): Party of 
Freedom (PVV); Livable Netherlands 
Environment The Greens Green Party of Switzerland (GPS); 
Green Liberal Party; Independents’ 
Alliance 
Green Left 
Note: Parties are only treated as issue owners, when they actually participated at an election.   
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Table 12: Operationalisation, source and descriptive statistics  
Variable Operationalisation Source Mean SD Min Max 
Dep. Variables 
  
    
Issue salience 
(newspaper) 
Percentage share of a party’s core sentences about an issue in 
relation to all statements coded at an election campaign for that 
party (Calculated separately for each issue). 
NPW/Polcon 11.47 10.18 0 75 
Issue salience 
(manifestos) 
Percentage share of a party’s quasi sentences about an issue in 
relation to all coded statements for that party in its manifesto.  
MARPOR 10.15 9.44 0 52.73 
Ind. Variables 
  
    
Issue ownership Dichotomous variable indicating whether a party owns an issue 
(1) or not (0) 
Own calc. 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Systemic issue 
salience (newspa-
per) 
Share of core sentences on an issue minus a party’s own state-
ments in relation to all observations during an election cam-
paign. 
NPW/Polcon 9.04 6.30 0 38.40 
Systemic issue 
salience (manifes-
tos) 
Mean issue salience in the party system calculated for each party 
without a party’s own salience scores. 
MARPOR 10.19 7.98 0 34.50 
Vote share  Vote share of a party at a given election in percent (pervote) MARPOR 18.31 11.06 3.15 43.21 
Government party Dummy variable indicating whether a party is in government (1) 
or not (0) during the election campaign. 
Own calc. 0.44  0.49 0 1 
Rile Placement of a party on a left-right scale based on its manifesto 
content. 
MARPOR -0.20 21.36 -63.38 47.79 
Media Dummy variable indicating whether an observation contains 
information on issue salience from newspaper data (1) or mani-
festos (0). 
Own calc. 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Note: Both, the manifesto and the newspaper data set, contain N=990 complete observations. The unit of observation is a party’s attention on a 
given issue at a given election in each data set. Thus, the appended data set has N=1,980 observations. 
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Table 13: Countries, elections, parties and issues covered by the analysis 
Country (N=6) Year of election 
(N=34) 
Number of parties Number of issues 
Austria 1994 
1999  
2002  
2006 
2008 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
France 1988 
1995 
2002 
2007 
2012 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Germany 1994 
1998 
2002 
2005 
2009 
2013 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Netherlands 1994 
1998 
2002 
2003 
2006 
2010 
2012 
5 
6 
7 
7 
6 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Switzerland 1991 
1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
2011 
8 
7 
5 
5 
5 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
United Kingdom 1992 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2010 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Note: As manifesto data and newspaper data follow an identical data structure, this summary applies to 
both data sets. 
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Separate models for manifestos and media data with interaction effects 
 
Table 14: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience separately for man-
ifesto and media data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Manifesto 
only 
Media only Manifesto 
only 
Media only 
     
Systemic salience (std.) 0.24** 0.44** 0.24** 0.48** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership 0.49** 0.83** 0.48** 0.81** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Vote share -0.03 0.15** -0.05* 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership*Vote 
share 
-0.03 -0.30**   
 (0.04) (0.06)   
Systemic salience*Vote 
share 
  0.02 0.10** 
   (0.02) (0.03) 
Left-right position -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Constant -1.75** -1.91** -1.75** -1.97** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) 
Observations 990 990 990 990 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 
AIC 675 750 675 751 
BIC 895 970 895 971 
Log pseudo likelihood -292 -330 -292 -330 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Alternative model specifications 
 
Table 15: Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models of issue 
salience with two-way interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Poisson Poisson ZINB ZINB 
Systemic salience 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Issue ownership 0.47** 0.57** 0.53** 0.63** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Source (Media=1) 0.17** 0.42** 0.28** 0.53** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.20**  0.22**  
 (0.06)  (0.08)  
Systemic sali-
ence*Source 
 -0.01**  -0.02** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Vote share -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right position -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Constant 1.92** 1.81** 1.69** 1.61** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Logit equation     
Government party (in-
flate) 
  -435.37 -32.90** 
   (.) (3.56) 
Constant   -3.34** -3.25** 
   (0.24) (0.22) 
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 
AIC 15346 15340 12160 12156 
BIC 15604 15597 12429 12430 
Log pseudo likelihood -7627 -7624 -6032 -6029 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for elec-
tions (34) and issues (6); overdispersion coefficient  in ZINB models significantly (p<0.01) larger 
than 0; ZINB model (3) does not converge after 100 iterations; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 16: Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial models of issue salience 
with three-way interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Poisson Poisson ZINB ZINB 
Systemic salience 0.05** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Issue ownership 0.48** 0.57** 0.53** 0.62** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Source (Media=1) 0.19** 0.41** 0.28** 0.51** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.18**  0.22**  
 (0.06)  (0.08)  
Systemic salience*Source  -0.01**  -0.01** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Vote share -0.04+ -0.06 -0.04+ -0.07+ 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Issue ownership*Vote share -0.03  -0.07+  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  
Systemic salience*Vote share  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Source*Vote share 0.18** -0.03 0.13** -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Issue ownership*Source*Vote 
share 
-0.21**  -0.17**  
 (0.06)  (0.07)  
Systemic salience*Source*Vote 
share 
 0.01**  0.02** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Left-right position -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.92** 1.77** 1.70** 1.63** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Logit equation     
Government party (inflate)   -4.71 -97.33 
   (9.38) (.) 
Constant   -3.43** -3.19** 
   (0.26) (0.21) 
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 
AIC 15162 15243 12131 12134 
BIC 15436 15517 12422 12420 
Log pseudo likelihood -7532 -7573 -6014 -6016 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for elec-
tions (34) and issues (6); overdispersion coefficient  in ZINB models significantly (p<0.01) larger 
than 0; ZINB model (4) does not converge after 100 iterations; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
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Table 17: Negative binomial regression models of issue salience  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Systemic salience 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Issue ownership 0.53** 0.66** 0.53** 0.65** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Source (Media=1) 0.26** 0.50** 0.26** 0.48** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.25*  0.25*  
 (0.12)  (0.11)  
Systemic salience*Source  -0.02**  -0.01** 
  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Vote share -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Issue ownership*Vote share   -0.08  
   (0.05)  
Systemic salience*Vote share    -0.00 
    (0.00) 
Source*Vote share   0.16** -0.04 
   (0.03) (0.06) 
Issue ownership*Source*Vote 
share 
  -0.19*  
   (0.09)  
Systemic salience*Source*Vote 
share 
   0.02** 
    (0.00) 
Left-right position -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.62** 1.54** 1.63** 1.48** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 
AIC 12187 12187 12143 12161 
BIC 12411 12410 12367 12384 
Log pseudo likelihood -6054 -6053 -6032 -6040 
Note: Cluster robust standard errors (for parties) in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not 
reported) for elections (34) and issues (6); overdispersion coefficient  significantly (p<0.01) larger 
than 0; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 18: Negative binomial regression models of issue salience with lagged sys-
temic salience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Systemic salience (Lag) 0.03** 0.04** 0.03** 0.04** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Issue ownership 0.50** 0.61** 0.50** 0.60** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.24** 0.61** 0.23** 0.60** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.22*  0.22*  
 (0.09)  (0.09)  
Systemic salience (Lag)*Source  -0.03**  -0.03** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Vote share -0.03 -0.04+ -0.04 -0.08+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Issue ownership*Vote share   -0.10*  
   (0.05)  
Systemic salience (Lag)*Vote share    0.00 
    (0.00) 
Source *Vote share   0.14** -0.01 
   (0.04) (0.07) 
Issue ownership*Source*Vote share   -0.21*  
   (0.08)  
Systemic salience (Lag)*Source*Vote 
share 
   0.01+ 
      (0.00) 
Left-right position -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 2.22** 2.09** 2.23** 2.06** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Observations 1488 1488 1488 1488 
AIC 9222 9193 9194 9192 
BIC 9440 9411 9427 9426 
Log pseudo likelihood -4570 -4556 -4553 -4552 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for elec-
tions (34) and issues (6); overdispersion coefficient  significantly (p<0.01) larger than 0; + p < 0.1, * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 19: Negative binomial regression models of issue salience with nicheness 
indicator 
 (1) (2) 
Systemic salience 0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Issue ownership 0.51** 0.62** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Source (Media=1) 0.26** 0.48** 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.24**  
 (0.07)  
Systemic salience*Source  -0.01** 
  (0.00) 
Nicheness  0.03 0.14** 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
Issue ownership*Nicheness 0.11+  
 (0.06)  
Systemic salience*Nicheness  -0.01* 
  (0.00) 
Source*Nicheness  -0.11** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.08) 
Issue ownership*Source*Nicheness 0.20*  
 (0.09)  
Systemic sali-
ence*Source*Nicheness 
 -0.01+ 
  (0.01) 
Left-right position -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.04 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.65** 1.52** 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Observations 1980 1980 
AIC 12154 12172 
BIC 12433 12452 
Log pseudo likelihood -6027 -6036 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for elec-
tions (34) and issues (6); overdispersion coefficient  significantly (p<0.01) larger than 0; + p < 0.1, * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Re-estimations of all models shown in the main text by excluding each issue once 
 
In this part of the Appendix, we assess the robustness of the dichotomous operational-
isation of issue ownership by re-estimating all models six times, each time excluding 
one issue category. In the following, each table refers to one re-estimated model of 
the main text and each table column refers to the excluded issue. 
 
Table 20: Re-estimations of Model (1) in Table 2 excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ronment 
       
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.27** 0.16** 0.28** 0.24** 0.23** 0.21** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership 0.38** 0.53** 0.60** 0.48** 0.46** 0.39** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Vote share -0.04 -0.06* -0.06* -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right position 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -1.83** -1.65** -1.97** -1.70** -1.71** -1.70** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 825 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.10 
AIC 502 518 560 620 642 596 
BIC 704 721 763 823 844 799 
Log pseudo likeli-
hood 
-208 -216 -237 -267 -278 -255 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 21: Re-estimations of Model (2) in Table 2excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ronment 
       
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.49** 0.49** 0.44** 0.43** 0.45** 0.41** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue ownership 0.94** 0.96** 0.94** 0.85** 0.69** 0.70** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Vote share 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05+ 0.08** 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Left-right position 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -2.04** -2.03** -2.04** -1.99** -1.94** -1.93** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 825 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
AIC 587 594 653 673 652 660 
BIC 790 797 856 876 855 863 
Log pseudo likeli-
hood 
-250 -254 -283 -294 -283 -287 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 22: Re-estimations of Model (3) in Table 2 excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ronment 
       
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.52** 0.47** 0.43** 0.40** 0.36** 0.40** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.46** 0.69** 0.66** 0.55** 0.50** 0.46** 
 0.52** 0.47** 0.43** 0.40** 0.36** 0.40** 
Source (Media=1) 0.19** 0.27** 0.24** 0.17** 0.11** 0.19** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue owner-
ship*Source 
0.44** 0.19* 0.27** 0.26** 0.14+ 0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Vote share -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right position 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.23** -2.21** -2.23** -2.06** -1.93** -2.06** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
AIC 1013 1039 1138 1219 1215 1183 
BIC 1256 1282 1381 1462 1458 1426 
Log pseudo likeli-
hood 
-461 -474 -524 -564 -562 -546 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 23: Re-estimations of Model (4) in Table 2 excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ronment 
       
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.57** 0.50** 0.49** 0.45** 0.35** 0.44** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.70** 0.79** 0.80** 0.68** 0.57** 0.57** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.35** 0.35** 0.42** 0.32** 0.15** 0.34** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Systemic sali-
ence*Source 
-0.13** -0.10* -0.16** -0.11** 0.01 -0.13** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Vote share -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right position 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.30** -2.24** -2.31** -2.14** -1.95** -2.14** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
AIC 1014 1039 1137 1219 1215 1182 
BIC 1257 1282 1381 1462 1458 1426 
Log pseudo likelihood -462 -474 -524 -564 -562 -546 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 24: Re-estimations of Model (1) in Table 3 excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ronment 
       
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.52** 0.48** 0.43** 0.41** 0.37** 0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.44** 0.69** 0.69** 0.56** 0.52** 0.47** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.20** 0.28** 0.27** 0.18** 0.13** 0.21** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue owner-
ship*Source 
0.41** 0.18+ 0.24** 0.24** 0.12+ 0.21* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Vote share -0.01 -0.07* -0.04 -0.05 -0.05+ -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership* 
Vote share 
-0.10+ -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Source*Vote share 0.17** 0.18** 0.23** 0.22** 0.21** 0.21** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Issue owner-
ship*Source* 
-0.25** -0.18* -0.34** -0.28** -0.19** -0.24** 
 Vote share (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Left-right position 0.00+ -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.18** -2.20** -2.20** -2.04** -1.94** -2.07** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 
AIC 1017 1044 1140 1223 1219 1187 
BIC 1277 1303 1400 1482 1478 1447 
Log pseudo likelihood -460 -474 -522 -563 -561 -546 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 25: Re-estimations of Model (2) in Table 3 excluding each issue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
excluding Welfare eco-lib/ 
budget 
cult-lib Europe Immi-
gration 
envi-
ron-
ment 
       
Systemic salience (std.) 0.58** 0.52** 0.50** 0.46** 0.37** 0.46** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.68** 0.78** 0.79** 0.66** 0.57** 0.57** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.37** 0.38** 0.44** 0.33** 0.17** 0.35** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Systemic sali-
ence*Source 
-0.11* -0.06 -0.13** -0.08* 0.04 -0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Vote share -0.04 -0.08* -0.08** -0.06* -0.07* -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Systemic salience*  0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 Vote share (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Source*Vote share 0.07+ 0.11** 0.09* 0.09* 0.14** 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Systemic salience* 0.07 0.15** 0.11** 0.11** 0.07+ 0.10** 
 Source*Vote 
share 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Left-right position 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.31** -2.27** -2.34** -2.16** -1.98** -2.17** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 
AIC 1019 1043 1142 1224 1220 1187 
BIC 1279 1303 1402 1483 1479 1447 
Log pseudo likelihood -462 -474 -523 -564 -562 -546 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (5); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Re-estimations of regression models separately for different newspaper types 
 
Table 26: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience as in Table 3 (Mod-
el 2) of the main document but separately for different newspaper types 
 (1) (2) 
 Media only 
Quality 
Media only 
Tabloid 
   
Systemic salience (std.) 0.38** 0.49** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Issue ownership 0.80** 0.79** 
 (0.06) (0.08) 
Vote share 0.03 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Left-right 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) 
Constant -1.82** -1.93** 
 (0.17) (0.18) 
Observations 924 870 
AIC 702 673 
BIC 914 882 
ll -306.88 -292.28 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Deviations in the number of observations 
between models are due to too few observations (<20) in either quality or tabloid newspapers.
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Table 27: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience as in Table 3 (Mod-
el 3 and 4) of the main document but separately for different newspaper types  
 (1) 
Interaction w/ 
ownership 
(2) 
Interaction w/ 
ownership 
(2) 
Interaction w/ 
sys. salience 
(4) 
Interaction w/ 
sys. salience 
 Quality Tabloid Quality Tabloid 
     
Systemic salience 
(std.) 
0.38** 0.45** 0.43** 0.48** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.55** 0.52** 0.66** 0.66** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Vote share -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Left-right -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Newspaper 0.19** 0.52** 0.32** 0.35** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Issue owner-
ship*Source 
0.23** 0.25**   
 (0.08) (0.05)   
Systemic sali-
ence*Source 
  -0.13** -0.05 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.01** -2.13** -2.07** -0.05 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) 
Observations 1,848 1,740 1,848 1,740 
AIC 1,258 1,192 1,258 1,192 
BIC 1,512 1,443 1,512 1,444 
ll -583.13 -550.00 -582.99 -550.22 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Deviations in the number of observations 
between models are due to too few observations (<20) in either quality or tabloid newspapers.  
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Table 28: Fractional logit regression models of issue salience with three-way in-
teractions  
(As in Table 3 (M1, M2) of the chapter but separately for different newspaper types) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Interaction  
Ownership 
Interaction  
Ownership 
Interaction  
sys. sal. 
Interaction w/ 
sys. sal. 
 Tabloids Quality Tabloids Quality 
     
Systemic salience (std.) 0.45** 0.39** 0.49** 0.44** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Issue ownership 0.53** 0.56** 0.65** 0.65** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Source (Media=1) 0.26** 0.21** 0.37** 0.34** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Issue ownership*Source 0.23* 0.21**   
 (0.09) (0.07)   
Vote share -0.04+ -0.05 -0.06* -0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Issue ownership*Vote share -0.01 -0.03   
 (0.04) (0.04)   
Source*Vote share 0.20** 0.19** 0.09* 0.08+ 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Systemic salience*Source   -0.03 -0.11** 
   (0.04) (0.03) 
Systemic salience*Vote share   0.01 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Issue owner-
ship*Source*Vote share 
-0.29** -0.23**   
 (0.07) (0.07)   
     
Systemic sali-
ence*Source*Vote share 
  0.08* 0.10* 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Left-right position -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government party -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -2.11** -1.99** -2.22** -2.09** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
Observations 1,740 1,848 1,740 1,848 
AIC 1,196 1,263 1,197 1,263 
BIC 1,464 1,533 1,465 1,534 
ll -549.01 -582.29 -549.72 -582.57 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; all models include fixed-effects (not reported) for 
elections (34) and issues (6); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Deviations in the number of observations 
between models are due to too few observations (<20) in either quality or tabloid newspapers.  
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Table 29: Overview of issue categories used in the study 
Issue cate-
gory 
Description/Examples Categories from BES 2015 
Welfare Welfare (in general), Health care, Retirement, 
Employment, Family, Consumer, Redistribu-
tion, Disabled, Housing 
poverty, living standards, social 
inequalities, welfare fraud, class 
difference, nhs, aging population, 
pensions, youth, housing 
Economy Economy (in general), Jobs, Labour market, 
Wage, Free trade, Agriculture, Fi-
nance/Banking, Enterprises, Competition, De-
regulation, Privatization, Corporatism, Promo-
tion 
economy general, inflation, unem-
ployment 
Budget/Tax Taxation, Budget, National Debt consumer debt, taxation, 
services-spending 
Cultural Liberal-
ism 
Nationalism, Cultural/Religious tolerance, Gen-
der, LGBT, Human rights, Abortion, Drugs, 
Democracy, Data privacy, Civil Society, Racism 
civil liberties 
Europe European Integration, Deepening, Enlargement, 
Euro, Common Policies, Referendum, Inst. 
Reform 
Europe 
Education/Culture Culture and education (in general), Prima-
ry/secondary education, University, Arts, 
Sports, Media, Science 
Education 
Immigration Immigration (in general), Integration, Refugees, 
Islam 
Immigration 
Defence Defence (in general), Military 
Infrastructure and manpower 
national security 
Security Security (in general), Corruption, Police, Secret 
agencies, Judicial, Terrorism, Crime, Guns 
Crime 
Environment Environment (in general), Pollution, Climate 
change 
Environment 
Energy Energy politics - 
Institutional re-
form 
Institutional reform (in general), Decentraliza-
tion, Efficiency, Accountability, Separation of 
powers, Citizen based democracy 
scot const, constitutional 
Foreign relations International cooperation, Development Aid, 
Peace, Disarmament, Humanitarian interven-
tions 
international probs, Iraq war 
Infrastructure Roads, Airports, Cycling, Trains - 
Note: Issue categories from the British Election Study Internet Panel (BES 2015) are based on the original 
auto-coding of the most important issue variable (miilabel) (Fieldhouse et al. 2015). For Energy and Infra-
structure no corresponding categories exist in the BES 2015. 
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Classification of Tweets 
This appendix shows how the Tweets analysed in the main article were pre-processed 
and classified into different issue categories using a machine learning approach based 
on support vector machine.  
First, the order of the words in the documents is discarded. Of course, this step strips 
information since the order of words in a sentence is crucial for its meaning. Assum-
ing that the same information is however provided several times in different manners, 
the remaining “bag of words“ is expected to fit the purpose of the analysis (Hopkins 
and King 2010: 232). Second, punctuations and numbers, which are not expected to 
carry any valuable information about a party's issue emphasis, were deleted. Third, all 
content was transformed to lowercase in order to avoid that the classification algo-
rithm discriminates between the same words written either in lower- or uppercase. 
Fourth, stop words were removed. While such words are important for human readers 
to understand a written document, they are unlikely to carry any information about 
the issue category addressed in a document. Fifth, special characters indicating a 
word as a hash tag or a linked name were deleted. This ensures that words are treated 
equally by the classifier regardless of their use as a link or as plain text. Finally, 
stemming of the remaining words in the corpus was applied. This step removes the 
ends of words in a way that terms referring to the same concept are treated equally in 
order the reduce the complexity of the data set (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 272). 
The cleaned corpus was transformed into a document-term-matrix. This matrix con-
sists of a vector for each observation in the corpus which counts the number of times 
each unique word stem occurs in the document. Sparse terms not appearing in at least 
one in 1.000 of the documents were excluded from the analysis. The resulting docu-
ment-term-matrix consists of 22.091 documents and 1.150 unique terms. With 
134,147 non-sparse entries the sparsity of the data amounts to 99.5 percent. 
Machine learning in general has proven to be particularly helpful to analyze vast 
amounts of political text (Burscher et al. 2015; D’Orazio et al. 2014; Grimmer and 
Stewart 2013; Hillard et al. 2008; Minhas et al. 2015). The basic idea behind such 
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approaches is to manually assign issue categories to a representative sample of all 
observations in the data set to train a classifier that can be used to label the remaining 
documents.  
Support vector machine is a particularly powerful classifier to explore topical affilia-
tions that is based on a geometrical representation of the data. For a two-class classi-
fication problem, it starts with a training set of N pairs 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖 with 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑃 being a p-
vector for the i-th observation and 𝑥𝑖 ∈ {−1, +1} being the binary response of predic-
tors (Hastie et al. 2004). Based on this information a decision function needs to be 
found that predicts y also for unknown x. This task is performed using a hyperplane. 
Hyperplanes are subspaces with one dimension less than the actual vector space and 
can be defined by x: f(x)=𝑥𝑇𝐵 + 𝐵0 = 0, where B is a unit vector with |B|=1. In a 
two-dimensional setting, a hyperplane is simply a line. The idea is then to find the 
line that maximizes the margin of separation between the training set points -1 and 1. 
The classifier to perform this task is defined as Class(x)=sign[f(x)] (see Hastie et al., 
2004: 1392). The resulting decision rule can then be used to classify the remaining 
unlabelled documents not part of the training set on one or the other side of that hy-
perplane, which results in a classification of all unlabelled documents. In the case of 
more than two dimensions, the visualization of a hyperplane becomes difficult. How-
ever, the approach can still be used by treating these more dimensions as several two-
class classification problems (James et al. 2014: 355). 
To apply the derived coding scheme shown in Appendix A to this labelling approach, 
a representative sample of all the documents under study was drawn from the down-
loaded data. The selection process considers that the data consists of observations 
coming from different subgroups (parties). In such a case, standard machine learning 
methods require the observations to be randomly selected within each of these groups 
to avoid biased classification results (Hopkins and King 2010: 234). In total, a ran-
dom sample of 500 Tweets was selected for each party. This results in a total of 3,000 
manually coded observations. Again, a random selection of 2,500 of these labelled 
Tweets serves as a training set for the remaining unlabelled data and 500 Tweets con-
stitute the test set to explore the performance of the classifier. 
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The classification was performed using the Rtexttools package for R from Jurka et al. 
(2013) that allows to estimate and test support vector machine models. The number of 
documents in the test set that are correctly classified in relation to all documents gives 
a first impression of the overall performance of the algorithm. For the 15 categories 
outlined above, a score of 0.84 is reached. Compared to other supervised learning 
approaches based on equally complex classification schemes (Burscher et al. 2015; 
Hillard et al. 2008), this result allows to conclude that the method works reasonably 
well.  
A high degree of overall prediction accuracy does however not automatically rule out 
the possibility of the classifier being biased (Hopkins and King 2010: 234). This 
makes it necessary to check, how the algorithm performs for different issue catego-
ries. For this task, Figure 19 shows a confusion matrix that reports the sum of pre-
dicted and true classifications in the test set. The results indicate that the model per-
forms well since most observations are true positives that are located on a diagonal 
from the lower left to the upper right. Moreover, it becomes obvious that extremely 
few observations are wrongly classified to a different issue. On the clear majority of 
incorrect classified observations, these are labelled "no issue". To explore, how this 
affects the results, Figure 20 contrasts the predicted and the manually coded salience 
scores for all policy issues based on the test set. The relatively small differences be-
tween these two variables show that the classification yields very satisfying results. 
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Figure 19: Confusion matrix 
 
Note: The figure shows a confusion matrix which plots the predicted issue categories against the man-
ually coded categories in the test set (n=500). All entries on a diagonal axis from the bottom left to the 
upper right indicate correct classifications. The overall accuracy of the prediction is 84%.  
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Figure 20: Predicted and manually coded salience scores in comparison 
 
Note: The figure shows the salience scores predicted by the svm-classifier (black) and the manual 
coding (white) of the same 3000 Tweets for all issue categories. 
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Coding of party manifestos 
To code the manifestos of the party under study, it is taken into account that the struc-
ture of these document features significant differences to social media data. Most 
importantly, text is nested in large and complexly structured documents, which re-
quires careful unitizing before such texts can be used to measure issue salience. Here, 
the study relies on the core sentence approach. The method was developed by 
Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001) and successfully adopted to study issue salience 
and party positions by Kriesi et al. (2008). Dolezal et al. (2016) have then demon-
strated that the core sentence approach works well to study issue salience in party 
manifestos. Using this method, a random sample of 25 percent of the grammatical 
sentences in each manifesto was randomly chosen from each manifesto and manually 
coded. In total, 1.903 core sentences are coded (Conservatives: 361, Greens: 437, 
Labour: 239, LibDems: 377, SNP: 197, UKIP: 292).  
To ensure that this sampling does not bias the results, one manifesto (UKIP) is coded 
completely in order to provide a test for the employed research strategy, especially 
the sampling and coding of 25 percent of the grammatical sentences in each manifes-
to. Figure 21 shows a scatterplot of the salience scores based on the sample and the 
fully coded manifesto. Due to the very high correlation (r = 0.98) of the sample and 
the fully coded manifesto, it is concluded that the sampling method does not bias the 
results presented in the paper.  
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Figure 21: Comparison of salience scores from sampled and full manifesto 
 
Note: The graph shows the relationship between the salience scores of the sampled 
manifesto of UKIP and the results from the full coding of the same manifesto. 
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Parties and Facebook accounts covered by the study 
We focus on all national parties included in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES) that gained at least five percent of the national vote in the 2014 EP election. 
In cases where multiple national parties formed alliances to campaign for the election, 
we only included them in the study, when the alliance obtained more than five per-
cent of the national vote. This threshold excludes extremely small parties with low 
levels of public visibility that hardly affected the content of the election campaign. 
Additional information on individual parties that could not be integrated in the analy-
sis are provided in the notes below Table 30. 
The getPage function included in the Rfacebook package allows posts on public pag-
es, such as the accounts of political parties on Facebook, to be downloaded. Almost 
all the parties included in this study run such accounts. To avoid confusion with so-
called 'fake accounts', the great majority of parties have verified that the pages studied 
are maintained by party officials. When an account was not verified, we additionally 
checked that we had collected data from the official party account by visiting the par-
ty’s official homepage to test whether the link to the party’s Facebook page provided 
there matches the account we identified. Table 30 provides an overview of all parties 
and accounts used in the analysis as well the number of posts analysed.  
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Table 30: List of parties, included Facebook accounts and number of observa-
tions 
Country Party Facebook account name N 
Austria  ÖVP Volkspartei 67 
(N=833) SPÖ Sozialdemokratie 125 
 
FPÖ HCStrache 404 
 
Grüne Diegruenen 125 
 
NEOS NeosDasNeueOesterreich 112 
Belgium Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams Cdenv 140 
(N=953) Groen groen.be 309 
 Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie nieuwvlaamsealliantie 117 
 Open Vlaamse Liberalen en De-
mocraten 
openvld 82 
 Socialistische Partij Anders Vlaamse.socialisten 130 
 Vlaams Belang vlbelang 175 
France Front National FN.officiel 181 
(N=1,216) Parti radical du gauche PartiRadicaldeGauche 97 
 
Parti socialiste Partisocialiste 309 
 
MoDem Mouvementdemocrate 32 
 
Les Verts e.ecologie 5 
 
Parti Communiste Français Cnpcf 21 
 
Parti de gauche partidegauche.national 533 
 
Ensemble ensemble.frontdegauche 38 
Germany  CDU CDU 139 
(N=769) CSU CSU 84 
 
SPD SPD 258 
 
AfD Alternativefuerde 141 
 
Grüne B90DieGruenen 59 
 
Linke Linkspartei 88 
Hungaria  Fidesz FideszHU 222 
(N=1,574) MSZP Mszpfb 207 
 
DK dk365 450 
 
Együtt Egyuttkorszakvaltok 176 
 
LMP Lehetmas 312 
 
JOBBIK JobbikMagyarorszagertMozgalom 207 
Ireland Fine Gael FineGael 60 
(N=296) Fianna Fáil Party Fiannafail 17 
 
Labour Party Thelabourparty 127 
 
Sinn Féin Sinnfein 92 
Italy  Partito Democratico partitodemocratico.it 126 
(N=859) Movimento Cinque Stelle Movimentocinquestelle 400 
 
Forza Italia ForzaItaliaUfficiale 121 
 
Lega Nord LegaNordUfficiale 212 
Luxem-
bourg 
(N=275) 
Alternativ Demokratesch Reform-
partei 
AlternativDemokrateschReformpartei 22 
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 Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei csv.lu 82 
 Déi Gréng deigreng 28 
 Demokratesch Partei demokrateschpartei 51 
 Déi Lénk lenk.lu 30 
 Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aar-
bechterpartei 
lsap.lu 62 
Poland  Platforma Obywatelska PlatformaObywatelska 116 
(N=973) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Pisorgpl 42 
 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej Sojusz 547 
 
Kongres Nowej Prawicy KongresNowejPrawicy 263 
 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe nowePSL 5 
Portugal Partido Socialista SedeNacionalPartidoSocialista 244 
(N=671) Partido Social Democrata Ppdpsd 408 
 
Partido da Terra PartidodaTerraMPT 19 
Spain Partido Popular Pp 384 
(N=1,409) Partido Socialista Obrero Español Psoe 152 
 
Izquierda Unida izquierda.unida 187 
 
Podemos Ahorapodemos 491 
 
UPyD Union.Progreso.y.Democracia 157 
 
Convergència Democràtica de Cata-
lunya 
Convergenciacat 20 
 
Unió Democràtica de Catalunya unio.cat 18 
Sweden 
(N=1,222) 
Socialdemokraterna Socialdemokraterna 88 
 
Miljöpartiet de gröna Miljopartiet 61 
 
Moderata Samlingspartiet Moderaterna 109 
 
Folkpartiet liberalerna Liberalernas 288 
 
Centerpartiet Centerpartiet 149 
 
Vänsterpartiet Vansterpartiet 132 
 
Kristdemokraterna Kristdemokraterna 89 
 
Feministiskt initiative Feministisktinitiativ 306 
UK  Conservatives Conservatives 79 
(N=698) Labour Labourparty 103 
 
Libdems Libdems 109 
 
Greens Thegreenparty 120 
 
UKIP UKIP 287 
  N=11,747 
Note: Even though some parties not included in this table also reached more than 5 percent of the vote 
in the 2014 EP election, they are not included in the study for two different reasons. First, the French 
Union pour un mouvement populaire, the Portuguese Centro Democratico and the Swedish Sverige-
demokraterna had to be excluded due to missing information about their behaviour on Facebook as 
these parties’ posts are no longer publicly available. Second, the following parties are not included, 
because no data is available for them in the CHES 2014: Parti del Socialistes de Catalunya (Spain), 
Grupa Vasco (Spain), Catalunia Verds (Spain), ANOVA-Irmandade Nacionalista (Spain), Partido 
Comunista Portugues (Portugal), Partido Ecologista os Verdes (Portugal), Párbeszéd Magyarországért 
(Hungary), Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Hungary), Union des démocrates et indépendants (France).  
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Coding of individual posts 
The classification was performed by trained human coders with respective language 
skills. The coding is based on the following scheme. We coded four variables: the 
general topic of a message (1), the mention of a Spitzenkandidaten (2), the name of 
the Spitzenkandidaten if one or more were mentioned (3) and the tone of a 
Spitzenkandidaten mention (4).  
- First, we code a variable (EP) that distinguishes between messages in two cat-
egories: 
- Messages related to the European Parliament elections (1).  
- Other messages (0) 
- Second, we code a dichotomous variable (SPITZENKANDIDATEN) that 
tells us something about the use of the Spitzenkandidaten: 
- Messages with no mention of the concept of the Spitzenkandidaten or 
one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten themselves (Jean-Claude Junck-
er, Martin Schulz, Ska Keller, José Bové, Alexis Tsipras, and Guy 
Verhofstadt). (0)  
- Messages with any mention of the concept of the Spitzenkandidaten 
and/or one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten themselves (Jean-Claude 
Juncker, Martin Schulz, Ska Keller, José Bové, Alexis Tsipras, and 
Guy Verhofstadt). (1) 
Note: For the dependent variable used in the study, we only coded this 
variable with 1 if one of the candidates is mentioned in person. 
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- Third, if one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten is mentioned, we code their 
names in a separate string variable (NAME_1, NAME _2, etc.): 
- Messages with no mention of one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten 
themselves are left blank. 
- Messages with mentions of one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten: 
(“Name, Surname”). 
 
- Fourth, we coded a dichotomous variable to capture the tone of a candidate 
mention. 
- Messages with a positive or neutral mention of a candidate (0). 
- Messages with a negative mention of a candidate (1).  
Note: Posts that include no plain text at all were not included in the overall analysis. 
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Further information on variables used in the study 
Table 31: Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Spitzenkandidaten 1  2.95 6.35 0 39.92 
Party affiliation   0.07 0.25 0 1 
Home country 2  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Nominated 3,4  0.64 0.48 0 1 
Candidate party congruence (EU dimension) 5  0.77 0.97 0 4.29 
Candidate party congruence (LR dimension) 5  0.89 0.86 0 3.30 
Left-Right  5.13 2.40 0.50 9.71 
Gov. party  0.36 0.49 0 1 
Vote share  0.17 0.12 0.05 0.68 
EU salience  6.01 1.58 3 9.54 
Length of message (log-transformed)  5.13 2.40 0.5 9.71 
Campaign day  35.62 5.43 1 62 
Note: The total number of observations is 11,747. Observations are clustered in 13 countries and 73 
parties. Means are calculated for individual parties.  
 
Additional remarks on the variables used in the study:  
1 It is important to note that this measure of salience is indifferent to a party’s position 
on a candidate in a given message. Additional analyses show that 94.8% percent of 
messages that mention a candidate are positive or neutral in tone, while only 5.2 are 
decidedly negative. Including only positive and neutral mentions does not alter the 
results presented in the manuscript. Moreover, the concept of Spitzenkandidaten as 
such, without a mention of one of the candidates in person, played a negligible role in 
the campaigns of all the parties under study. Among the total of 11,748 observations 
in our data set, there are only 29 cases in which only the institutional innovation of 
the Spitzenkandidaten, but no candidate name is mentioned. We therefore focus ex-
clusively on the persons nominated.  
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2 The candidates were from Luxembourg (Jean-Claude Juncker), Germany (Martin 
Schulz and Ska Keller), Belgium (Guy Verhofstadt), France (José Bové) and Greece 
(Alexis Tsipras).  
3 The British Labour party was a special case in this regard. It belongs to the Party 
group of European Socialists, which nominated Martin Schulz as their lead candidate. 
However, the party abstained from this nomination. Thus, we code the party as not 
taking part in the nomination of a candidate.  
4 Moreover, due the high correlation of a party’s position on European integration 
provided in the CHES 2014 data set with our variable indicating whether a party 
nominated a lead candidate (r = .66), we do not include this variable in our analysis to 
avoid problems of multicollinearity.  
5 For congruence between candidate and party values only exist for the 47 parties 
which nominated a candidate (N=6,685). 
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Different model specification 
Table 32: Exploring emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten (multilevel models) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Nominated 1.866*** -0.468      1.380** 
 (0.458) (2.433)      (0.493) 
National 
Party affilia-
tion 
 2.191***   2.144*** 2.672***  2.101*** 
  (0.572)   (0.374) (0.657)  (0.566) 
Congruence 
(EU) 
  -0.600*  -0.0652    
   (0.300)  (0.232)    
Congruence 
(LR) 
   -
1.012*** 
-0.924***    
    (0.276) (0.211)    
Home coun-
try 
 1.092   0.984  1.882** 1.108 
  (0.617)   (0.570)  (0.656) (0.623) 
Position 
(voters) 
 0.0363   0.381   0.191 
  (0.303)   (0.256)   (0.234) 
Nominated # 
Position 
(voters) 
 0.310       
  (0.400)       
EU salience  0.0775   0.0661   0.102 
  (0.153)   (0.180)   (0.151) 
Left-right 
(general) 
 -0.169   -0.330***   -0.148 
  (0.096)   (0.078)   (0.093) 
Government 
party 
 -0.0998   -0.0267   -0.154 
  (0.392)   (0.300)   (0.390) 
Vote share  1.405   0.837   1.194 
  (1.716)   (2.056)   (1.707) 
Campaign 
day 
 0.0248***   0.0234***   0.0248*** 
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Length of 
message 
 0.373***   0.333***   0.372*** 
  (0.084)   (0.087)   (0.084) 
_cons -
6.089*** 
-9.134*** -
3.785*** 
-
3.419*** 
-7.871*** -
4.957*** 
-
5.520*** 
-10.19*** 
 (0.527) (2.233) (0.419) (0.437) (1.732) (0.363) (0.424) (1.824) 
lns1_1_1         
_cons 0.156 -0.206 -0.0166 0.192 -0.260 0.0148 -0.222 -0.196 
 (0.276) (0.305) (0.357) (0.295) (0.271) (0.303) (0.414) (0.305) 
lns2_1_1         
_cons 0.135 -0.218 0.114 -0.177 -23.92 0.126 0.352* -0.198 
 (0.167) (0.226) (0.200) (0.237) (3.680e+09) (0.169) (0.151) (0.222) 
N 11,747 11,747 6,685 6,685 6,685 11,747 11,747 11,747 
Note: Results are based on multi-level logistic regression models with Spitzenkandidaten mentions as 
the dependent variable and observations nested in countries and parties. Included variables are identi-
cal to the models presented in Table 6 of the main article. To foster interpretation of the coefficient for 
the interaction term in Model 2, a marginal effect plot is presented as well (see below). Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 01. 
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Figure 22: Marginal effect plot based on Model 2 in Table 32 
 
Note: Marginal effects are based on Model 2 in Table 32. The spikes represent the confidence intervals 
at the 95 percent level. 
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Mechanisms behind individual hypotheses on Spitzenkandidaten mentions 
All hypotheses outlined in the article make claims about the overall attention parties 
devote to the Spitzenkandidaten. However, one might argue that the mechanisms be-
hind the derived hypotheses lead to the expectation that a party only or particularly 
emphasises the same candidate it nominated (H1, H2, H3), the candidate who is from 
its own party (H4) and the candidates who are from its own country (H5). To explore 
the postulated mechanism behind greater attention on the Spitzenkandidaten in these 
hypotheses, we additionally measure our dependent variable in a way that is sensitive 
to attention towards specific candidates. The results presented below, corroborate that 
the mechanisms suggested in our hypotheses are responsible for the effects presented 
in our main findings. 
To explore this point in more detail, we estimate logistic regression models treating 
Spitzenkandidaten mentions as the dependent variable like the analysis presented in 
Table 6 of the main article, but with the dependent variable measured to more neatly 
fit the mechanisms at work as suggested in our individual hypotheses. For this task, 
we take advantage of the fact that our coding scheme differentiates between mentions 
of the Spitzenkandidaten in person (see Appendix B). Based on this information, we 
calculate a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 only when the candidate is men-
tioned that a specific party nominated (H1, H2, H3, and H4). Similarly, we construct 
a dependent variable to explore the idea that parties put the spotlight particularly on 
the Spitzenkandidaten when one is affiliated to the party, as hypothesized in H5. This 
variable only takes a value of 1 when the party to which one of the candidates be-
longs mentioned this specific candidate in the message. Moreover, to test H6 in more 
detail, we only coded the dependent variable as 1 if a candidate from the same coun-
try as the respective party was mentioned. All models support our initial findings. In 
these specifications of the dependent variable, we find a statistically significant effect 
for our independent variables as well. Only the effect of the home country variable 
fails to reach statistical significance as it is also the case in Model 5 and Model 8 pre-
sented in Table 6. We therefore conclude that the mechanisms suggested in our hy-
potheses are responsible for the effects presented in our main findings. 
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Table 33: Mechanisms behind the hypotheses on Spitzenkandidaten mentions 
 H1 H2 H3/H4 H5 H6 
Nominated 1.573*** -2.289  2.084*** 1.926*** 
 (0.476) (1.871)  (0.541) (0.521) 
Nominated # Position (voters)  0.653*    
  (0.301)    
Congruence (EU)   -0.668*   
   (0.289)   
Congruence (LR)   -0.857*   
   (0.340)   
National Party affiliation 1.916*** 1.926*** 1.341 1.756** 1.852*** 
 (0.514) (0.529) (0.729) (0.538) (0.484) 
Home country 0.950 0.938 1.128 0.784 0.886 
 (0.668) (0.653) (0.945) (0.611) (0.591) 
Position (voters) 0.234 -0.263 0.501*** 0.0172 0.106 
 (0.215) (0.339) (0.139) (0.218) (0.206) 
EU salience 0.348 0.302 0.211 0.345* 0.324* 
 (0.186) (0.176) (0.251) (0.167) (0.161) 
Left-right (general) -0.230*** -0.268*** -0.303** -0.308*** -0.266*** 
 (0.064) (0.080) (0.107) (0.087) (0.057) 
Government party 0.745* 0.770* 0.442 0.695 0.632* 
 (0.340) (0.391) (0.245) (0.360) (0.268) 
Vote share -0.870 -0.198 0.293 -2.014 -1.167 
 (2.121) (1.972) (2.417) (2.606) (2.011) 
Campaign day 0.0239** 0.0241** 0.0236** 0.0216** 0.0233** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Length of message 0.314*** 0.324*** 0.284*** 0.357*** 0.333*** 
 (0.076) (0.072) (0.058) (0.086) (0.064) 
cons -11.10*** -8.016** -9.217** -9.551*** -10.09*** 
 (2.729) (3.014) (2.804) (2.166) (2.215) 
N 11,748 11,748 6,685 11,748 11,748 
pseudo R2 0.262 0.265 0.255 0.224 0.247 
Note: Standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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